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Abstract
Why have some economically-active militaries of autocratic regimes gained more
autonomy vis-à-vis their civilian elite as a consequence of economic liberalization
processes adopted in 80s and 90s, whereas others have remained subordinate to civilian
control? This dissertation examines the impact of economic liberalization since 1980s on
civil-military relations (CMR) in autocratic regimes. Prior to liberalization, the centrallyplanned governments of Egypt, Iran, and China utilized their militaries to implement
economic development projects. Post-liberalization, these militaries expanded into new
economic sectors like finance, banking, and trade. The expansion impacted the balance of
CMR differently in each case. Egypt’s military took over the state, the China’s People’s
Liberation Army retreated to the domain of defense, and Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary
Guard Corps became a coalition-maker. This research argues that the modes and pace of
liberalization in general, and privatization specifically, are crucial to understanding CMR
variations. Aspects of liberalization led to varied capitalist development projects, which
conditioned the empowerment or disempowerment of militaries. If liberalization and
privatization fostered economic competitiveness, militaries had fewer opportunities for
enhancing their autonomy. Whereas if incomplete liberalization and rapid privatization did
not lead to the establishment of a competitive economy, militaries had more opportunities
to expand their autonomy.
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Introduction: Bridging the Gap: Economic Liberalization and Civil-Military
Relation

The Puzzle
The implementation of economic liberalization policies in the final decades of the
twentieth century provided an alternative path for development in closed economies that
relied on central planning. The political science literature has examined the consequences
of economic liberalization on domestic politics and economies. However, a more specific
question on the impact of such policies on economically-active militaries, and their control,
in autocratic regimes has not received much scholarly attention. In my dissertation, I
identify a puzzling outcome in terms of economically-active militaries behavior in
liberalizing economies. I explain why some economically-active militaries of autocratic
regimes have gained more autonomy vis-à-vis their civilian elite as a consequence of
economic liberalization processes adopted since 1980s, whereas others have remained
subordinate to civilian control. More specifically, in these three states, similar economic
policies led to different outcomes for civil-military relations: near-total military autonomy
in Egypt but much less in Iran and not at all in China. Why?

1

By analyzing three aspects of control, i.e. political, functional, and social control, I
argue that the specifics of liberalization and privatization impacted the control of forces
differently in each case. If haphazard economic liberalization and rapid privatization fails
to establish a competitive market economy, the economically-active militaries are more
likely to amass political power. Additionally, the militaries turn into economic interest
groups and likely outcomes are decreased functional and social controls. If a gradual
economic liberalization and private sector development fosters economic competitiveness,
economically-active militaries have fewer opportunities to amass political power.
Additionally, there are less incentives for militaries to operate as economic actors as well.
Hence, the functional and social controls either increase or remain the same.
Therefore, in three cases under study, fluctuations in the power of economicallyactive militaries vis-à-vis their civilian counterparts were a function of states’ capacity to
establish a competitive economy. In a relatively competitive economy, militaries had
higher incentives to limit their activities to the domain of defense since carrying out both
tasks of defense and economic production effectively were costly. Therefore, they were
more dependent on civilians and could not increase their political autonomy. This was the
case of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army. Conversely, in economies characterized by
cronyism, militaries were able to maintain their economic activities and to pressure the
government for more economic and political gains. This was the case of the Egyptian
Armed Forces. Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ trajectory took the middleground providing mixed outcomes: the IRGC established itself as an economic and
political player but failed to take over the government completely. Additionally, in states
2

where economically-active militaries established themselves as economic interest groups,
functional capabilities and social controls declined.
Motivation
Following the emergence of the modernization discourse after the Second World
War, autocratic regimes in several Middle Eastern and Asian countries assigned their
militaries the dual role of state defense and socio-economic development. The success of
revolutionary armies in defeating conventional armies in China, Southeast Asian countries,
Algeria, and Cuba drew attention to the role of militaries in combating domestic
revolutionary armed groups. Simultaneously, US military assistance in Latin America
underscored the role of local militaries in counterinsurgency, nation-building, and civic
action; there was an increasing belief that “professional military expertise” could be
utilized for domestic purposes, such as provision of internal security. A new perspective,
known as new-professionalism, argued for interrelated nature of politics and military. This
shift to the increasing politicization of militaries; it also resulted in militaries’ roleexpansion as governors of national development projects, particularly in states with weak
civilian governments (Stepan 1986, 136-137).
Latin American states were not the only countries that assigned development
projects to their militaries. Other states across the developing world also adopted similar
polices. Frequently, the outcome was the emergence of economically-active militaries that
not only received official budgets for defense spending, but also generated extra-budgetary
income via economic activities. In response to this development, the study of Civil-Military
Relations (CMR) also focused on the role of militaries in modernization. Scholars such as
3

Levy (1971), Needler (1971), and Quinlivan (1999) examined the changing dynamics
between civilians and militaries in modernizing economies. The focus, however, was on
destabilizing effects of modernization and possibilities for militaries’ intervention in form
of coup d’états.
For example, Levy (1971) and Needler (1971) studied the likelihood of military
coups d’états in modernizing states. Levy argued that the governments utilized careful
military recruitment policies to reduce possibilities for military coups1. Similarly, Needler
(1971) considered coups as likely consequences of deteriorating economic conditions:
dominant classes, discontent from the process of modernization, used their militaries to
stage a coup and retain the status quo. Although above-discussed studies focused on the
interrelation of economic development and coups, they failed to examine the specific
question of militaries’ economic role-expansion and their impact on local economies or
politics. Furthermore, not only they took political control as the sole measure of civilian
control, they also adopted a narrow definition of political control—coup d’états or overt
military intervention.
Coup-proofing literature was also primarily concerned with the question of coupd’états. The scholarly work that observed militaries’ economic power, did so in the context
of examining the possibilities for coups. For example, Quinlivan (1999) discussed various
coup-proofing strategies in Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Syria by identifying strategies such as
establishment of parallel militaries to counterbalance regular militaries or providing

1

Specifically in form of palace coups
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funding for militaries2 (Quinlivan, 1999: 135). Similarly, Makara examined the
effectiveness of coup-proofing strategies in Arab states of Egypt, Syria, Libya, Bahrain,
and Yemen. In states where parallel institutions or unequal distribution of material
incentives divided militaries, defections were more likely (Makara, 2013: 334-335).
Albrecht (2014) also compared the cases of Egypt and Syria and argued that those
strategies that kept officers outside of the politics, and meanwhile enhanced their corporate
autonomy, were more ineffective for the times of crisis (Albrecht, 2014: 37). The abovediscussed literature, among other things, underscored the economic aspect of military’s
susceptibility to coups. However, it overlooked a systematic study of military’s economic
role-expansion and its impact on domestic politics.
While preventing coup-d’états is a significant sign of civilian control, the empirical
evidence suggests that militaries’ intervention in politics takes various shapes, in addition
to coups. Autocracies could be immune to coups and still be vulnerable to other forms of
military influence such as military politicization by civilians or military’s interference in
governance, such as foreign policy or economic policy decision-makings. Therefore, on
the one hand, studies on the interrelation of economic development and civil-military
relations focused on a narrow definition of military interferences. One the other hand, they
did not treat those militaries engaged in developmental tasks as economic actors since they
overlooked the implications of militaries’ economic-role expansion. My dissertation
focuses on economically-active militaries specifically and treats them as economic actors.

2

Quinlivan, Coup Proofing, 135. Other coup-proofing strategies included creation of multiple intelligence
organizations for monitoring, exploitation of group loyalties (ethnic, religious, family), and fostering
military professionalism.

5

In doing so, it also draws on recent literature that problematizes a sole focus on coups, and
hence accounts for varied forms of military intervention in autocratic politics.
More recently, scholars (Feaver 1999, Taylor 2003, Avant 2005, Epstein 2008)
have theorized varied forms and aspects of control, expanding the CMR literature beyond
the study of coup d’états. Brian Taylor, in his Politics and the Russian Army: Civil–Military
Relations, 1689-2000 (2003), categorized some of those forms of interference that go
beyond coup d’états. He classified military interventions as an actual or threat of use of
force aiming at changing the executive; other forms of interference are military arbitration
when militaries become mediators between legitimate civilian actors, and no military
intervention for cases where an otherwise expected coup doesn’t occur (Taylor 2003, 7).
Similarly, Feaver (1999) also highlights the multifaceted nature of civilian control
by identifying coup d’état, military influence, civil military friction, and military
compliance as four main dependent variables commonly considered by theoretical studies
of CMR. Feaver explains that military institutions’ inclination to coups, i.e. the frequency
and likelihood of military seizures of state power, has been the focal interest of classic
literature, as in works by Huntington, Finer, Nordlinger, Bienen, Jackman. However,
according to Feaver, there are other conceptual categories, such as military influence that
acknowledge the degrees of political power militaries could exercise: arguing for a
continuum as opposed to a coup versus non-coup dichotomy (Feaver 1999, 217-219).
Epstein’s In Pursuit of Liberalism: International Institutions in Postcommunist
Europe (2008) is another work underscoring the importance of contextual differences in
both understanding and conceptualizing military control and autonomy. The author
6

examined NATO’s role in reforming CMR in the socio-political context of post-communist
legacies and transformations. Instead of military seizure of the state’s power—commonly
seen in non-communist states—militaries in the post-communist states of Central and
Eastern Europe struggled to remain autonomous and free from civilian interference. The
Soviet legacy of military autonomy in return for subordination to civilian authority posed
a challenge as democratic control required limiting militaries’ autonomy both functionally
and normatively (politically). This process particularly required civilianizing the security–
military apparatus with democratic institutions, where civilians, instead of military
personnel, would run ministries of defense, parliamentary defense committees, and would
oversee the intelligence services, and the defense budget (2008: 109). The abovementioned studies provide a more nuanced understanding of the question of political
control. These works highlight the sophisticated nature of civil–military interactions in the
domain of politics, possibilities include: politicization of militaries by civilians,
militarization of politics, or other forms of military interference such as occupying
government positions.
Furthermore, challenging the one-dimensional views that either focused solely on
one aspect of political control or employed various aspects of control vaguely or
interchangeably, Avant explains that the CMR literature often rests on different concepts
of control (Avant 2005). Though many implicitly appreciate that what we mean by civilian
control includes a military that is capable (functional control), responsive to leaders
(political control), and serving societal values (social control), analyses tend to elevate one
or another (2005: 5-6).

In analyzing the question of civilian control, specifically
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privatization of security, Avant (2005) argues that “the control of force has been most
stable, effective, and legitimate when all three aspects have reinforced one another – when
capable forces have been governed by accepted political processes and operated according
to shared values” (2008: 6). Hence, as discussed thus far, recent scholarly works have
adopted a more sophisticated framework in understanding the concept of military control
by underscoring various aspects of civilian control.
In studying the role of economically-active militaries in China, Iran, and Egypt, I
embrace this broader framework that moves beyond a study of coup d’états and takes into
consideration various forms of military influence in politics. I focus on military influence
as a continuum that manifests itself not only in the domain of politics, but also in the
domains of society, and economy. Moreover, as mentioned before, the literature surveying
militaries in autocratic regimes has failed to critically examine militaries’ political
economy; it has not offered theoretical frameworks or hypotheses that would explain the
consequences of militaries’ economic power not only on political control but also on
military capabilities and social values. I take various types of intervention in politics, as
well as functional and social controls into account. In doing so, I identify political economy
variables that impact militaries economic behavior, and ultimately, explain the processes
that sometimes increase the functional, political, and social power of economically active
militaries and at other times have a reverse effect on those dimensions.
A systematic study of economically-active militaries is imperative in understanding
an unexplored dimension of military power. There is an emerging body of research
examining militaries’ roles as economic actors, as well as case studies focusing on the
8

economic activities of militaries. These studies, primarily focus on the following issues:
classification of different types of militaries’ economic activities (Brömmelhörster and
Paes 2003, Mani 2007), contingent generalization on interrelation of militaries’ economic
activities and civil-military relations (Alaggapa 2002, Mani 2007, Mani 2010), and case
studies ( Mulvenon 2001, Siddiqa 2007).
For example, Brömmelhörster and Paes’s collection provides a descriptive
typology of militaries’ business activities classified as budgetary assistance, pensions
welfare, developmental role, import substitution, economic opportunism, and opportunities
for corruption for the cases of Argentina, Central American states, China, the DRC,
Indonesia, Pakistan, Russia, and Vietnam (2007: 681). Mani (2007) also offers a typology
of militaries’ economic activities: institutional (benefiting the institution), spoils
(benefiting the individuals), statist-institutional (state-led benefiting the institution), and
statist-spoils (state-led benefiting individuals) (2007: 596). Two causal variables of state
capacity (weak vs. strong) and military’s organizational nature (professionalization vs.
parochial) determine the above outcomes. In strong states, militaries’ economic activities
are directed by the state; in weak states, military’s organizational nature (professional
versus parochial) determines the outcome (2007: 595). In a later piece, Mani (2010)
explains that cultural, structural, and rational approaches could help us understand the
reasons behind trajectories of civil-military relations regarding economically-active
militaries but doesn’t offer testable hypotheses.
Other studies such as Siddiqa’s Military Inc.: Inside Pakistan’s Military Economy
(2007), Cheung’s China’s Entrepreneurial Army (2001), Mulvenon’s Soldiers of Fortune:
9

The Rise and Fall of the Chinese Military–Business Complex, 1978-1998 (2001) focus on
individual case studies. These case studies provide insights and testable hypotheses on the
role-expansion of militaries for individual cases but do not provide comparative case
studies. Other studies, such as Alagappa (2002) in his Coercion and Governance: The
Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia (2002), offered contingent generalization.
In discussing militaries’ role-expansion in Asian states, Alagappa (2002), argued
that what mattered was the scope of military’s participation in economic governance. A
simple increase in the scope of participation (breath of participation in governance) in the
socio–economic domain didn’t necessarily mean expansion of the military’s role. It was
considered role-expansion only when it was linked to an increase in the military’s
jurisdiction and decision-making power (32, 2002). The role-expansion3 was a function of
the weakness and illegitimacy of the governing elite and not a function of
unprofessionalism. CMR patterns, hence, were determined by the interrelation of the
following factors:
“beliefs, interests, and power of administrative, military, and political institutions
(bureaucracy, presidency, legislature, communist party), and military institutions
(armed forces, paramilitary forces, intelligence agencies, and the security agencies)
mediated by the beliefs and power of civil society and international society”
(Alagappa 2002, 58).
In the context of strong political institutions, the beliefs and values, norms and
principles determined the CMR patterns. In institutionally weak states, the distribution of
power among major actors and their interests, which were influenced by civil and
international society, determined the outcome. Alagappa’s work is among very few studies

3

Based on Stepan’s notion of new professionalism, i.e. militaries involvement in non-defense related tasks.
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focusing on the causes behind militaries’ economic role-expansion. Similar to previous
studies, however, Alagappa does not take into account varied aspects of control. Moreover,
the causal explanation considers the impact of several variables, making it difficult to
analyze the causal process and identify the most determinant variables.
Building on above-mentioned works, my project takes a step further in comparing
and contrasting cases in terms of the militaries’ power-expansion in politics, the militaries’
effectiveness, and changes in their values. I propose testable hypotheses leading to
contingent generalizations regarding economically-active militaries’ political behavior, as
well as their functional and social control. Furthermore, the above works mainly focus on
organizational character, elite interactions, or domestic state capacity variables; they do not
expand the underlying micro-mechanisms of militaries’ economic expansion or contraction
under conditions of changing economic systems. While the literature of political science
has examined the consequences of liberalization on domestic economies and on politics
alike, it has not systematically examined the relationship between liberalization and
economic activities of militaries in autocratic regimes. The literature also overlooks
discussion of the changing conditions under which these militaries became economicallyactive. The economic activities of militaries under central planning and import substitution
policies had a different character and meaning compared to the liberalized economies of
today. My research intends to breach this gap by examining militaries of China, Iran, and
Egypt.
Fist, centrally-planned economies of China, Iran, and Egypt all had economicallyactive militaries and have experimented with state control over their militaries during the
11

phase of their nationalized centrally-planned economies. The liberalization programs in all
three cases included trade liberalization, financial sector reforms to attract foreign capital
and foreign direct investment, and a process of privatizing state-owned enterprises. As a
consequence of these reforms, not only these militaries expanded their economic power,
but also, in some cases, they succeeded to translate their economic power into political
authority in the decades following the reforms. The economic liberalization also had
varying impacts on the functional and social aspects of control. Together, these shifts
translated into varying degrees of military influence.
On certain occasions, militaries have profited from their power to engage in
preferential bidding, tax evasion, smuggling, and unfair competition. Their economic
expansion resulted in exercising different degrees of political power such as interfering
with foreign policy decisions, electoral processes, or coup d’états. The functional control
varies as well, with some militaries acquiring more capabilities and expanding their
functional power while others’ capabilities have decreased. In terms of social control, some
militaries have become self-interested institutions, pursuing or even prioritizing their
corporate interests while others still maintain the values and ideologies of the societies they
represent or adhere to the international humanitarian values. Despite the above-mentioned
economic policy changes, the discipline has failed to analyze the impact of these changes
on various patterns, as well as three aspects of CMR, i.e. political, functional, and social
controls.
While all three implemented liberalization policies, overall China has been most
successful in maintaining or expanding civilian political control, as well as functional and
12

social control. In Iran, there is a balance of power between civilians and the Islamic
Republic’s Guard Corps (IRGC); the IRGC has turned into a power bloc. The economic
reforms have negatively impacted the functional capabilities of the military. With regards
to the social values, the IRGC has remained loyal to the ideals of the Islamic Revolution
but it has also become a self-interested corporate entity making decisions to serve its
narrow economic interests. Its pursuit of narrow self-interest at times is in the expense of
Iran’s national interests, i.e. the revolutionary developmental goals such as alleviating
poverty. In Egypt, the military continued to monopolize its power during Hosni Mubarak’s
regime and became a power broker during the Egyptian Revolution of 2011. The functional
control has not registered significant changes while liberalization has negatively impacted
the social control since the military has become a self-interested corporate entity
representing social values in conflict with the majority in the society.
The dependent variable of civil-military relations varied as follows: the Chinese
PLA divested its businesses and returned to barracks. Egypt’s EAF fought to maintain and
expand its economic empire, and ultimately took an almost complete control of the state.
The IRGC’s political leverage was not as extensive as the EAF’s, but unlike China, it has
established itself as an accepted political player. Why?
I argue that civilians’ ability to foster economic competitiveness and private sector
growth conditioned and constrained militaries’ behavior, and subsequently the CMR.
Particularly, incomplete liberalization or selective protectionism provided opportunities for
economically-active militaries to capture state resources and provided them with enough
leverage to translate their economic power into a political power. In the absence of
13

competition in the economy, economically-active militaries enjoyed an edge and could use
their government linkages to their advantage, thus increasing military influence in the
political domain; militaries became less dependent on their civilians because they could
maintain their businesses in an uncompetitive economy, Where economic liberalization
fostered decentralization of economic activity and competition, however, economicallyactive militaries had fewer opportunities to capture state resources and transform their
economic power into political influence. In more competitive economies, military
businesses needed to maximize profit and out-compete other actors to gain success.
Without selective protectionism, maintaining profitability for militaries became
increasingly difficult, weakening their leverage over civilians and hence their potential
influence.
Moreover, economic liberalization that allowed for economic integration also
generated more income, which allowed for increases in defense spending, which decreased
the need for militaries to maintain businesses. This process improved the military’s
capabilities and its incentives to remain subordinate. Conversely, unintegrated economic
liberalization did not generate income that could be used for increases in defense spending,
leading militaries to continue their focus on economic activity instead of focusing on
improving their capabilities. In these instances, militaries turned into self-interested
corporate entities pursuing institutional interests rather than adhering to the values of the
society.
This dissertation’s findings offer insights on how International/regional
Organizations’, or United States’, economic policy recommendations impact the balance
14

of power between militaries and civilians in autocratic regimes, and what subsequent
security implications of those changes are. A military’s economic role-expansion and their
ability or inability to leverage their economic power into a political one is crucial in state’s
political liberalization process, and ultimately possibilities for democratization. Also a
military’s economic role-expansion, if not in service of developmental goals, could impede
economic development, as it has been in the cases of Iran and Egypt. Ultimately, in terms
of security sector reforms, the findings underscore the importance of combining economic
reforms and security reforms; it highlights the importance of coordination among
developmental agencies in terms of recommendations they could offer to those developing
states where the militaries have a history of economic activity.
Structure of the Dissertation
This dissertation consists of five chapters. The first chapter outlines the theory,
hypotheses, and methodology. It develops the theoretical framework based on capitalist
development models that informed the selection of independent variables and generation
of testable hypotheses. Then, it explains the process of case selection, the dependent
variable of military control (political, functional, and social control) and its
operationalization.
The second chapter analyzes the reasons behind the willingness of China’s People’s
Liberation Army (PLA) to dissolve its economic empire following the civilian order in
1998; it explains why, to the surprise of many, the PLA divested its enterprises and returned
to barracks.

15

The third chapter focuses on Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). It
aims at explaining why despite its success to considerably expand its both economic and
political power, the IRGC nevertheless failed to completely dominate Iran’s economy and
politics.
The fourth chapter delineates the process of economic liberalization in Egypt and
how it facilitated expansion of the Egyptian Armed Forces (EAF) into the economy and its
later success in transforming its economic power into political power: a complete
government take-over. The final chapter wraps up the findings, suggests the policy
implications of the findings, and offers recommendations for future research.

16

Chapter 2: Hypotheses on Economic Competitiveness and Civil-Military Relations

Theory: Pathways to Capitalist Developments
This dissertation (i) suggests that specifics of liberalization and privatization
processes are crucial for understanding the variations in the balance of power between the
civilian elite and militaries, and (ii) identifies variations in the degrees of political,
functional, and social autonomies that militaries exercised prior to and after liberalization
processes. The types of economic liberalization, and their outcomes, i.e. gradual
liberalization coupled with reform of regulations and bureaucracy leading to
competitiveness versus a rapid process of deregulation and privatization that hinders
competitiveness, impact militaries’ political, functional, and social controls. This study
formulates hypotheses by referring to capitalist development models developed by King
and Szelenyi (2005) and by Harris’ (2013). The theory King and Szelenyi offer informs
the selection of independent variables, and the subsequent formulation of testable
hypotheses.
King and Szelenyi, in their Post-Communist Economic Systems (2005), present
three ideal types of capitalist development in Eastern Europe. Like the literature that argues
for examining divergent capitalist projects (Hall and Soskice 2001), the authors articulate
17

the unique features of class, private-property formation, and market institutions in several
post-communist states, and how they mitigated the privatization and liberalization.
Capitalism from above, capitalism from below, and capitalism from without were three
pathways of capitalist development that resulted in divergent capitalist systems. In
capitalism from above, elites followed a neoliberal plan to transform a socialist economy
into a capitalist one. The process enabled the nomenklatura to convert itself into a new
capitalist class. Labeled as patrimonial capitalism, characteristics of capitalism from above
have included patrimonial relationships and network-based economic activity. Capitalism
from below emerged as a hybrid system of new actors, private property owners, and a
market economy that kept operating alongside the old redistributive system. Hybrid
capitalism was an outcome of capitalism from below where state-owned enterprises and a
small private sector coexisted. Finally, capitalism from without, like capitalism from
above, adopted neoliberal policies but with a significant difference. In this scenario, instead
of privatization and empowerment of the older nomenklatura, states relied on foreign
ownership and multinational corporations. Liberal capitalism was a system where market
institutions had developed and there was a globally integrated economy (King and Szelenyi
2005, 205-208).
By utilizing capitalist developmental models, Kevan Harris, in his “The Rise of the
Subcontractor State: Politics of Pseudo-Privatization in the Islamic Republic of Iran”
(2013), also discusses the impact of state capacity and instructional competency on
different forms of capitalist development. He adopts King & Szelenyi’s three models of
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capitalist development4 to explain various periods of economic reform in Iran, comparing
them to other cases in the developing world.
In Harris’ account, the Iranian economy experienced all three forms of
development, with Ahmadinejad’s privatization policies amounting to capitalism from
above, and the consequent empowering of the IRGC. Similarly, Egyptian economic
development took the path of capitalism from above, while China, in contrast, experienced
capitalism from below and origination of a private sector operating parallel to the state
sector. Harris’ work provides a basis for understanding the interaction of political and
economic institutions in the cases under study. Given the fact that the economic activities
of militaries in China, Iran, and Egypt have been embedded in capitalist development
projects, my research builds on King and Szelenyi (2005) and Harris’ (2013) framework
to explain why, under conditions of varied capitalist development projects, militaries in
each state have acquired different degrees of power in relation to civilians.
I focus on the variables of economic liberalization and modes of privatization to
examine (i) states’ ability to implement market mechanisms, and (ii) the process of private
sector development, and (iii) the extent to which both of these conditions create a degree
of competition in which militaries must operate. Subsequently, I test the interrelation of
economic competitiveness and the question of military control.

4

Harris, The Rise of Subcontractor State, 65-66. Capitalism from above leads to the engineering of a
Weberian rational–bureaucratic state and the implementation of liberal policies resulting in export-oriented
and foreign capital-intensive economic strategy. In the case of capitalist development from below, a coalition
between technocratic elite and domestic bourgeoisie operating in a politically powerful state bureaucracy
leads to the emergence of a “hybrid system of capital accumulation and mixed forms of property”, where the
balance of power between the two groups has led to the emergence of a private sector co-existing with a big
public sector. The outcome of privatization in the absence of a solid bureaucratic-institutional framework—
capitalism from above—has been states’ asset-stripping by the elite in power.
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Explanatory Hypotheses: Competitive versus Uncompetitive Economies
Hypothesis#1: If rapid or haphazard economic liberalization fails to establish a
competitive economy, or does not facilitate private sector development, economically
active militaries turn into economic interest groups. A likely outcome is increased
autonomy in the political domain, and decreased functional and social controls.
In other words, incomplete economic liberalization (or selective protectionism)
conditions maintenance of economically active militaries as economic actors and increases
their political leverage.
Causal explanation: Rapid liberalization in the absence of market institutions and
regulatory regimes, as well as the transfer of previously state-owned enterprises to private
actors, provides an opportunity for existing networks of influence in the state to engage in
asset-stripping. In transition economies, liberalization via transfer of both ownership and
management of state-owned enterprises to private actors takes place under the conditions
of weak economic institutions. Subsequently, due to weak regulatory regimes, existing
networks of influence, in this case economically-active militaries, are able to further
enhance their economic power and translate it into political leverage by becoming a
pressure group impacting civilian decisions.
Civilians’ Functional control over the military also decreases because militaries
expand economically to support themselves or to simply generate profits. Since the state
doesn’t increase defense spending, the military has an incentive to remain economically
active. Moreover, rapid liberalization provides opportunities for transformation of
military’s economic base into a political one. The military turns into an interest group; it
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might still adhere to social values but self-interest takes precedent over social values.
(Cases of Egypt and Iran).
Hypothesis#2: If economic liberalization and private sector development establish
a competitive economy, economically-active militaries have less incentive to operate as
economic actors. The outcome is increased civilian control in the political domain. The
functional and social controls either would increase or would not change.
In other words, relatively thorough-going economic liberalization that establishes
a competitive economy reduces incentives for militaries to engage in economic activities,
which in turn leads to a decrease in militaries’ political leverage.
Causal explanation: If the state carries out gradual economic liberalization, where
state-owned enterprises are not rapidly transferred to the private sector but instead a new
private sector emerges parallel to the public sector, the chances for economically-active
militaries to enter the new private domain are slimmer. In other words, if the state engages
in partial privatization—where it still retains either partial management or ownership of
state-owned enterprises, outsources activities previously done by the state but doesn’t
necessarily transfer them to the private sector, or engages in joint public–private ventures—
then privatization is gradual. Under these circumstances, the existing networks of influence
have smaller windows of opportunities to engage in asset-stripping. This is because if the
economic liberalization fosters competition, the economic space opens for new
entrepreneurs to flourish, meaning the emergence of new businesses in those private sectors
that are not dominated by the state.
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In terms of the sectors dominated by the state, privatization is controlled and
gradual, with private actors holding less power in relation to the state. Subsequently, the
state faces the emergence of parallel public and private sectors where state and private
actors engage in different kinds of economic activities. The best examples of these types
of privatization are the cases of China during Deng’s leadership and continuing to the
present (Gao 2014), and Iran during the presidency of Khatami (Harris 2013).
If the state is generating income via economic liberalization, the probability for an
increase in defense spending is higher. Therefore, there are improvements in militaries’
functional control as the military receives extra funds. A military’s incentive to engage in
economic activities is also reduced. Moreover, gradual privatization doesn’t provide
opportunities for asset-stripping. In this scenario, the military is more likely to remain loyal
to the regime and uphold the values of the autocratic regime. (This was the case for China).
Most Similar Systems Design
Why did China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) divest its businesses and return
to barracks following economic liberalization policies in the 90s, whereas Iran’s Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) established itself and became a coalition-maker but
Egyptian Armed Forces (EAF) rose into political power? Despite the similarities these
cases share in terms of military control prior to the economic liberalization, as a result of
economic liberalization the EAF gained significant power—almost a complete government
take-over. In China, on the other hand, liberalization consolidated civilian control over the
PLA. In Iran, the IRGC entered into coalitions with the leading civilian elite. I aim to
understand why seemingly similar policies led to such different outcomes. I argue that
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when liberalization and privatization does not foster competitiveness, militaries have
opportunities to expand their economic base, engage in stripping of state resources, and
turn their economic power into a political power. In contrast, when liberalization and
privatization assist establishment of a competitive economy, militaries have limited
opportunities to transfer their economic base into a political one.
By adopting a Most Similar Systems Design (MSSD) (Della Porta, 2008), my
research utilizes a historical institutionalist approach and a method of process-tracing to
provide a causal explanation for the impact of economic liberalization policies on civil–
military relations in the three cases of China, Iran, and Egypt. MSSD is used to rule out
similarities and identify the points of divergence among the three case; the dependent
variable is the civil-military control post-liberalization. Aiming to offer contingent
generalization, I utilize the method of process-tracing to find critical processes by
comparing historical cases (cited in George and Bennett 2005, 205). I look at those critical
moments in history where policy choices changed the states’ economic trajectory in
general, militaries’ economic power in particular, and ultimately their political leverage.
The countries under study share similarities in terms of civil–military relations prior
to liberalization in the 1980s, as well as in their adoption of economic liberalization policies
as a remedy for the economic constraints they faced. The balance of civil–military power
subsequent to the liberalization, however, varies. Therefore, given similarities the cases
shared with respect to their nationalization policies, their militaries’ role in economic
development, and their adoption of economic reforms, what variables determined the
divergent outcomes in civil–military relations (CMR) following liberalization?
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Through process-tracing, this study will identify those market and state institutions
that conditioned the interactions of civilian and military elites in autocratic regimes; it will
also explain how the introduction of new market policies led to different types of capitalist
development projects that provided opportunities for empowerment or disempowerment of
militaries. In order to compare these three cases, this study adopts the comparative method
of MSSD to rule out similarities and find the most determinant variable. Case selection
focused on three theoretically relevant similarities in the domains of historical legacy,
economic policy, and the militaries’ position in the society. Those similarities are the
following: regime collapses via revolutions followed by the establishment of autocratic
regimes, the adoption of a leftist economic orientation accompanied by central planning,
an anti-imperialist discourse, the militaries’ ideological role as guardians of newly formed
independent states or regimes, and finally the allocation of economic development tasks to
militaries are similarities all cases share. In addition, all cases adopted similar economic
liberalization policies: reforming exchange-rate systems, banking/financial sector, and
privatization packages.
Similarities: Cases of China, Iran, Egypt
Table 1: MSSD, Similarities of China, Iran, and Egypt
Similarities
Historical
Revolution
legacies/
State
Establishment
of
Institutions regime
Civilian autocracies

Cultural

Iran

China

(1979)

(1945)

Egypt
(1952)

Autocratic
Monarchy

Established autocracies (no civil
wars/ not in transition)
Anti-West rhetoric
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Economics

Militaries

Centrally Planned Economy/ ISI
Shadow Economies
Existence of Private sector along
with the public one, but dominance
of State Owned Enterprises
Openness/Economic
Reform
Policy
Trade liberalization
Exchange rate reform
Assigning the militaries dual roles
of defense and development
Ideologically oriented militaries
(defending the ideology of state)
Militaries under civilian control
prior to the liberalization policies

-

In these three cases, the revolutions and implementation of economic liberalization
policies occurred at different times. However, they share both the same international
context and the same domestic ideologies. China experienced revolution in 1949, at the
beginning stages of the Cold War. Egypt and Iran experienced revolutions and established
new regimes in 1952 and 1979 respectively. Although their revolutions occurred in
different times, all three happened during the Cold War and were similar in terms of their
adoption of anti-western and anti-capitalist ideologies. In all three cases the revolutions
brought left-leaning elites into power and were responses to a polarized international
environment. In all three cases, the elite in power adopted centralized economic policies.
In addition, all three states are established regimes with a strong state capacity to
monitor their borders, and subsequently have not experienced civil war. Therefore, the
literature related to states in transition, militaries in the process of state formation, as well
as civil wars should be excluded from this study.
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The Dependent Variable
The dependent variable (DV) is degree of civilian control over the armed forces
measured along the three aspects of political, functional, and social control. The DV is a
military’s political, functional, and social values both prior to and after economic
liberalization processes in the eighties and nineties. Therefore, operationalization requires
assessment of DVs both prior to and after economic liberalization.
Political control. I base my measurement of a military’s political control on Brian
Taylor’s (2003) definition: militaries’ involvement in politics includes “military
intervention” and “military arbitration.” In the former case, intervention is “the use, actual
or threatened, of force by members if the military, either alone or with civilian actors, in
an attempt to change the executive leadership of the state” (Taylor 2003, 7). Hence, military
intervention could be operationalized based on (i) coups, (ii) attempts/threats to coups, (iii)
direct intervention in electoral processes or exercise of a veto-power over electoral results,
(iv) the military assuming governmental positions, and (v) the military’s responsiveness to
the government or at least to a faction of the civilian elite.
According to Taylor (2003), military arbitration is “when multiple persons or
groups claim to hold legitimate state power and the military is forced to decide from whom
to obey orders” (Taylor 2003, 7). Military arbitration is evidence of military interference
in politics. However, in autocratic regimes, due to the absence of both institutional
mechanisms of control and democratic norms, the line between militaries and civilians is
blurred. The militaries are usually politicized and serve interests of a faction of the elite in
power. Hence, drawing a clear distinction illustrating a shift from non-interference to
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interference is difficult. Therefore, I will take arbitration as evidence of interference only
when arbitration serves the corporate interests of the military rather than expressing the
military’s responsiveness (or loyalty) to a particular political faction. In other words, the
motivation behind military’s decision-making is important: if the military switches sides
constantly, makes coalitions with various elite factions, in order to advance its economic
interests, I will count it as military interference in politics.
By assessing each military’s political autonomy, prior to and after economic
liberalization I can identify whether there was a shift in the military’s political power after
economic liberalization.
Functional control: Civilians have functional control of the military when it has
“the capacity to create military power from a state’s basic resources in wealth, technology,
population size, and human capital.” As put by Brooks and Stanley, “A military’s level of
effectiveness varies with the degree to which it is organized to make good use of these
material and human resources” (Brooks and Stanley 2007, 9-13). In keeping with this
definition, I use the following attributes to measure military effectiveness: (i) integration:
the ability to ensure consistency in military activity, create synergies, and avoid
counterproductive activities, (ii) responsiveness: the degree to which the state
accommodates internal and external threats to prepare itself for armed conflict, (iii) skill:
preparation and motivation of military personnel to execute tasks in the battlefield, (iv)
quality: capacity of the state to provide itself with weaponry.
Based on Brooks and Stanley’s classification (2007, 15), some of the following
indicators (given available data) are used to measure military effectiveness across time: (i)
27

Integration: consistency between tactics with broader political goals, consistency of
training system of personnel with tactical concepts, logistics and operational plans support
strategic objectives. (ii) Responsiveness: tactics designed to address weakness of
adversary, modification of forces in response to new threats and challenges, rigorous
internal monitoring system (intelligence gathering), officer selection. (iii) Skill: fluid
assimilation of technology, highly motivated soldiers, proficiency in executing doctrines;
assessing the education and training programs. (iv) Quality: Nature of weapons procured,
ability to minimize trade-offs in mobility
Social control: Social control refers to the values that underlie military activity.
Based on Avant’s (2005) classification of various types of control, I assess social control
in terms of changes in military values, i.e., adherence to social norms of the society (43).
If militaries start operating based on narrow self-interest rather than an adherence to
previously-established social norms and expectations, there is a change in the social
control.
DV Prior to and Post-Economic Liberalization
Iran: I focus on sixteen years of liberalization policies since 1997; the policies were
adopted during Khatami’s and Ahmadinejad’s presidencies (1997-2013). Rafsanjani’s
presidency from 1989–1997 was marked by the politicization of the IRGC and its roleexpansion. That is the DV (prior) to the effective economic liberalization policies in 1997.
Although Rafsanjani attempted to liberalize the economy, his policies did not succeed. The
period of post-liberalization is identified with two changes under two presidencies:
liberalization during Khatami’s presidency (1997-2005) when Iran faced the rise of a
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private sector parallel to the public sector, and acceleration of liberalization since 2005
following Ahmadinejad’s election when the state privatized rapidly and sold state owned
enterprises (SOEs) to private actors.
DV (prior to liberalization): 1989 to 1997 (during Rafsanjani’s presidency), the
IRGC was assigned an economic development role and was tasked to generate its own
income. The IRGC was institutionally autonomous and politically subordinate to the
civilians’ demands. It upheld the values of the 1979 Revolution.
DV (post-liberalization): Since 1997, the IRGC began interfering in the politics but
the quality and forms of intervention differed significantly under two presidencies of
Khatami and Ahmadinejad. During Khatami’s presidency (1997-2005), the IRGC started
interfering in the politics but not as extensively as in Ahmadinejad’s period (2005-2013).
Its economic base did not expand and its interference in politics was a result of its
politicized nature (linkages to the hardliner elite). Since 2005, however, following rapid
liberalization and privatization policies of Ahmadinejad (2005-2013), the IRGC turned into
a political power block. The functional capabilities of the IRGC have not registered
dramatic changes. Despite claiming to uphold the values of the revolution, the IRGC
behaved as a self-interested institution. It still upheld the values of the Islamic Revolution
and Iran’s theocratic ideology but it also, at times, acted as a corporate institution
undermining national security, or hindering state’s developmental goals.
One could argue that the IRGC gained power via political means and expanded its
economic empire. There are also arguments regarding a symbiotic relationship between the
IRGC’s political and economic power. However, this research marshals evidence to
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illustrate how the increasing power of the IRGC was resulted from the types of
privatization policies adopted since 1997 by Khatami’s and Ahmadinejad’s governments.
Egypt: This section focuses on the aftermath of the economic liberalization that
commenced post Sadat’s Camp David Accords (1978), and accelerated under Hosni
Mubarak’s regime until the breakdown of his regime in 2011. The period prior to the
liberalization coincided with Nasser’ rule; it was characterized by policies of central
planning (1956-70). The liberalization policies coincided with Sadat’s (1970–81) and
Mubarak’s (1981–2011) presidencies. Liberalization during Sadat’s period was marked by
the adoption of Infitah (an open-door policy) but the process did facilitate the emergence
of a real independent private sector and led to macroeconomic instability. The acceleration
of the liberalization-privatization process in the aftermath of the Camp David Accords
(early 80s), supported by international institutions such as the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund, however, produced new windows of opportunity for the
capture of state resources by elite networks with linkages to the state. This process of rapid
reform continued under Mubarak’s rule and led to the further expansion of the Egyptian
Armed Forces in Egypt’s economic, and, later, political domains.
DV (prior to liberalization): Since 1952 until 1978, and primarily during Nasser’s
rule, the military was assigned an economic development role and was tasked to provide
its own budget. It was politically subordinate and upheld the values of the revolution.
DV (post-liberalization): Since late 1978 (post-Camp David), the military expanded
its economic power. The capabilities increased primarily due to foreign aid. The military
remained ideologically subordinate to the values of the regime. Since 1981, During
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Mubarak’s rule (1981–2011), however, the military further expanded its economic power,
as well as its political power and ultimately assumed the state’s control during and after
the 2011 Egyptian Revolution. The military’s functional capabilities did not register radical
changes. The military behaved as a self-interested institution; it took over the state
primarily, maintained its economic interests, and expanded its businesses.
China: Mao’s rule (1945–1976) was the period of economic centralization and
military’s involvement in development projects. This period resembles Rafsanjani’s
presidency in Iran and Nasser’s rule in Egypt. Liberalization started in 1979, during Deng’s
rule, and led to the expansion of PLA businesses. This period was marked by the formation
of the PLA’s economic conglomerates. Meanwhile, it was also noticeable for the spread of
corruption and the engagement of the PLA in illegal activities such as smuggling.
Following the Tiananmen Square protests in 1989, however, a subsequent backlash among
the Chinese Communist Party’s elite against liberalization and resulting purges in the
military, China adopted a policy of reforming the PLA’s economic activities. The reform
process, however, intensified in 1998 and led to the near eradication of the PLA’s economic
power and the restoration of civilian supremacy in the economic domain.
DV (prior to liberalization): From 1945, during Mao’s rule, the PLA was assigned
the development task of rebuilding the country but also was expected to generate its own
income. The PLA was institutionally autonomous and politically subordinate. It upheld the
values of the revolution.
DV (post-liberalization): Since 1979, during Deng’s rule (from 1979–1989), the
military gained economic autonomy but was politically subordinate to the civilians. The
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PLA commercialized and gained economic autonomy through the process of gradual
privatization; China experienced the rise of a private sector parallel to the public sector.
Since 1998, during Zemin’s rule, the PLA’s began divesting its businesses; the PLA
became subordinate to the civilians in the political and social domains; its functional
capabilities increased.
Alternative Hypotheses
The literature assuming globalization as an inevitable process (race-to-bottom
literature) (Hirst 2009, Cerny 1995) or works such as Bunce and Wolchik’s (2010) on
transnational norm diffusions argue that the pressure of liberalization produces a race to
the bottom, pushing states to liberalize their economic and political systems. Subsequently,
the spread of democratization and the liberalization of domestic political systems, or
international norm diffusion, should impact civil–military relations. The expectation in this
race-to-the-bottom literature is democratization of civil–military relations with civilians
gaining more autonomy vis-à-vis civilians.
Alternative hypothesis#1: Changes in civilian control are dependent on the degree
of political liberalization that states have undergone due to the spread of globalization. In
states with a greater degree of political liberalization, militaries are politically less
autonomous, culturally more democratic, and functionally more capable.
Note: In line with the literature of democratization and political liberalization, the
alternative hypothesis 1 would suggest a causal pathway whereby political liberalization is
the most determinant variable in explaining civil-military relations.
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Falsified if: (i) There is political liberalization but civil–military relations have not
changed. (ii) There is no evidence of democratization but the political control of the
military has decreased. Or there is political liberalization but the military has gained more
political power.
Regarding the professionalization thesis, Huntington’s (1957) concept of objective
control underscores professionalization as an important factor determining civil-military
relations.

Based

on

Huntington’s

professionalization

thesis,

once

militaries

professionalize, there should be an expectation for increased objective control, or increased
civilian control, over militaries, regardless of economic liberalization.
Alternative hypothesis #2: Changes in the civilian control are dependent on the
degree of militaries’ professionalization. In states where militaries are professionalized and
modernized, there is a lower likelihood for the military to interfere in politics.
Falsified if: (i) military is professionalized but the degree of civilian control is the same or
has declined. (ii) There is equifinality. There is increase in the degree of political control
but the cause is another variable, meaning the professionalization is a development parallel
to other variables that determined changes in the CMR.
Data Collection
In this study, I use processes-tracing to find the political critical junctions in each
case. In order to identify the causal chains or causal mechanism between the independent
and dependent variables (George and Bennett 2005, 206), method of process-tracing assists
researchers in “figuring out which aspects of the initial conditions observed, in conjunction
with which simple principles of the many that may be at work, would have combined to
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generate the observed sequence of events.” (emphasize added, cited in George and Bennett
2005, 206). Through process-tracing, the researcher assesses the alternative causal
pathways to rule out equifinality; it allows the researcher to identify the causal process that
determined the dependent variable (George and Bennett 2005, 207). This study utilizes the
method of process-tracing to rule out explanations based on political variables such as
regime type, institutional engineering, or inter-elite relations. Instead, it identifies the
economic variables as the most determinant causes in explaining the behavior of
economically-active militaries.
I use library research to gather data on IVs and DVs. I utilize Persian-language
books published by Iranian economists on Iran’s economic trajectory, news sources such
as Persian-language sources of BBC Persian Television, Deutsche Welle’s Persian service,
Radio Farda, Radio Zamaneh, Entekhab newspaper, Roozonline, Rajanews, and others, as
well as information available in the websites of the IRGC.
I also use English-language newspapers such as The Wall Street Journal, Business
Insider, The Washington Post, Public Broadcasting Service’s (PBS) Frontline and Tehran
Bureau, The Cable News Network (CNN), Bloomberg (world news), Al-Monitor, and Al
Jazeera. Reports by the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), RAND Corporation, and the International
Institute for Security Studies (IISS).
These sources are used to find evidence of (i) economic policies, (ii) primary
discussions among local economists or influential elites in the countries under study:
criticisms, compliments, or recommendations, and (iii) statements made by state officials,
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including the militaries, with regard to the militaries’ businesses, politics, or other aspects
of control under study.
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Chapter 3: People’s Liberation Army’s Inability to Compete in China’s Competitive
Economy and Divestiture in 1998

Introduction
Why did the People’s Liberation Army in 1998 relinquish its business holdings and
submit to the civilians’ will, despite its ability to leverage its economic power for political
gains? This chapter examines mechanisms behind the expansion and retrenchment of
PLA’s businesses in the context of China’s economic trajectory. It argues that the pace of
liberalization and modes of privatization in China created conditions whereby the drive for
competitiveness via productivity improvements and export-promotion motivated firms’
behavior. In the context of a consensus over China’s need to modernize and integrate in
the global economy, competitiveness was incentivized, which in its turn rewarded
instrumental profit-maximizing behavior for firms. The PLA was not exempt from
competitive forces. Its decision to return to barracks during the 1998 divestiture campaign
was a consequence of both the state’s assertiveness in implementing market reforms and
the PLA’s inability to run its businesses effectively in a competitive economy.
The first section of this chapter outlines the Chinese economic trajectory that
conditioned the PLA’s business expansion and later its contraction. The subsequent
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sections explain the causal mechanisms—the impact of economic liberalization—on the
variation in the dependent variables of political, functional, and social control.
Economic Reform Processes and the PLA’s Economic Behavior
The Chinese economic trajectory gradually departed from central planning, and
assumed liberalization policies since 1978. China adopted an Open-Door Policy that
combined a gradual trade liberalization with careful experimentation with reforming
domestic institutions and regulatory frameworks. A significant consequence of this
cautious liberalization has been China’s relative ability in fostering productive capacities
of firms, encouraging competition, and relatively strengthening market mechanisms.
Parallel to this process of economic reform, the Chinese Communist Party ordered the
expansion of PLA businesses into new sectors, such as international trade and
manufacturing. This economic role-expansion occurred under conditions of a liberalizing
economy; the specifics of the PLA’s role-expansion reflects the overall characteristics of
China’s economic liberalization. This section will explain Chinese economic trajectory and
the process of the PLA’s economic role-expansion.
China set the primacy of a state-led economic liberalization and adopted a reform
strategy of “gradualism” (Chow 2004), “segmented deregulation” (Zweig and Zhimin,
2007), or what became known as “socialist commodity economy” and ultimately “socialist
market economy5”. In China, there emerged what King and Szelenyi (2005) would name
“hybrid capitalism” or “capitalism from below”, a system of co-existence between the

5

Vogel, Deng and Transformation of China, 682. A concept introduced by Jiang Zemin in 1992 to replace
“planned socialist market economy”; it was introduced in the 14th Party Congress.
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public and a growing private sector. New private property owners emerged gradually, and
the market economy operated alongside the old redistributive system, which also became
reliant on market mechanisms (King and Szelenyi 2005, 211). This hybrid system6 did not
fully prevent clientalism but limited it significantly; it also facilitated a high capacity
developmental state (Harris 2013, 66). This was a significant development since the PLA
as an economic actor also operated in this increasingly competitive economy, and hence,
had fewer opportunities to pressure the civilians for economic gains.
The first aspect of economic liberalization was decentralization of authority over
foreign trade via empowering non-central government actors, i.e. “provinces,
municipalities, industrial sectors, and enterprises” (Song 2012, 74). This policy of trade
decentralization broke the monopoly that state trading companies enjoyed. It allowed new
state agencies, various levels of government, and industrial ventures to engage in trading
(Chin 2007, 157). To attract foreign capital, China permitted joint ventures’ formation or
foreign-run businesses; it offered preferential treatment to foreign investors, such as
allowing exports for hard currency, encouraging export by tax holidays, lowering tax rates,
and reducing tariffs. It also encouraged modernization of infrastructure, and promoted
flexible wage and labor policies, and less bureaucracy. In return, its SEZs were expected
to receive foreign capital7, foreign management skills and new technologies (Marti 2002,

6

Harris uses King and Szelenyi’s (2005) Capitalist Development Pathways typology for his argument.

7

World Bank, Foreign Direct Investment, Net Inflows. For example, according to the World Bank data, the
FDI inflows increased from $430 million in 1982 to $43.751 billion in 1998.
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.KLT.DINV.CD.WD?locations=CN
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7-8). In accordance with this overall reform strategy, the Communist Party also sanctioned
PLA’s extensive entrance into new economic domains, which led to both decentralization
of PLA’s economic activities and joint-venture formation.
In 1985, government and the military issued the ‘Provisional Instructions
Concerning the Army’s Engagement in Production, Business and Foreign Trade’ that
officially ordered the expansion of the military’s economic activities (Cheung 2003, 53).
The decentralization strategy led to the establishment of the PLA business at lower levels
of its organization, such as regional unit-level businesses. The PLA also began forming
joint-ventures. Bickford (1994) categorizes PLA ventures into levels of (i) businesses
mainly administered8 by General Logistics Department (GLD), (ii) collective enterprises
of individual units, and (iii) joint ventures. Furthermore, extending beyond generating
funds and operating in domestic market, these ventures entered the international domain,
and operated under conditions of the market economy (Bickford 1994, 461). Newlyestablished PLA firms also varied in their sizes. While regional and unit level firms were
small or mid-sized, the PLA established 20 conglomerates until 1993 (Mulvenon 2001,
104).
Therefore, following decentralization and trade liberalization, the PLA businesses
turned “from a relatively primitive system of farms and factories to a multi-billion-dollar
international business empire of unit-, region-, and sector-based conglomerates, designed
to centralize control of enterprises and exploit economies of scale” from 1978 to 1998

8

Bickford, Chinese Military and Its Business Operations, 461. Although some were also run by the
General Staff Headquarters and the General Political Department.
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(2001, 136). The PLA firms consisted of ventures operating in diverse sectors of economy,
were owned by various levels of military establishment (national, regional, or local units),
and had different sizes (small, medium, or conglomerates).
The striking outcome of the Chinese economic trajectory was the government’s
support for proliferation of new economic actors that operated alongside its old public
sector. In fact, the process of economic reform in China did not encompass rapid
privatization programs common in many post-communist states, or in both Iran and Egypt.
Along with strengthening of its local governments, China also reformed its public sector.
With regard to State Owned Enterprises (SOEs), however, the process of reform did not
include an ambitious privatization plan; discussions on privatizing ensued in later stages of
liberalization, mainly in the 90s. Support for the emergence of new economic actors along
with a delayed process of SOEs’ privatization reduced opportunities for asset-stripping or
capture of state resources in China by economic actors, including the PLA.
The initial policy of SOE reform focused on adopting “the responsibility system”
in 1978—that was granting a selected number of SOEs autonomy9 in determining their
plans for production, marketing, employment, and technological innovation (Huang 2012,
99). The reforms in the 80s gradually increased SOEs’ domain of responsibilities; they did
not eliminate state ownership; instead, China adopted the “contract system” consisting five
contract types with specified responsibilities and rights for the enterprises (Huang 2012,
102). But, the process of privatization did not accelerate until the 90s, more specifically

9

Chow, Economic Reform and Growth in China, 130. Under the responsibility system, SOEs paid fixed
state taxes and had autonomy over their spending.

40

under Jiang Zemin’s10 leadership (1989-2002). In the 90s, the discussion centered on
property rights11 reform; since 1994, a policy known as “emphasizing the big and
liberalizing the small” (Huang 2012, 105) guided the state’s privatization plans; the
government sanctioned the maintenance of 1000 SOEs via a shareholding system, whereas
smaller and medium-sized SOEs were privatized (Huang 2012, 105-106). This strategy of
gradual privatization limited the PLA’s opportunities to assume ownership of the SOEs.
In China, unlike cases of Iran and Egypt, the process of privatization did not lead to transfer
of SOEs to government-affiliated groups, such as crony-networks or the military. The
overall outcome has been relative strengthening of the private sector and emergence of
small economic actors. For example, half of China’s GDP in the early 1980s was produced
by small or mid-sized firms in the service sector and the household farming agricultural
sector. 40 percent of industrial production was by what could be accounted as small sized
firms in industrially advanced states (Yusuf et al 2006, 52). This development impacted
the PLA’s economic production as well.
Throughout the process of reform, the PLA transformed itself from what Cheung
calls “a military production complex” to “a military business complex” (Cheung 2001, 20).
According to Cheung’s classification, PLA’s businesses encompassed army-owned
companies (mainly in service sector), foreign trade companies, along with hotels and

10

Mulvenon and Yang 2002, The People’s Liberation Army as Organization, 7. Run by Central Military
Commission’s members, General Logistics Department is one of four general departments (Staff, Political,
and Equipment) that engage in policy-making for the PLA.
11

Huang, State-Owned Enterprise Reform, 105. The debate was divided into three strands—some linked
SOE efficiency to full autonomy in decision-making, others argued for privatization or divestiture, while
another group blamed inefficiencies on the uncompetitive environment, and not on ownership.
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transportation businesses, military personnel centers, and hospitals (2001, 29-31). For
example, by acknowledging the primacy of foreign trade, PLA’s central headquarters
departments founded trading companies, such as Polytechnologies Ltd., China Xiaofeng
Ltd., and Xinxing Corp. as PLA’s main trading bodies. Trade, however, was not limited to
central headquarters; regional level companies were also eligible to trade. Military units in
the regions began establishing small hotels, transportation companies, local stores, and
hospitals (Cheung 2001, 29-30).
PLA’s enterprises substantially grew in agriculture, industry and service sector. In
agriculture, establishment of fisheries, animal husbandries, food crops, and cash crops
extended PLA’s enterprises beyond historically limited agricultural production such as
farming, fishing, or livestock breeding. In industry, PLA owed small or mid-sized firms in
mining or manufacturing. These firms produced vehicles, pharmaceuticals, textiles,
building materials, machinery, and chemicals. For example, 3700 factories were under
PLA’s control by 1987 producing 62 percent of PLA’s total economic output value. In
service industry as well, PLA ventures grew impressively in areas of hotel and boarding
services, health services (hospitals), real estate, transportation, and technologies and
communications among others (Mulvenon 2001, 86-95).
Table 2: PLA’s Expansion into New Economic Sectors
Industry
vehicles,
pharmaceuticals,
textiles, building
materials,
machinery, and
chemicals

Service Sector

Agriculture

hotel and boarding
services, health
services (hospitals),
real estate,
transportation, and
technologies and
communications

fisheries, animal
husbandries, food
crops, and cash
crops
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Int’l Trade
Polytechnologies
Ltd., China
Xiaofeng Ltd.,
Xinxing Corp.

Alongside decentralization and cautions privatization, China also adopted an
export-oriented strategy. This strategy, incentivized by a foreign exchange rate policy,
empowered local governments and private enterprises to engage in international trade and
exports (Song 2012, 74). Subsequently, non-central government bodies and non-state
actors had to learn to adapt to new circumstances of the international markets. Not only the
reform facilitated origination of economic actors that were not linked to the central
government, it allowed them to assume responsibilities as traders; their success depended
on their performance and their profitability rather than selective protectionism. The PLA’s
businesses also operated in this gradually liberalizing economy; their survival, similar to
other economic actors, depended on their ability to compete with an emerging private
sector.
Regardless of size or their ownership, all PLA enterprises also began pursuing
profitability instead of merely generating fund for the military. Since 1985, with the
decision of the Central Military Commission, PLA’s mission was altered: instead of
protecting the state from a possible nuclear attack, PLA was assigned the task of aiding the
civilian economy. In the context of demobilization of PLA soldiers, and general emphasis
on self-employment and productivity, PLA both reintegrated its discharged soldiers in
businesses and focused on profitability as a goal (Karmel 1997, 105-107). PLA’s focus on
profitability was an offshoot of Chinese governments’ continued support for marketization
and increased competitiveness.
Examining the process of economic liberalization in China reveals a consistent
effort to support to encourage competitiveness, within which the PLA businesses had to
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operate. The data on China’s economic performance supports above conclusion. World
Economic Forum’s growth competitiveness rank suggests China’s increasing economic
competitiveness.
World Bank data also suggests incremental improvements in the GDP growth,
capital inflows, and domestic credit to the private sector.
Table 3: China’s GDP Growth, Domestic Credit to Private Sector, FDI inflows (19802015)
China
GDP growth
Domestic
Credit to
Private
Sector (% of
GDP)
FDI (net
inflows)

1980
$ 191.15
Billion

1990
$360.859
Billion

2000
$1.211 Trillion

2015
$11.065
Trillion

52.627

86.2

111.123

152.552

$ 430 Million
(in 1982)

$ 3.487 Billion

$ 42.095
Billion

$242.489
Billion

From 2010 to 2012, 90% of the Chinese exports were produced by the private
sector. In addition, it was private sector that produced two-thirds/ three-quarter of Chinese
GDP in the same period. While agricultural sector employs 33% of the labor force, service
sector and industry employ 36.1% and 30.01% respectively. 9.2% of the GDP production
is provided by agricultural sector, whereas service sector produces 48.1% and industry
produces 42.7% of the GDP by 201612. China has also registered advancements in the
domain of new technologies and research and design.

12

Eckart, Jonathan, “8 Things You Need to Know About China’s Economy”, World Economic Forum,
June 23, 2016. https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/06/8-facts-about-chinas-economy/
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Table 4:World Economic Forum, China’s indicators of Competitiveness in the last
decade

Company spending
on R&D
Firm-level tech.
absorption
FDI and Tech.
transfer

2004/2005(out
of 104 states)
72 (93)

2005/2006 (out
of 117 states)
31 (35)

2017(out of 134
states)13
25

37 (48)

37 (42)

60

44 (51)

57 (65)
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Due to reforms, China registered both “extensive growth” and “intensive
growth”—increased factor input, and growing productivity and efficacy. IMF analysis
challenges the conventional wisdom attributing the growth mainly to capital increase and
labor inputs. While these factors contributed to the growth, “improvements in productivity
and efficiency” were essential to the success of Chinese reform. Restructuring of resources,
a shift away from agriculture to the more productive sector of manufacturing was central
to growth. Non-state sector development, as well as marketization, has also boosted
productivity. The declining share of SOEs in industrial production, and the increasing role
of non-state enterprises, demonstrate the impact of opening and gradual marketization.
Therefore, growth has not been solely a result of capital accumulation but also caused by
“productivity gains resulting from sectorial reallocation, market-oriented reforms,
technical progress, and external opening” (1997, 123-124).
Scholars emphasize the significance of competitiveness and contribution of nonstate actors to Chinese economic production. Cao (1996) argues that economic

13

World Economic Forum, Global Competitiveness Index: China, 2016-2017 edition,
http://reports.weforum.org/pdf/gci-2016-2017/WEF_GCI_2016_2017_Profile_CHN.pdf
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advancement, whether at regional, sectorial, or enterprise levels, was determined
predominately by market dynamics. For instance, a cluster of profitable businesses with
various ownerships, i.e. state-owned, collectives, funded by foreign partners, townships, or
enterprises owned privately, all shared the strategy of utilizing competitive market forces.
Adjusting to market alterations, and meanwhile extricating oneself from state’s designated
tasks, allocation of fixed-priced materials drove the success. Marketization encouraged
innovation and helped enterprises to reify their capacities; evidence from China illuminates
the vigor of market-oriented policies in pursuit of actualizing a socialist market economy
(Cao, 1996, 3-4).
Yusuf et al. (2006) also concluded that small profit-maximizing units controlled
three quarters of Chinese economy in the early 1980s. This process of reform also
fashioned macroeconomic stability during the initial years. There were low levels of price
increase and inflation. The state provided pensions and benefits for SOEs’ workers, and
suppressed urban industrial labor growth. The banking system did not suffer from the
burden of unprofitable assets. If SOEs could not return their capital loans to the banks, the
state covered. The Chinese state also did not have any international debts during initial
years, and hence, was for the most part macro-economically stable (Yusuf et al. 2006, 5253).
The ultimate outcome has been (i) the emergence of a private sector operating along
with the public one with the private sector producing 90% of China’s exports by 201514,

14

Tsai, The State of China’s Economic Miracle,144.
http://nbr.org/publications/asia_policy/free/091715/AsiaPolicy20_BookReview_Roundtable_July2015.pdf
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(ii) the dominance of mainly small or mid-sized level businesses in this domain, and (iii)
gradual property rights’ reform delaying/or limiting opportunities for state-level colossal
cliental networks’ formation. In this economic environment, firms’ operation under new
conditions depended on their ability to maximize profits. While PLA’s businesses grew
drastically post-liberalization, under conditions of emerging market economy, PLA as an
economic actor as well had to abide by rules of the new system. Hence, based on the
conclusions from Chinese economic policies, what were the implications of these reforms,
the gradual movement towards a competitive economy, for the PLA’s economic activities
and the question of the political control?
The Political Control of the PLA
This section tests hypothesis number one (H1) on political control of the PLA. If
the economic liberalization and privatization led to the establishment of a competitive
market economy, the PLA had limited opportunities to translate its economic power into a
political one. The outcome was increased civilian control. The independent variable is the
specific nature of economic liberalization, and subsequent competitiveness, discussed in
the last section. The increase in the civilian control of the PLA is the dependent variable.
Since the PLA’s businesses were unable to compete as profitable enterprises in an
increasingly competitive economy, the PLA could not leverage its economic power for
political gains. In a relatively competitive economy, the PLA became dependent on the
civilians’ demands, divested its businesses, and returned to barracks.
Regarding Chinese civil-military relations, scholars observed changes in the
civilian control of the PLA in the late 90s and early 2000s. There is a consensus suggesting
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an observable increased civilian control over the PLA and a reduction in the PLA’s political
clout in the following decade of liberalization. There has been an increase in the degree of
the civilian control along two dimensions: responsiveness and military’s assumption of
governmental positions. My dissertation, specifically, focuses on the success of divestiture
as a critical event signaling an increasing PLA responsiveness to their civilians’ demands.
Historically, Chinese militaries engaged in agricultural or industrial production to
fund themselves. This tradition of self-financing continued in the Maoist era15; PLA
participated in the economy to fund itself and to assist with the implementation of
developmental projects (Mulvenon 2001, 36). However, under Deng’s leadership since
1978, the scope of PLA’s economic engagement changed; the PLA businesses proliferation
in diverse economic sectors. Hence, the PLA’s decision to divest its businesses in the 1998
was a puzzling political outcome, especially given both the historical tradition of militaries’
participation in the economy, as well as the PLA’s transformation into an economic
conglomerate. Contemporary reports on divestiture indicated a politically risky decision.
Analysts of Chinese politics (1999) characterized it as “one of the biggest gambles”
(Lawrence and Gilley 1999, par. 1) of Zemin’s career, as well as “one of the most painful
and acrimonious initiatives” of his rule.
In examining changes in China’s civil-military relations (CMR), scholars have
studied political variables, such as inter-elite relations, Chinese Communist Party’s
institutionalization, state capacity-building, and professionalization of the military as
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Mulvenon, Soldiers of Fortune, 36. Securing resources for the Korean War, reducing budgetary pressures
on the state, and Mao’s usage of the military as a means for development justified PLA’s participation in
the economy.
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determining variables. In explaining the divestiture, scholars draw on the above approaches
and offer political explanations for the PLA’s divestiture. In my research, I depart from
those explanations that underscore the role of above-mentioned political variables in the
success of divestiture. Instead, I put the locus of explanation on economic variables. I do
not dismiss the roles of political institutions, state-level changes, and professionalization,
but I argue that the success of divestiture—and succeeding increased political control over
the PLA—was a consequence of economic policies discussed in the previous section. In
this section, I explain why the PLA was not successful in transforming its economic role
into a political one and increasing its leverage over the civilians. Or in other words, I
explain how economic considerations played a crucial role in the PLA’s decision-making
process pushing it to forgo its businesses in 1998.
By testing the H1, I illustrate that the most determinant cause explaining the PLA’s
compliance with divestiture was the cost-effectiveness of maintaining its businesses in a
newly

emerging

competitive

economy.

The

political

variables

of

PLA’s

professionalization and transformation of elite relations were parallel developments that
contributed to the PLA’s compliance with the divestiture. Hence, the evidence suggests
that the PLA’s economic behavior, i.e. its willingness to divest is businesses, was a
consequence of economic policies, and the PLA’s economic cost–benefit considerations.
The outcome was increased civilian control and the PLA’s return to the domain of defense.
As mentioned before, in order to explain PLA loyalty to the Chinese Communist
Party, especially after termination of Mao’s, and to an extent Deng’s personalistic rules,
approaches to the study of CMR place the locus of explanation on political variables.
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Kiselycznyk and Saunders (2010) categorize Chinese CMR analysis into traditional,
combination, and contemporary approaches. The traditional approaches (1989-1995)
include the factional model, symbiosis, professional, and party control 1989-1995. The
combination approach (1995-1997) merges the above models. Finally, contemporary
approaches (1998-2003) focus on the PLA’s social or economic linkages, but offer no
analytical models (Kiselycznyk and Saunders 2010, 11). The factional model examines
elite factions’ rivalries, while coalition models underscore cooperation by considering the
party and the military as functionally separate institutions. Party control models also focus
on Chinese institutions, specifically on institutional peculiarities determining the CMR.
The symbiosis model16 hypothesizes the functional inseparability of the two institutions,
and their ambiguously delineated boundaries due to elites’ movement across institutions in
earlier decades of the CCP rule.
To explain the change from symbiosis to an increasing bifurcation of elite relations
in the mid-90s, scholars studied professionalization as an independent variable. For
example, Kiselycznyk and Saunders (2010) summarize works of Harlan Jencks, Ellis Joffe,
and Paul Godwin. These scholars challenge Huntington’s view on professionalism and
argue that in the case of China, PLA has been a “political force” but its main motivation
has been retaining its institutional interests. Labeling it “political quiescence17”, the PLA
has primarily been concerned with improving its defense capabilities. These scholars

16

Kiselycznyk and Saunders, Civil Military Relations in China, 13. Also known as “dual elite role” or
“interlocking directorate”.
17

Cited in Kiselycznyk and Saunders, Civil Military Relations in China, 15. A characterization offered by
Jencks.
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identify the party-army relations as a “red versus expert” relations (cited in Kiselycznyk
and Saunders 2010, 15). When explaining the divestiture of 1998, the scholars also draw
on above CMR models to explain the PLA’s behavior.
For example, Lee (2006) uses the bifurcation model to explain the success of
divestiture. Lee (2006) uses Huntington’s notion of subjective control but with a caveat—
“strategic subjective control”. Strategic subjective control suggests a shift from subjective
personal control to an institutional subjective control coupled with professionalization of
the PLA. Deng exercised subjective personal control. Professionalization in Chinese
context meant development of institutional mechanisms, bifurcation of civilian and
military institutions, rather than adoption of democratic normative values. Hence, “Pulling
in” of the PLA into the economy in 1979 during Deng, and its “pulling out” during Zemin
in 1998 illustrated civilian elites’ ability to utilize the military in times of transition (Lee
2006, 440-449). While my dissertation does not dispute the gradual bifurcation of China’s
civil-military relations, it challenges the view that assumes a professionalizing PLA would
prefer to focus on defense only. Why would not an economic conglomerate retain its
businesses if it was generating enough profits to fund its defense-related activities?
Explanations based on professionalization thesis do not address four relevant
matters: (i) initial negotiations between the civilians and the military included a promise
by the government to offer a compensation package to the PLA in return for divesting its
businesses, (ii) the civilians began the process of divesting businesses in the mid 1980s—
a process known as rectification. The rectification campaign was not as successful as
divestiture due to resistance from the military. Unless one can prove that the PLA’s degree
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of professionalization changed dramatically within a decade, one cannot attribute a causal
relation between professionalization and divestiture. (iii) PLA’s involvement in economic
activity was in accordance with Chinese militaries’ tradition of self-sufficiency. What
change forced the PLA to break from its tradition of self-financing? (iv) Ultimately, if
professionalization was the cause for divestiture, then why were there reports of tensions
between the civilians and military leaders over divestiture?
I argue that the PLA’s willingness to divest its businesses was not mere
subservience to civilian leaders’ needs but a strategic choice made in accordance with the
broader consensus on encouraging competitiveness. Given China’s steady progress
towards global economic integration, and an incremental but consistent process of
liberalization despite political or economic obstacles, one can conclude there was a
consensus within the society and among the elite to continue the path towards
marketization. In the context of this consensus, the PLA’s mid- and small-sized ventures’
inability to compete effectively was deemed economically costly.
The state’s assertiveness in fostering competitiveness, discussed in detail in the
previous section, the requirement of competiveness to succeed in this new economic
system, and limited opportunities for asset-stripping made the PLA’s businesses reliant on
market forces for profitability. In the context of the emerging competitive private sector,
running parallel to the public one, as well as carefully executed privatization that gradually
transformed the property rights, the PLA fell short of efficiently performing the two tasks
of defense and economic production. Divestiture was the logical outcome, despite the poor
compensation package. There is ample evidence supporting this conclusion.
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For example, PLA’s firms’ annual revenues increased from 1986 to 1995 by 20
percent on average. This growth however declined to 5.5 percent from 1994 to 1996. PLA’s
ability to fund itself also declined since 1990. Their after-tax profits (as percentage of
defense expenditure) was 3.34% in 1985. Those profits reached to 12% in 1989; from 1990
to 1992, PLA’s profits were about 11%. However, by 1996, the profits fell to 7.36%
(Cheung 2001, 150). The PLA firms’ performance began to decline. Two-third of PLA
factories were registering losses. Although the service industry was the most profitable
sector, it comprised only 40% of the PLA profits, while firms in this sector were prone to
corruption and tax evasion (Cheung 2001, 151).
Reports indicated both low levels of productivity and presence of corrupt practices.
For example, with regard to PLA firms’ competitiveness, Mulvenon (2001) reviews PLA
firms’ sector-level productivity. The government was concerned for decentralized and
uncoordinated nature of PLA businesses, as well as the their “poor integration”, which led
to low output. For example, Larger PLA enterprises in the late 80s produced one-third less
than other SOEs (Cheung 2001, 42-44). In the agricultural sector, despite regulations and
organizational reforms to improve PLA firms’ agricultural production, the overall profit
was low. Since this sector was not as lucrative, the crime in this economic domain was
relatively lower too (Mulvenon 2001). However, both corruption and misconduct at various
levels were detrimental for PLA businesses’ profitability. Discussing the PLA businesses’
losses, Karmel explains, “the high profits and taxes from some businesses… [were] almost
certainly eaten away by high expenses and losses.” While one-third of state businesses
registered losses, the PLA’s enterprises’ profits were less than average relative to other
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state-owned ones, with more than 40 percent of its businesses losing money in the 1990s
(Karmel 1997, 110-111).
Cheung (2001) divides PLA businesses’ growth into two periods coinciding with
the Seventh Five-Year Plan (1986-1990), and part of the Eight Five-Year Plan (19911993). From 1986 to 1990, the government encouraged emergence of new PLA enterprises,
which facilitated a fast growth of service sector firms in the coastal regions; the regional
military units owned these firms and earned seven times more profits (also paid taxes) in
1990 than they did in 1985. Like township and village enterprises (TVEs), 90 percent of
these firms were small-sized (low capital and small labor size) and primarily mushroomed
in the regions. Producing cheap labor-intensive goods, these firms were primarily
autonomous with low government support. Due to lack of adequate government
monitoring, however, in a few years, these firms began engaging in illicit activities,
specifically smuggling of illegal goods.
Furthermore, competition in the market economy created new demands. Local
businessmen and regional governments expected the PLA to compete fairly and to give-up
its monopolies. An evidence of such change in attitudes was local Shanxi Province’s local
government’s demand to end PLA’s monopoly over mines. PLA owned overall 150 major
mines and sold its products either to the government or in the market. Officials of Shanxi
Province, however, demanded the Central Government to stop PLA’s price manipulations.
To resolve the tensions, the Central Government ordered the PLA to transfer more than
sixthly mines to the local officials (Mulvenon 2001, 94).
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Ultimately, various PLA companies and enterprises competed with one another
over market share. Mulvenon (1997) questioned the conventional wisdom that considered
the PLA’s enterprises as part of “a larger commercially-oriented strategy”. He identified
three kinds of businesses in China: defense-industrial companies18, military companies19,
and civilian ones. Military businesses were run by non-civilians. The bureaucracy20 in
charge of the defense-industrial companies is distinct, unlike the popular belief. These
businesses are bureaucratically separated; their profits allocations are disjointed as well.
The author suggests that even military-related companies competed for market-share in
both China and the US, and should be viewed as competitors rather than cooperators (1997,
5-9).
Mulvenon’s conclusion implies that PLA’s corporate activities were uncoordinated
and competed over market share. “There is little centralized coordination among the
literally thousands of businesses with military affiliations”, reported the BBC, describing
how individual or retired officers, or even civilians run these ventures, and the GLD was
unaware of the actual numbers of these businesses. June Teufel Dreyer, an expert on
Chinese politics, referred to the PLA as an entrepreneurial army resembling “feudal
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Mulvenon, Professionalization of Chinese Officer Corps, 5-9. Defense industrial companies were civilian
and accountable to ministers, or the Premier as the head of the government’s State Council.
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Mulvenon, 1997, 5-6three General Departments (Staff, Political, and Logistical), military regions and
districts, reserve or active-duty personnel of three branches of military, as well as Strategic Rocket Forces,
are authorized to engage in regulated economic activities. They pay taxes to General Logistics Department
(GLD) and reinvest their profits on improving themselves.
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The Commission on Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND) was founded
in 1982 to centralize supervision over defense-industrial companies and respond to the Central Council and
Central Military Commission, which made many believe that defense-industrial companies’ proceeds are
directed to the PLA.
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Chinese warlords”. ‘It’s not a state within a state, but fiefdoms within a state’, states Dreyer
in an interview to BBC21. Uncoordinated and market-reliant, PLA businesses were
pressured to operate as profitable firms. The PLA started generating income but it also
began grappling with corruption and losses, especially at lower levels. The presented data
thus far suggests unprofitability and uncompetitive nature of the PLA businesses operating
in an increasingly competitive economy. Unable to compete effectively, the PLA’s
complied with the civilians.
Scholars also have cited the costliness of maintaining the PLA businesses as a
justification for divestiture. For example, Bingman (2009) analyzes SOEs’ costliness. He
states that the SOEs, including the PLA businesses, were extremely incompetent and
operated with deficits; the money spent on maintaining these businesses diverted resources
from in the military. Additionally, there was a system of subsidies keeping these PLA
businesses afloat. The businesses that were profitable produced civilian goods. Hence, it
was reasonable to divest them by returning them to the competitive civilian sector
(Bingman 2009, 98). In agreement with Bingman’s assessment, my central argument also
suggests that the PLA’s inability to profit from its businesses was the reason behind its
willingness to divest its businesses. The implication of this economic behavior on civilmilitary relations was increasing PLA’s dependence on the civilians for both funding and
legitimacy.
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“Business, the Economy: China’s Army Goes Out of Business”, bbc.com, December 15,
1998.http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/235592.stm
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The divestiture campaign was a direct response to the dangers of corruption on
functionality of market and competition. Since the central government collected revenues
through tariffs, and relied on taxation money collected from SOEs, smuggling impacted
the state budget (Yang 2004, 115). The conflict of interests between central and local
governments led the central government to begin a crackdown on illicit activities in 1990s,
particularly under Zemin after the CCP meeting in mid-July 1998. Like other institutions,
the PLA was also ordered to put its house in order. (Yang 2004, 118). The extensive and
heavy-handed crackdown was set in motion by employing the whole machinery of the
state. The purpose of the crackdown was not solely saving the state revenue. The civilians
led by Zemin were concerned about the role of businesses run by the military, the police,
the judiciary, and various government and party institutions since they impeded market
functionality. the process of marketization due to utilization of their privileges or because
of existing corruption. For instance, even in 1989, Wang Mengkui, a State Council advisor
warned about the dangers of corruption in the PLA both for morale and for its impact on
the development of market institutions (Yang, 126). Yang argues that the character of
divestiture, its “swift implementation,” illustrated the primacy of political decision-making
and civilian elites’ assertiveness (Yang 2004, 134). In addition, the divestiture was in line
with an effort to transform “the Chinese state into a regulator state and creating a fairer
economic environment22” (Yang 2004, 143).
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Yang, Remaking the Chinese Leviathan, 143-144. This was due to the government’s push to further
decrease the supervisory role of the ministries over SOEs; instead of sectoral agencies, the macro level
agencies assumed the role of supervisors and regulators, which meant decreased role of the central
government agencies over regulation and ownership. For example, 4 asset management companies and 18
enterprise groups were a result of combining 1546 PLA ventures in provinces, along with 50 governmental
institutions.
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In explaining the reasons behind the success, Yang offers three explanations: 1low levels of opposition from PLA leaders, 2- a compensation package offered to the PLA
decreased incentives for resistance, and 3- an increased competitive environment made it
less attractive to maintain businesses for the PLA. The PLA’s inability to compete under
market conditions had diminished their profitability; hence, their contribution to the
defense budget was in decline. Although firms that were linked to the General Logistics
Department— such as Sanjiu Group and Poly Group— were successful, the rest, especially
small ones, were not profitable (Yang 2004, 140-141). Yang concludes the following:
“the declining profitability of businesses in an exceedingly competitive business
environment appears to have provided the single most important incentive for the
military and other institutions to give up their commercial operations that have quite
often become a financial burden” (Yang 2004, 141).
In agreement with Yang’s argument, this chapter has illustrated how the process of
economic reform conditioned the PLA’s economic behavior, both its expansion into new
economic domains and its decision to retrench from economic domain. The PLA’s
increasing responsiveness was a result of its growing independence on civilians following
its inability to maintain its businesses effectively.
There are alternative accounts that explain the PLA’s return to barracks. For
example, Jencks (1989) points to the older generation’s resistance to reforms, but
emphasizes the determining role of young, professional, and less-politicized military
personnel (266). In his analysis, however, Jencks also acknowledges the problem of low
profitability; he explains that concerns over low profitability of the PLA’s businesses
existed prior to Zemin’s leadership. From 1978 to 1985, the PLA removed itself from
construction and police work in order to focus exclusively on defense. It was in the mid58

80s that lower level units entered into production, profitability became imperative, and
problems emerged. Economic production became the PLA’s major preoccupation, and it
even became susceptible to the illegal activities of local authorities and SOEs (Jencks 1989,
265). While generational change could be a plausible reason for the PLA officers’
compliance with the divestiture, it doesn’t take into account new officers’ decision-making
logic. After all, the new generation had experienced a new PLA, the one involved both in
the economy and defense. Additionally, Jencks, himself, focuses on the economic loss as
an important dimension of in Chinese CMR. Even if the generational change impacted the
PLA’s decision-making process, it does not exclude the importance of PLA businesses’
unprofitability as a deciding factor.
Mulvenon (2007) also challenges the following schools of thought in explaining
the divestiture: one stresses Zemin attempts to reaffirmed civilian control over the PLA;
the other underscores the military leaderships’ discontent with corruption as a motivating
force for divestiture. The first school offers its evidence based on Zemin’s choices, and his
attempt to create his own cult of personality, for instance being named “a supreme leader”
by military officers (Mulvenon 2007, 225). The second school studies the bargaining
process between the two distinct institutions of the military and civilians 23. In disagreement
with above explanations, Mulvenon (2007) maintains that divestiture questioned the
bargaining process. Despite common belief, the civilians did not hold their end of the
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Mulvenon, The PLA in the New Economy: Plus Ca Change, Plus C’est la Meme Chose, 225-226. This
explanation sees the divestiture as a bargain between military and civilian leaders whereby (i) PLA
enterprises had to be transferred to local and regional governments in a one-time process, and (ii) PLA yearly
budget had to increase.
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bargain24. The PLA received less than expected in compensation both in absolute and
relative terms; the compensation did not cover the PLA enterprises’ losses (Mulvenon
2007, 227). This is a significant conclusion: first, it suggests increased dependence of the
PLA on the civilians. Secondly, by highlighting PLA’s demands for compensation, it
undermines those arguments that underscore the role of PLA’s professionalization as a
determinant variable. If professionalization was the reason behind compliance, why were
there reports of tensions between civilians and military elite?
Not only was the process of divestiture kept relatively secret, interviews with PLA
leaders indicated “heavily strained” relations between civilians and the military. There
were two main reasons behind the PLA’s dissatisfaction: damage to the PLA’s reputation
due to publicized information on corruption and a poor compensation package25 (Lawrence
and Gilley 1999, par. 2-3). For example, US intelligence reported tensions between premier
Zhu Rongji and the PLA after Zhu commented on smuggling by Tiancheng, an important
company owned by the PLA’s General Political Department. Zhu pointed to the company’s
failure to pay 50 million renminbi in sales and import taxes (Lawrence and Gilley 1999,
par. 7). there were also fears of serious tensions between civilians and the PLA, which were
expected to emerge over Taiwan policy or other security-related issues, such a Chinese
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weapons’ proliferation policy or its foreign policy in South China Sea territorial disputes
(Lawrence and Gilley1999, par. 6). Experts also expressed concerns regarding Zemin’s
decision. Huang Jing, a Utah State University expert on Chinese economics, states that “I
am a person who is generally positive on PLA reforms, but in this case, I think Jiang has
lost more than he gained.” (Lawrence and Gilley 1999, par. 6).
Furthermore, the divestiture campaign was not civilians’ first attempt to limit the
PLA’s business activities. Concerned with problems associated with low productivity and
corruption, the Chinese state adopted measures to address both inefficiencies and
corruption in the 80s. For example, In the industrial sector, series of reforms aimed at
making firms competitive and reliant on the market forces. The reforms, however, failed
to improve the situation because the PLA firms still relied on subsidies; their labor force
was also inefficient. Furthermore, PLA firms’ competition over raw material and market
share contributed to what Mulvenon characterized as “underindustrialization and serious
waste” (2001, 91-92).
As in the broader efforts to direct the process of reform, PLA smuggling was
addressed by new regulations. To address corruption in the PLA, the state embarked on a
process known as rectification in 1988–1990 that prohibited the following activities by
military units: import of restricted commodities, production and sale of low quality
commodities, utilization of military equipment for economic production purposes, using
infrastructure for smuggling, unapproved usage of personnel for economic activities, price
distortions, and operation of business by active-duty or retired personnel (Cheung 2001,
43). Additionally, Civilian elites, as well as the General Logistics Department began
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adopting measures to address illegalities and inefficiencies. For example, in the late 1980s,
the Central Military Commission (CMC) prohibited military departments from
participating in commercial activities, specifically those involved in trade. In 1989, among
other economic activities26, the military was banned from importing restricted commodities
(equipment, cars, electrical appliances, accessories). (Cheung 2001). Several attempts
aimed at limiting the military’s economic activities, however, failed in effectively curbing
illicit activities.
Therefore, evidence of rectification campaign in the 80s and existence of tensions
between the civilians and the military over the divestiture in 1998 undermines the
professionalization thesis. Additionally, while in some places PLA handed over its
businesses, in other cases, it tried to maintain the management and profits of its businesses,
especially in strategic sector companies such as China United Airlines and Great Wall
Telecom. Another strategy the PLA units used in order to keep their businesses was
reclassification of military enterprises to non-military ones (Mulvenon 1-3). It is also worth
noting that the divestiture never completed, but about 10,500 enterprises were transferred
in one year impacting 70,000 workers. Nevertheless, there were still 10,000 PLA ventures,
as well as SOEs, that remained under the PLA’s control in 2009. More importantly,
Bingman explains that the divestiture took place in the context of valuing “competitive
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contracting” under the conditions of a market economy, and that the PLA “dumped mostly
the low-end debt ridden activities onto local governments” (2009, 98-100).
Although Mulvenon dismisses the local media’s perception of tensions between
civilians and the military over divestiture, but he, also, stressed the importance of the
existence of negotiations between military and civilians over both a compensation package
and defense budget. It appears that disagreements came from tensions within the military,
with senior military leadership and combat units favoring divestiture whereas regional and
district commanders and members of the departments of logistics and management of
enterprises opposing it. Since the idea of compensation hinged upon what might be called
‘the trickle-down theory of PLA economics,’ local military units were suspicious of
receiving profits out of this deal. The PLA adopted measures to calm discontent by
increasing rank and file wages by 10 to 25 percent. Regardless, military units resisted
divestiture by folding their enterprises under other institutions or handing over the
unprofitable ventures but meanwhile protecting the profitable ones (Mulvenon 1-3).
Above discussed discrepancies in the PLA’s behavior suggests that it divested its
businesses because of their lack of profitability as oppose to other political considerations.
The proliferation of the PLA ventures at lower levels, and a privatization policy limiting
prospects for capture of state resources, coupled with increasing economic competitiveness
created conditions where the PLA’s firms’ survival depended on their profitability. The
PLA’s smaller firms’ inability to compete did not leave the PLA with any choice but
relinquishing its lower level business assets. The ultimate outcome was increased civilian
authority.
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Explanations that rely on political variables are fruitful for understanding the
changing nature of CMR in China; however, they fail to fully explain the PLA’s economic
behavior regarding submission to divestiture, which led to increased civilian control. The
1998 divestiture was, in reality, a culmination of previous rectification campaigns.
Moreover, the PLA’s continued compliance despite the poor compensation package was
also puzzling. These approaches offer explanations for PLA decision to divest but fail to
account for the causal mechanism behind the decision-making process, that is the role of
economic considerations in decision making.
The specifics of economic reform, i.e. the focus on trade liberalization,
decentralized center-regional relations, and the gradual reform of property rights, produced
two significant outcomes: the emergence of small- and mid-sized ventures in the regions
and a private sector parallel to the state, and the reliance of newly emerged enterprises on
playing market rules for productivity. These developments impacted the PLA businesses
as well, since not only did lower-levels units begin expanding, they also focused on
profitability as a goal. Divestiture targeted the lower-level economic ventures to curb the
effects of illegal smuggling, as well as low profitability, in the regions. Since the reform
process had created dispersed and uncoordinated PLA businesses—or in other words, there
were considerable numbers of lower-level businesses and the PLA businesses did not
operate as unified entities—the PLA’s top brass did not have incentives to sanction the
continuation of regional units’ operation.
Therefore, the consensus between military and political leaders to focus on
professionalization of the PLA was part of the decision-making equation regarding the
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divestiture, but the fact that PLA’s economic performance in the regions was poor
ultimately decided the outcome. In the absence of opportunities for economic expansion,
the PLA did not have enough economic reason, or leverage, to pursue economic activities.
Subsequently, it did not have enough incentive to resist divestiture and transform its
economic power into political power. The PLA’s compliance might have been partially
influenced by the political determinants of professionalization and party–military
bifurcation, but the determinant cause was the absence of or gradual decrease in
opportunities for economic expansion outside of market mechanisms.
The Functional Control of the PLA
This section tests hypothesis number two (H2) concerning the impact of economic
policies on the functional control. According to H2, if gradual economic integration
generates income for the state, the economically active military (the PLA) will have fewer
opportunities to turn itself into an economic interest group, and the subsequent outcome
would be a possible increase of the PLA’s functional control. By examining available data
on the Chinese military doctrine, defense expenditure, weapon procurement, organizational
restrictions, and recruitment policies, this section examines PLA’s functional capabilities.
With regard to integration, the PLA’s record has been mixed. Military doctrine has
undergone changes for decades to match the demands of a changing international
environment, but the actual capacity to carry out new tasks has not met expectations.
Military doctrine has transformed from “people’s war” (1935-1979), to “people’s war
under modern conditions” (1979-1985), “limited war” (1986-1991), “limited war under
high technology conditions” (1991-2005), and ultimately “limited war under high
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technology and information conditions” (Mulvenon 2007, 84).

Doctrinal changes

demonstrate the Chinese leaders’ ability to asses and adapt to the international security
environment. Since mid 1980s, along with economic liberalization process, the military
doctrine also echoed China’s shift of attention to procurement of new technologies. A
change from a people’s war doctrine to preparedness to conventional wars under new
technological conditions suggest a shift in planning and priorities.
For example, since the Gulf War of 1991, China manifested a new direction in its
doctrine by investing in new technology, especially electronic warfare and
countermeasures, ballistic missile systems, early warning and command systems27.
Correspondingly, the Commission on Science, Technology, and Industry for National
Defense (COSTIND) pressed for improving China’s industrial base. The PLA began
reorganizing and learning new skills, and adopted what Shambaugh names “flexible
response”—that is the PLA’s attempt to improve capabilities that would allow it to face
conventional war, nuclear war (or WMBs), air-to-air or coastal and naval battles, and force
deployments in the peripheries (Shambaugh 2002, 69-72). Similarly, Chase et al. (2015)
point out the impressive transformation for a military that was referred to as “junkyard
army,” characterized by low quality weaponry, personnel, and training, as well as by
rampant corruption (13-14).
Hence, the data illustrates the overall success of economic reform and its
contribution to GDP growth; the growth enabled civilians to invest in military
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modernization without heavily burdening the state. The quality of the functional control,
i.e. the nature of weapons and ability to trade-offs in mobility, has also increased. China
has invested in the production of new weapons as well as in weapons procurement. It’s
ability to utilize those weapons, i.e. the skills aspects of functional control, however, has
not kept pace. Therefore, while budgetary increases, as well as investing in China’s
industrial base, have led to its overall technological modernization, the training of soldiers
to utilize new equipment has been slow.
China’s Military-Industrial Complex (CMIC) is the main provider of the weaponry
to PLA’s ground-forces, air-force, navy, and missile forces. For example, since 1960s,
China has masterfully produced short and mid-range, and intercontinental ballistic
missiles. Production of competitive surface-to-air and surface-to-surface missiles in the
1980s was another accomplishment. However, overall, the CMIC hasn’t been successful
in production of modern weaponry (Shambaugh 2005, 85). Bitzinger (2000) also elaborates
Chinese Industrial Complex’s capabilities to produce and utilize advanced military
technology. The industrial complex has incrementally advanced for the past two decades,
but the overall progression has been limited since some areas of technology have been
developing relatively better than others (Bitzinger 2000, 9-10).
Improvements in the civilian technologies, specially advancements in science and
technology, has also benefited the military from overall advances in tech and science. In
the domain of the defense solely, China has aimed at producing “long-range precisionstrike, command, control, communications, computing, and intelligence (CI), information
warfare, and area denial”. With regard to other technologies, such as commercial dual-use
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technologies in areas of aerospace, shipbuilding, and microelectronics, China purchases
them from Russia, Israel, and some Western states (Bitzinger 2000, 11-16). These findings
suggest that overall economic development has assisted China in enhancing its functional
capabilities. Therefore, there is clear evidence of increasing functional control prior to and
post economic liberalization. China’s ability to produce competitive weaponry occurred in
the aftermath of its modernization plan—following economic liberalization.
Examining functional capabilities reveals a consistent effort on the civilians’ part
to address the inefficiencies. For example, two factors of institutional reorganization and
marketization contributed to the shift in military production in 2001. Establishment of PLA
General Armaments Department in 1998 and demotion of Commission on National
Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND) allowed for new
supervisory body to introduce successful reforms. More importantly, modifying the CMIC
from a state-owned and heavily subsidized organization to that of sensitive to market
mechanisms was another major step. The process has been incremental (mainly since
2004), but introduction of contract-bidding was imperative in reforming the CMIC’s
procurement process (Shambaugh 2005, 87). Economic liberalization policies, not only
increased state’s budget and its ability to invest in the military, they also sanctioned growth
of an industrial base capable of producing weaponry.
Analysis underscores the importance of continued economic success on improving
military capability. Projecting the PLA’s modernization process through 2025, Chase et al.
(2015) list slowing economic growth, social instability, and possible violence in Tibet as
some of the factors that could possibly change the current trajectory. Since economic
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growth and the subsequent growth of the defense budget, without burdening the GDP and
government spending, were imperative in the success of the modernization project, RAND
predicts that a decline in growth, as well as negative externalities of growth, could be
detrimental to defense spending and modernization plans (2015, 21-22). Therefore,
economic policies and economic growth are imperatives in creating suitable conditions for
increasing functional capabilities.
With regard to skill and training, however, China is not as efficient as modern
armies. It appears that increase in functional control has been linked to changes in the
strategy, weapons procurement, and modernization due to the economic growth. But the
actual capacity in utilizing those new resources is weak. Chase et al. (2015) examine “two
incompatibles” and “two gaps” prevalent in Chinese discourse on PLA efficacy since 2006.
The “incompatibles” are (i) the gaps between the level of modernization and the capability
for winning a local war in the information age, and (ii) between the military’s current
capability and its historical mission.
The two incompatibles and two gaps assess the same issue from different angles,
i.e. the former states the problem while the latter identifies the root causes. The problems
include an incongruence between training and required skills to win in combat in an
“informatized” age; organizational and structural problems, as well as personnel’s
inaptness to carry out the tasks of modern warfare; obstacles for force development due to
structural inefficiencies; and ultimately ineffective logistics. In terms of the PLA’s ability
to carry out historical tasks, with the exclusion of force development, the related areas of
training, organization, and logistics lag behind (2015, 69-72).
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Despite disadvantages28, as mentioned before, Chinese authorities have been
adopting measures to address systemic weaknesses, which indicates a willingness to invest
in functional capacity. For example, in order to address its shortcomings in the quality of
personnel, PLA accepts graduates from science and engineering schools, and programs to
pay for student loans in return for joining the PLA has been put in place. Higher education
requirements for admission, and better pay and benefits are other strategies (Blasko 2012,
Kindle Locations 2012, 5499-5501).
In conclusion, the PLA’s functional capability has improved post-liberalization.
Economic growth has generated funds for the state to invest in military modernization. It
has also strengthened the industrial base, which has contributed to weapons production
programs. The state’s capacity to invest in the military’s capabilities has also meant that
the civilian and military leaders were responsive to the changing international security
environment, and adapted its military doctrine.
The Social Control of the PLA
According to hypothesis number 3 (H3), if gradual economic reform reduces
opportunities for transformation of militaries into economic interest groups, social control
would either remain the same or increase. As a dependent variable, social control refers to
militaries’ values and their compatibility with societal norms, both domestically and
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internationally. Militaries’ social control is measured by observable changes in military
values and attitudes. Therefore, the social control changes if the military’s values either do
not reflect the collective values of the society or transform in accordance to changes in
societal values. This section argues that during the period of illegal smuggling in the 1980s,
the PLA’s values did not reflect the overall values of the communist revolution, as well as
traditional values of the PLA. However, since the PLA could not transform itself into an
economic interest group, it has been able to maintain its commitment to both communist
and traditional Chinese values pertaining to militaries’ position in society.
In terms of the PLA’s military culture, a Report by Kaufman and Mackenzie (2009)
explains PLA’s cultural transformation. Both Chinese traditional military thinking and
teachings of Marxism-Leninism contributed to the PLA’s culture. From Marxist-Leninist
thinking, the PLA concludes the importance of “party-army principle”, “mass
mobilization”, “broad consultation, limited participation”, and “voluntarism”. There is a
belief in prominence of morality vis-à-vis material capability, and calling itself a “people’s
army”. Hence, PLA defines a moral obligation to treat people humanely and its personnel
with kindness. PLA perceives itself morally superior to average citizens and is expected to
garner populations’ support by modeling socialist morality and behavior29. If the PLA
prided itself on being the “people’s army”, its illegal smuggling and corruption in the 1980s
illustrated how the liberalization and privatization complicated the above aspect of the
social control. However, throughout decades of communist rule, the PLA has remained
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loyal to the values of communism and, when necessary, has sided with the ruling elite and
their social constellations that favored early revolutionary values.
There is also consistency with Chinese traditional values of humanitarianism and
the PLA’s practices. Drawing on Confucian tradition of “Soldiers must be righteous,
violence must be directed at the right targets” (cited in Wenjuan 2013, 6), the PLA is trained
to value humanitarianism in its conduct (Wenjuan 2013, 6). Hence, the PLA’s social values
have not changed post-liberalization. Wenjuan (2013) argues that both the Chinese
government and the PLA have been implementing measures in compliance with
international humanitarian law (IHL). Not only does China have a tradition of
humanitarianism, it also has both ratified and undertaken legal measures to implement IHL.
China is signatory to Hague Convention (ratified in 1917), Geneva Convention
(ratified in 1956), Additional Protocol I & II (ratified in 1983), The Hague Cultural
Property Convention (2000), Treaties on the Use of Certain Weapons (ratified in 2000),
and Geneva Gas Protocol (ratified in 1952). It promotes further expansion of these
protocols; it also supports Biological Weapons Convention, Chemical Weapons
Convention, and Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. (Wenjuan 2013, 8-15).
China has adopted legal measures domestically to implement the above-mentioned
protocols. For example, article 67 of National Defense Law of PRC sanctions the military
to comply with international treaties. “Export Control of Dual Use Biological Agents and
Related Equipment and Technologies Regulation” and “Export Control of Chemical
Products and Related Equipment and Technologies Regulation” are among other
legislature enacting compliance with conventions. In addition, it has actively supported
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international criminal justice cases , has a history of complying with the Geneva
Convention during its wars, and has incorporated international humanitarian law’s
education into the PLA’s curriculum (Wenjuan 2013, 8-15).Therefore, PLA’s loyalty in
upholding humanitarian values suggests that despite its economic activities postliberalization, the PLA did not transform its social values.
Therefore, in terms of social control, China’s economic reform policies have not
changed the PLA’s social values. The PLA remains a professional army loyal to the CCP.
As a professional institution, it does assert itself in areas relevant to its expertise but it does
not operate as an economic interest group.
Conclusion
This chapter argued that a relative success in establishing a competitive economy,
gradual privatization coupled with reforming regulatory frameworks, limited opportunities
for asset-stripping. Although there was corruption in the form of illegal smuggling,
economic actors and primarily the PLA did not have opportunities to capture state
resources. Moreover, state’s commitment to establish market mechanisms manifested itself
in its persistence in reforming regulations regarding PLA businesses. Under conditions of
an emerging market mechanisms, the PLA businesses were also expected to operate as
profitable firms. However, PLA was not successful in maintaining its economic production
effectively. Its firms registered losses and could not compete with an emerging private
sector. The outcome was PLA’s subservience to the civilian demands by divesting its
businesses in 1998. Unable to profit economically, the PLA became more dependent on its
civilian counterparts for both funding and legitimacy. Furthermore, unable to transform
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itself into an economic interest group, the EAF’s functional and social controls have
increased and remained the same respectively.
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Chapter 4: Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps: An established but nonDomineering Economic and Political Player

Introduction
As a consequence of Mahmood Ahmadinejad’s privatization and economic
liberalization policies from 2004 to 2013, businesses of Islamic Revolutionary Guard
Corps (IRGC) expanded into new sectors of the Iranian economy, including finance, trade,
and oil and gas. Not only did the IRGC become a more visible economic player a result of
this expansion, it also amassed a considerable degree of political leverage that culminated
in the so called “election coup” in 2009 that brought Mahmood Ahmadinejad into power30.
Subsequently, many analysists and politicians, including then U.S. secretary of state,
Hillary Clinton, warned about Iran’s transformation into a military dictatorship31.
Furthermore, many cautioned that the Iranian economy was becoming militarized. Belying
these speculations, the IRGC failed to dominate Iran’s economy or politics. It did, however,
succeed in establishing itself as a significant economic and political player. The IRGC is
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not the most dominant actor but it has amassed enough leverage to engage in the process
of bargaining with the ruling elite.
This chapter will illustrate how Iran’s uneven liberalization process since 1989 both
conditioned the IRGC’s economic role-expansion and constrained its ability to completely
dominate the economy, and consequently, the political arena. On the one hand,
privatization policies facilitated the proliferation of crony-networks, including the IRGC
businesses, in a semi-public economic domain that operates parallel to the private and state
sectors. On the other hand, haphazard economic planning failed to establish a competitive,
diversified economy. In this uncompetitive economic system, the survival of the IRGC’s
businesses did not depend on their profitability; this uncompetitive economy created
conditions that facilitated the maintenance of the IRGC businesses. However, competition
among the crony-networks operating in the semi-public domain constrained the IRGC’s
ability to capture the state completely. The outcome has been the establishment of the
IRGC as an economic actor that has enough leverage to engage in negotiations with the
dominant elite but has been unable to gain sole control of Iran’s economy and politics. The
rest of this chapter will explain Iran’s economic trajectory, the IRGC’s position in Iran’s
economy, and its economic behavior, and finally the impact of economic policies on three
dimensions of military control.
Economic Conditions and the IRGC’s Economic Behavior
When Ahmadinejad came to power, Iran had already undergone two decades of
inconsistent and unorganized liberalization and privatization. This uneven economic
trajectory impacted the economic power of the IRGC in three ways: (i) the acceleration of
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privatization since 2004 provided the IRGC with opportunities to capture the state
resources, (ii) the economic system characterized by overall lack of competitiveness meant
that the IRGC could keep its businesses despite their unprofitability, and ultimately (iii),
the IRGC, unlike the case of Egyptian Armed Forces, failed to dominate Iran’s economy
and politics. Iran’s caveat, compared to China and Egypt, lied in the existence of
competition among the crony-networks operating in Iran’s extensive semi-public economic
sector; established and consolidated throughout decades of haphazard privatization, these
crony-networks checked the IRGC’s economic ambitions. The rest of this section will
delineate two parallel developments: the trajectory of IRGC’s economic role expansion
and the overall economic processes that conditioned and constrained the IRGC’s economic
behavior.
The IRGC’s Economic Expansion
It was during Rafsanjani’s presidency (1989–1997) that the IRGC became an
economically-active military. Rafsanjani—who assumed office in the aftermath of the IranIraq war (1980-1988)—focused on combined goals of economic liberalization and
reconstruction32. Known as the “Reconstruction Era33”, the government focused on
rebuilding Iran’s war-torn economy by addressing inefficiencies of central-planning and
undertaking massive developmental projects. To implement his modernization plans,
Rafsanjani ordered the IRGC to engage in economic reconstruction projects; it was a
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strategy to both demobilize the IRGC in the aftermath of war and to utilize its capacities
for economic development34.
The scope of the IRGC’s economic activities changed with its expansion into new
economic sectors concomitant with the acceleration of liberalization and privatization since
2004–2005. This period corresponded to the final two years of Khatami’s presidency
(1997-2005) and primarily the period of Ahmadinejad’s presidency (2005-2013). The
IRGC expanded into new economic sectors, such as oil and gas, and finance. Although the
data is inconclusive, the estimates suggest that the IRGC businesses produced at least one
third of Iran’s GDP by 201035—during Ahmadinejad’s first tenure. According to the
WikiLeaks cables, the IRGC’s total assets by 2010 were about $180-$250 billion36. While
there is no available data on the total assets of the IRGC before privatization, local analysts
estimated that Rafsanjani’s sold $7 billion worth of State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) during
his privatization plan, whereas by the beginning of 2005, the government sold $50 billion
worth of assets, the majority of them to the IRGC37.
It is worth noting that in the cases of China and Egypt militaries became
economically-active during the periods of central planning. The IRGC’s economic roleexpansion, however, occurred during Rafsanjani’s liberalization period when the
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government intended to curb inefficiencies caused by economic nationalization that was
adopted post 1979 Revolution. Despite this seemingly different context, my research
accounts for Rafsanjani’s presidency as a period of central planning for three reasons: (i)
the emphasis of the government was primarily on state-led reconstruction, (ii) the
liberalization process was short-lived, caused a short-term debt crisis, and was reversed,
and (iii) Article 44 of the constitution, adopted post-revolution, allocated the control of key
industries to the state sector38; That meant the government had limited options for
privatization. In addition to the above-mentioned developments, it was with the leadership
of Rafsanjani that Iran’s semi-public sector grew with significant implications pertaining
to the IRGC’s economic power in the following decades.
Therefore, regarding to both overall economic planning and the IRGC’s economic
role-expansion, Rafsanjani’s period resembled periods of central-planning in Egypt and
China. Similar to the cases of the People’s Liberation Army and the Egyptian Armed
Forces, the IRGC was primarily involved in economic development projects. The IRGC,
in 1989, with Khomeini’s approval, established Khatam Al-Anbia39, its engineering
company. Its commanders assumed managerial positions in the firm. The reason for
Khatam Al-Anbia’s establishment, according to the supreme leader’s representative, was
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utilization of the IRGC’s war-era machinery and equipment for reconstruction projects40.
In an interview with Entekhab newspaper in 2014, Rafsanjani justified his decision to
assign the IRGC economic projects. Specifically in reference to Karkheh Dam’s project,
Rafsanjani stated that “…[the IRGC] had acquired machinery for the [Iran-Iraq] war. It
had bought bulldozers, trucks, loaders, and cranes required for Karkheh Dam’s
embankment, and accomplished the task easily and quickly. It did a quick job but did not
own anything.”
The extensive nationalization of industries, sanctioned by the Article 44 of the
constitution, marginalized the private sector. Since 2004, however, the Guardian Council41
issued a directive permitting privatization of “foreign trade, banking, insurance, power
generation for domestic consumption and export, telecom and postal service, railway,
airlines, and shipping” 42. In 2005, the supreme leader, Khamenei, also sanctioned43
acceleration of privatization by Ahmadinejad’s government (since 2005). This
privatization, however, did not lead to the growth of an independent private sector. On the
contrary, Ahmadinejad’s privatization became detrimental for the private sector’s growth
since it did not focus on selling the SOEs to the private actors. By 2013, the sale of
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government assets constituted $ 80 billion, but only 17 percent had been sold to the private
sector; the rest had been transferred to the IRGC and other crony-networks44.
Encompassing transfer of SOEs to regime affiliates, including the IRGC, Ahmadinejad’s
privatization plan became infamous as “pseudo-privatization45” or “customization46”
(ekhtesasi-sazi).
There is a consensus among analysts and journalists in the Iranian media that
Ahmadinejad’s pseudo-privatization conditioned the IRGC’s expansion into new
economic domains such as finance, banking, oil and gas, and manufacturing. Embracing
Khamenei’s privatization proclamation, Ahmadinejad accelerated privatization in Iran. He
claimed that the sum of privatization prior to 2005 had been $3 billion while under his
presidency abound $30 billion were transferred via the Tehran Stock Exchange. Iran’s
Privatization Organization47 provided similar numbers. Reportedly, Ahmadinejad prided
on “Iran’s speed of privatization compared with other state-run economies, which,
Ahmadinejad said, had taken twenty years to achieve what Iran had achieved in five”
(Alfoneh 2010, 3).
In this context, newspapers reported on the IRGC’s assumption of new economic
projects on non-bidding basis. For example, in 2007, the IRGC won several big projects:
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the Asaluyeh natural gas pipeline, completion of Tehran’s Metro, and the pipeline for
fifteenth and sixteenth phases of the South Pars oilfield. Those three projects totaled $7
billion and were awarded without a bidding process. The construction of Development of
Shahid Beheshti Waterfront, worth $341 million, was another project granted to the
IRGC48. Brigadier General Abdol-Reza Abed-Zadeh announced completion of 1220
projects in mining and other industries, and management of another 240 projects49 by 2007.
The IRGC became active in the financial sector. The IRGC-affiliated lending funds
were turning into financial institutions, expanding their monetary activities and later
transforming to accredited banks50. The first IRGC bank started its operations in 2009.
Ansar Finance and Credit Institution was established after the Iran–Iraq war and began
lending, while under Ahmadinejad it became a financial institution and then a bank. Some
of these organizations engaged in banking for decades. Their activities were not
transparent. Under Ahmadinejad, they became established financial institutions, changing
their names to conceal their military ownerships.
The IRGC also expanded to strategic sectors. Kaveh Omidvar (2010)51 highlights
the negative impact of sanctions on Iran’s oil sector and argues that the retreat of foreign
companies, such as Shell, Repsel, and Total—due to the difficulties of doing business in
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Iran, —opened space for local companies. Faced with rising criticism for his inability to
attract investors for the South Pars Oil Project, Ahmadinejad decided to hand the South
Pars project over to state and semi-public institutions, the IRGC obtaining the highest
shares.
Lack of transparency makes it difficult to measure the growth of businesses but it
is safe to assume that the majority of financial institutions and manufacturing companies
emerged during the recent decade, once the IRGC began expanding its businesses. Some
of those organizations such as Khatam Al-Anbia were established during Rafsanjani’s era.
Majority of the affiliated companies, however, were founded or expanded recently. The
following tables contain lists of IRGC-owned or IRGC-affiliated companies. They do not
offer timelines for companies’ emergence, but they illustrate the extent of the IRGC’s
economic engagement52.
Table 5: IRGC Companies
Financial Institutions
Basij Coopertaive
Foundation; Ansar
Financial-Credit
Foundation,
Armed Forces Retirement
Organization, Mehr
Financial-Credit
Foundation
(formerly Basijis
Benevolent Fund), and
Mehr Economic
Investment., Sepah
Cooperative Foundation,

Engineering
Khatam Al-Anbia
Construction Base (KA)
KA’s Ghorb Nooh
KA’s Hara Institute
KA’s Sahel Institute
KA’s Makin Institute
IRGC’s Ground Forces’
Construction Base and
Ghaem Base
South Region’s Base of
Islamic
Republic’s Military

52

Some Companies
under Sanctions
Imensazan Consultant
Engineers Institute,
Gharargahe Sadandegi
Ghaem, Omran Sahel,
National Iranian Oil
Company, Mehr Bank
Mehr-e Eqtesad-e
Iranian Investment
Company
Ghorb Karbala
Tehran Gostaresh
Company
Rah Sahel Institute

INSIGHT- IRAN- List of IRGC firms- IR2, The Global Intelligence Files, Wikileaks.com, February 13,
2010. https://search.wikileaks.org/gifiles/?viewemailid=1116599
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Ansar Financial-Credit
Foundation, Mehr
Economic Investment and
SATA (Armed
Forces Pension Fund)

Deep Offshore
Technology Company
Fater Engineering
Institute
Pouya Air
Rahab Institute
Sahel Consultant
Engineers
Naftiran Intertrade Co.
(NICO)
Tidewater Middle East
Co.
Sepasad Engineering
Company
Sepanir Oil and Gas
Engineering Company
Makin Institute
Hara Company
Oriental Oil Kish
Iran Marine Industrial
Company, SADRA
Syrian Arab Airlines

Table 6: IRGC-affiliated Companies53
Bahman Group Company
Investments
Saipa Co.
National Iranian Investment
Co.
Bahman Investment Co.
Bahman Leasing Co.
Bahman Diesel Co.
Mellat Insurance Co.
Bahman Brokerage Co.54

Pasargad Bank
Pars Arian Investment Co., Pasargad Insurance
Co., Pasargad Bank’s Electronic Payment Co.,
Pasargad Bank’s Financial and Investment Co.,
Pasargad Banks’ Brokerage Co., Pasargad
Leasing Co., Pasargad Bank’ Leasing of
Machinery and Equipment Co., Aryan
Construction Management Co., Iran’s Credit
Consulting Company, Pasargad Mass Production
Development Co., Aryan’s Saman Construction
Co., Pasargad Aryan’s Support Services Co.,
Pasargad’s Financial Service’s Labor’s Supply
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Services, Pasargad Energy Development Co.,
Middle East Mining and Mining Development
Co., Pasargad’s Andishenegar Trade
Development Co., Pasargad’s Tadbirgaran Co.,
Pasargad’s Ayandenegar Commercial
Management Co., Eight Urban Building Co.,
Pasargad Currency and Exchange Services Co.,
Pasargad’s International Trade Development
Co., Construction Company for expansion and
Modernization of Industries (MANA), Iranian
Zarand Steel Co., Khavar-Mianeh Aftab
Derakhshan Trading Co., Iranian Sirjan Steel
Co., Middle East Industry Standard Engineering
Co., Pars Hafez Investment Co.
It is worth noting that the IRGC’s expansion into the Iranian economy has been an
incremental process that has continued under Khatami’s presidency as well. However, the
IRGC’s economic expansion under Ahmadinejad differed in two significant ways: the type
of economic activities, and their scope. First, while under Khatami the IRGC was mainly
involved in smuggling or covertly assuming economic projects, under Ahmadinejad this
process became transparent and was ‘legitimized’ due to the newly adopted privatization
policy. Second, the scope of the IRGC’s expansion under Ahmadinejad was distinctly
different to that of Khatami’s.
For example, while Khatam Al-Anbia’s economic role was a public knowledge in
Iran, the extent of the IRGC’s involvement in the economy was not known until mid-2000.
The IRGC’s illegal economic activities during Khatami’s presidency, those in the ports and
at Payam Airport were the most scandalous. The speaker of the Sixth Parliament (2000–
2004), Mehdi Karroubi, announced that the IRGC had established sixty waterfronts in the
south of Iran, unlicensed. Following Karroubi, another Sixth Parliament member, Ali
Ghanbari expressed regrets since “one-third of state imports…[came in] unofficially via
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illegal markets, the underground economy, and waterfronts55”. Another illegal project
occurred in Karaj’s Payam Airport for postal services. Khatami’s minister of intelligence,
Ali Yunesi, provided data on smuggled goods amounting to 150 billion Iranian Rial
confiscated at the airport in 2005. Under Khatami, however, the growth of the IRGC’s
economic empire was not as extensive. As Ali Afshari, an activist and a contributor to
foreign and domestic news outlets wrote of the IRGC’s growing economic power in
Roozonline, “During Khatami’s presidency, this expansion came to a stop, but during
Ahmadinejad’s term, large economic projects in the country were handed to the Guards.”56
During Ahmadinejad’s rapid privatization, the private sector either could not
compete with the IRGC or was marginalized in the absence of relevant laws and
regulations. For example, Iran Marine Industrial Company’s main shareholder is IRGC.
Khatam Al-Owsia, on no-bidding basis, took over the development of 14th and 15th phases
of South Pars project, removing Shell and Opsel from the project, as well as local
companies. By 2012, Khatam Al-Anbia and Khatam Al-Owsia were granted total of 51
contracts, equating $17 milliard. Khatam Al-Anbia has been established since Revolution
and has been involved in construction projects; its activities, however, expanded into oil
and gas and pharmochemicals since 2006. By 2012, it oversaw 30, high level and low level,
oil and gas projects in Iran.
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Another significant shortcoming was lack of political will in passing laws that
would direct privatization and encourage the growth of a productive private sector. For
example, Kamal At’hari, in an interview broadcast on Radio Zamaneh in 201057, criticized
Iran’s subsidy reform and underscored the need to create economic institutions prior to
implementation of reforms. Targeted subsidies coupled with price liberalization were
expected to optimize resource allocation. In the absence of institutions encouraging
production, research and design, and the division of labor, price liberalization would not
yield expected results. Criticizing the pace of privatization, At’hari argued that the Fourth
Five Year Economic Development Plan’s shock therapy was a populist policy58. If global
market forces determine prices, the economic system should be capable of competing in
global markets. He argued that liberalization should be gradual, i.e. there should be a period
of building institutions and structures, preparation of the private sector, and innovation. In
Iran, institution-building goals identified by the third and fourth development plans have
not been actualized.
Prior to Ahmadinejad’s presidency, the IRGC either performed economic
reconstruction projects or was involved in illicit activities. It was after Ahmadinejad’s rapid
privatization that it became an established and accepted economic actor. Prior to
privatization, many IRGC officials consistently rationalized IRGC’s economic activities,
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but only in those areas that the private sector could not undertake developmental projects.
IRGC’s mission was to serve the state and its reconstruction needs. Majority of its work
was expected to serve underdeveloped regions59. While Khatam Al-Anbia officials claimed
that its activities have been limited to major projects that cost more than $100 million
(implying that Khatam Al-Anbia was not competing with the smaller business and the
private sector), the data published in Khatam Al-Anbia’s website suggests that the IRGC
has taken over many smaller projects costing less than $100 million60, and hence, has been
impeding private sector’s ability to take over smaller projects.
Therefore, both the civilian leaders and analysts, such as the former Speaker of the
Majlis (parliament) criticized the privatization program’s inability to boost private sector’s
growth. For instance, the Majlis’ Strategic Research Center reported that only 19% of the
SOEs were purchased by private economic actors in the years between 2005 to 2009.
12.5% went to the “public” sector, and 68.5% went to the cooperatives (bonyads) (Alfoneh,
2010, 3). “The state sector’s privileges, monopolies, and unlimited access to investment
capital frustrate[d] private-sector involvement”.
Masoud Behnood, a renowned Iranian journalist, also referred to the growing
dangers of the IRGC’s economic role expansion. Citing a report by the newspaper
Sarmayeh, Behnood discussed how private-sector managers were concerned with the
IRGC’s presence in development projects, the existence of conditions favoring Khatam Al-
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Anbia over private-sector companies, and the detrimental role the IRGC’s was playing by
creating obstacles for private-sector growth61.
If one monitors the process of privatization in recent history, as Razaghi (2013)
argues, it becomes evident that privatization has never been an instrument directing
economic development and the creation of a strong productive private sector. On the
contrary, it has been a strategy to remedy the state’s budgetary constraints (Razaghi 2013,
133). Additionally, the strategy to privatize has taken the shape of a mere transfer of SOEs’
ownership without a comprehensive reform package to encourage productivity. The most
significant outcome of privatization has been transfer of ownership from the state to the
IRGC operating in the semi-public sector, or at times the private sector, but without
changes in managerial composition of already-inefficient industries. Furthermore,
privatization has not been coupled with effective labor law reform, which left companies
with bloated payrolls to preserve their employees. Privatization also has led to tax evasion
or reduction in taxation for privatized SOEs. The state not only sold state companies
cheaply, but also imposed their inefficient management on new owners, which made it
difficult for those companies to pay taxes (Razghi 2013, 131).
This pseudo-privatization, and subsequent economic expansion of the IRGC,
sparked criticism; the militarization thesis gained traction among analysts who warned
about the growing economic dominance of the IRGC—militarization of Iran’s economy62.
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Political developments after Ahmadinejad’s presidency (post-2013), as well as analyses of
scholars (Harris 2013, Mohseni 2016) challenged the conventional wisdom regarding the
militarization of Iran’s economy and politics. Unlike expectations of analysts, the IRGC
did not become the most dominant actor in Iran’s economy or politics. It did however
establish itself as an economic player. Unlike China’s PLA, the IRGC maintained its
businesses. Unlike Egypt, it could not outcompete its contenders, or execute a government
take-over to expand its economic assets. Why did the IRGC establish itself as an economic
actor but fail to become a dominant player?
The answer lies in understanding two interrelated economic conditions: (i) Iran’s
overall reform strategy—haphazard liberalization and privatization—fostered an
uncompetitive economic system where survival of the military businesses did not hinge
upon their profitability but their relationship with the government instead. (ii) Existence of
crony-networks operating in the semi-public domain limited the IRGC’s possibilities to
take over the Iranian state/government.
An Uncompetitive Economy
Outcomes of three presidents economic reform projects illustrate Iran’s inability to
foster competitiveness throughout decades. Rafsanjani’s policy of economic reform
focused on trade liberalization and initially boosted private consumption, but a macroeconomic instability reversed the course of reform. During liberalization, due to easier
access to foreign credit, both the public and private sectors received more investments.
However, increased government’s spending on reconstruction projects during the period
of high oil revenues in the 1980s was coupled with an increase in both consumption and
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import of intermediate and capital goods. When oil prices plummeted in 1992, Iran
experienced a shortage of foreign exchange and suffered a heightened short-term debt crisis
(six-fold debt increase from 1989-1993). Iran’s inability to attract long-term credit pushed
the government to renegotiate its debt payments, and to reinstate tighter import controls
(Karshenas and Hakimian 2000, 48–50). Instead of liberalizing the economy, the state
implemented control over trade, continued its multiple exchange rate system, and
maintained price controls.
In addition to sanctioning IRGC’s economic role-expansion and an attempt for
liberalization, albeit unsuccessful, Rafsanjani’s period was also notable for the expansion
of crony-networks. The revolutionary forces of 1979 revolution, with Khomeini’s order,
confiscated assets of the deposed Shah and his affiliates and formed revolutionary
foundations known as bonyads. These bonyads operated in a semi-public sector63 and as
Saeidi characterizes them were “giant private monopolies with no governmental discretion
over their operations” (2004, 480). They were bulwark of the Supreme Leader and the
religious clergy, were unaccountable, enjoyed privileges64 such as tax cuts or easy access
to credit, and were used to implement populist policies (Saeidi 2004, 484–485). Consisting
of primarily conservative elite factions (Islamists and clergy), a few of these famous
bonyads are Panzdah Khordad Foundation, Islamic Revolution’s Martyrs Foundation,
Islamic Revolution’s Housing Foundation, Foundation of Oppressed and Disabled.
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When Rafsanjani’s economic reform project included privatization of the SOEs,
those elite that were already benefiting from bloated public and semi-public sectors
opposed his policies. Instead of privatizing, Rafsanjani’s government engaged in sale of
SOEs to their ex-owners or capitalists, which led to the transfer and sell of those SOEs to
regime-affiliates, i.e. religious loyalists65 (Amirahmadi 1996, 12-13). It was during this
time that the semi-public sector’s bonyads, such as the Imam Reza Foundation and the
Foundation for the Oppressed expanded, with assets reaching $12 billion (Clawson 2008,
par. 22). Rafsanjani’s policies had two implications pertaining to competitiveness: (i) those
crony-networks that expanded during this period contained economic ambitions of the
IRGC when rapid privatization in 2004/2005 facilitated IRGC businesses’ growth. (ii)
Rafsanjani failed to implement meaningful reforms that would assist private sector’s
growth.
This process of uneven liberalization and privatization continued under Khatami
(1997-2005) and Ahmadinejad (2005-2013) and led to an economic system crippled with
inefficiencies and lack of competitiveness. Perhaps the most intriguing economic
innovation under Khatami was government’s circumvention of the article 44 of Iranian
Constitution by permitting private enterprises to operate in sectors not subject to
constitutional limitations. Hence, the privatization during Khatami focused on facilitating
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development of new businesses rather than an extensive sale of SOEs (Harris 2013, 53).
This process was coupled with a financial reform supporting private sectors’ financial
activities with establishment of private banks as his main accomplishment (Valadkhani
2001, Alizadeh 2003, Amuzegar 2006, Harris 2013). Along with supporting private sector
growth, Khatami also adopted policies of trade liberalization via tariff reductions, corporate
and individual tax reforms, and offered incentives to foreign investors (Alizadeh 2003,
276-277).
In addition, with regard to privatizing the SOEs, Khatami promised to reform
prevalent methods of privatization. For example, Khatami forbade the negotiated sale of
the SOEs and established the “Privatization Organization” to regulate privatization
process. Prior to Khatami, in an unregulated environment, the privatization encompassed
transfer of SOEs to regime-affiliated groups. For example, lack of relevant labor laws led
to either layoffs or falsified bankruptcy claims by new owners who abused the system to
receive benefits. Khatami’s regulations mandated up to 15% sale of shares with discounts
to the workers of the privatizing companies. The rest were sold through the stock market
or on a bidding basis66.Continuing the reforms, the state was barred from investing in new
companies. In addition, a new law demanded bonyads’ sale of their shares to the private
sector after three years in order to prevent monopolization by bonyads. As a result, Panzdah
Khordad, Mostazafan, Shahid, and Sandogh bonyads sold parts of their shares to the
public67.
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Despite his attempts, Khatami—who was notable for his political reforms rather
than for his economic policies—failed foster competitiveness. First, the state remained
heavily dependent on oil and its expenditure grew from 24.5% of GDP in 1999 to 27.2 %
in 200468. Additionally, government’s strategy of supporting private businesses by offering
them subsidies exacerbated the economy’s reliance on the oil revenues (Karshenas and
Hakimian 2005, 76). Therefore, although Khatami boosted the private sector and made
significant changes, Ahmadinejad inherited an economy that suffered from the same
structural problems—undiversified, uncompetitive, and oil-dependent.
Proposing an ambitious economic plan, President Mahmood Ahmadinejad’s Fourth
Five Year Economic Development Plan (2004/2005-–2009/2010) was expected to improve
annual GDP growth, per capita income, and employment, and meanwhile reduce inflation,
economic disparities, the Gini coefficient, and poverty. It also proposed to diversify the
economy by increasing non-oil exports to 10.7 percent, along with state retrenchment— a
10 percent reduction of the national budget to GDP ratio and a 5 percent reduction of
government employment (Amuzegar 2010, 114–115). The results were disappointing
though. Challenging Ahmadinejad’s false claims regarding the nation’s economic
performance, Amuzegar explains that “a combination of structural weaknesses, resource
misallocation, and worsening business climate produced stagflation” (emphasis added)
(Amuzegar 2010, 117).
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The state struggled with inflation and unemployment; it also failed to boost
productivity, specifically its low labor productivity. Investment rates also decreased
because of a drop in capital returns caused by lack of competitiveness internationally,
short-term trades’ lucrativeness and speculations in the stock-market, and banking
systems’ inadequacies impeding domestic financing, offshoring prospects, and changing
regulations (Amuzegar 2010, 116). Additionally, state did not align currency’s value with
rising inflation resulting in over-valuation, and subsequent decline in competitiveness of
domestically produced goods. Coupled with increased importation of intermediate and
capital goods, foreign direct investment and non-oil exports dropped, and Iran experienced
capital flight (Amuzegar 2010, 116-121). Therefore, similar to both Rafsanjani and
Khatami, Ahmadinejad’s economic liberalization and privatization also did not contribute
to an overall competitiveness. On the contrary, productivity declined, while cronyism,
including the IRGC businesses, thrived.
Available data from World Economic Forum and the World Bank also supports
above conclusions regarding the lack of competitiveness. The World Bank’s data suggests
that Iran registered volatile annual GDP growth rates fluctuating between the highest rate
of 13.6 in 1990 and the lowest rate of -6.6 in 201269. These radical fluctuations in growth
rates are also evident during each presidency (Rafsanjani 1989-1997, Khatami 1997-2005,
Ahmadinejad 2005-2013)70. Based on the World Economic Forum data, after decades of
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attempted reforms, including structural adjustment policies, Iran is ranked 76 out of 138
states in 2017 for its global competitiveness71. The World Economic Forum does not
provide data from the earlier decades of Iran’s performance in order to compare the degrees
of change in competiveness. However, given decades of economic liberalization, Iran’s
ranking in terms of its competitiveness would be expected to have been higher than it is
today.
Table 7:World Economic Forum, Iran’s Competitiveness Index (134 states, by 2017)
Goods
Market
Efficiency
111

Labor
Market
Efficiency
134

Financial
Technological
Business
Market
Readiness
Sophistication
Development
131
97
109

Innovation
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Three consecutive presidents’ policies also did not originate a strong independent
private sector. Despite attempts to privatize the SOEs, the public sector remained bloated
an inefficient. Ironically, the government’s size compared to the GDP during three
presidencies of Rafsanjani, Khatami, and Ahmadinejad has been 22%, 53%, and 66%
respectively indicating an incremental growth of the public sector despite attempts to
privatize (Vaezi 2014, 51). With regard to the strength of the private sector, indicators of
technological

readiness,

business

sophistication,

and

innovation

underdevelopment in terms of its private sector’s capacity72.

growth has been negative. GDP Growth (annual %), The World Bank,
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=IR
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Table 8: Iran’s Technological readiness, Business sophistication, Innovation
Technological Readiness
Firm Level
Exports
Technology
Absorbtion
124
119

Business Sophistication
Innovation
Local
Production
Capacity for
Company
Supplier
Process
innovation
Spending
Quality
Sophistication
on R&D
103
78
108
89

The World Economic Forum and the World Bank do not offer data from earlier
decades of Iran’s economic performance. However, the recent data illustrates the overall
uncompetitive nature of Iran’s economy, its private sector’s weakness, and public sector’s
inefficacy despite two decades of economic reform processes. This overall lack of
competitiveness and state’s inability to establish market mechanisms has created
conditions conducive to operation of the IRGC businesses.
How did this lack of competitiveness impact the IRGC’s businesses? First, the
IRGC’s substantial economic expansion occurred in the absence of a strong private sector
that could have challenged the IRGC’s economic power. There are two rationales behind
this conclusion: first, while the privatization aimed at supporting emergence of an
independent private sector, the IRGC’s economic expansion had negative consequences on
private-sector development. Therefore, one possible conclusion is that the private sector in
Iran never had the capacity to challenge the IRGC’s economic aspirations. In other words,
absence of domestically or internationally competitive private interest groups, and their
social constellations, made it less costly for the IRGC to enlarge its economic empire. If
decades of economic liberalization and privatization had made the Iranian economy a
competitive one, the IRGC would have logically faced greater competitors from domestic
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and international markets and the destabilizing costs of its economic role-expansion would
have arguably been higher when it aimed at expanding its businesses since 2004.
Secondly, If Iran’s overall economy is uncompetitive, and the IRGC is estimated
to produce one-third to two-third of Iran’s GDP, then the IRGC’s businesses are
uncompetitive as well. Anecdotal evidence supports this conclusion. For example, in 2016,
there was a disagreement between IRGC and the executive branch of Rouhani over South
Korean Hyundai Heavy Industries deal with the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines
Co.. The Korean company assumed responsibility to build ten container ships. The press
and analysis speculated that IRGC’s behavior was a result of its nervousness regarding the
opening of Iran’s economy and introduction of competitors. As an analyst in RAND,
Alireza Nader stated, “[t]hey are worried about competition internally”, “[t]hey want to
make sure for any given deal, they get a part of it.”73 First Vice President Eshagh Jahangiri
responded claiming the contract had been signed in 2008 but the production stopped
following the sanctions; after Iran’s Nuclear Deal, Hyundai agreed to continue the project.
While the head of Khatam Al-Anbia, Ebadollah Abdollahi, complained about South
Korea’s history of signing contracts and not completing them, government officials blamed
IRGC for its history of not completing projects on time74. IRGC’s complaints about foreign
or domestic competitors suggests that a competitive marketing economy poses a threat to
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military businesses. In addition, civilian elites’ criticism of its economic performance
implies the IRGC’s incompetence.
The evidence of IRGC’s anxieties for losing its economic power illustrate how its
economic activity is contingent upon an economic system operating based on cronyism
and selective protectionism. A most stark example supporting this view was IRGC’s
advantageous economic position during international sanctions. Mehdi Karoubi, an
oppositional presidential candidate in 2009, explained that “part of the state and IRGC
pursue sanctions because sanctions help them obtain huge and astronomical profits75”. For
example, post-sanctions, IRGC succeeded in replacing foreign investors in the gas and oil
sector. In addition, analysis criticized IRGC’s role in limiting private sector growth.
According to reports in the Iranian media, IRGC found strategies to circumvent the
sanctions, but its ability to do so was linked to the linkages it had with political or security
elite in the government. Subsequently, continuation of sanctions was deemed beneficial for
these elite groups and IRGC76. Therefore, while IRGC strives in a closed, uncompetitive,
and undiversified economy, the introduction of foreign and domestic competitors threatens
its economic power.
Therefore, lack of competitiveness created conditions conducive to the IRGC’s
business operations. Although the IRGC established itself economically, it could not
completely militarize Iran’s economy. Why?
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A Competitive Semi-Public Domain
Examining Iran’s political economy post-Ahmadinejad, following the election of
Rouhani (2013–present), suggested that the IRGC was not the most dominant economic
player. For example, in 2016, Rouhani refused to grant Khatam Al-Anbia with 10 projects;
he also annulled the contract that had granted 50% of Iran’s telecommunications company
to IRGC-affiliated companies77. In the summer of 2016, IRGC agreed to Rouahni’s plan of
shifting its focus on development projects in rural and bordering regions. As The Wall
Street Journal78 concluded, this agreement indicated Rouhani’s attempt to control IRGC
and contain its unrestrained expansion into the economy. Some also argued that it implied
a bargain between the president and IRGC whereby the IRGC would remove itself from
lucrative sectors such as oil and gas and finance—sectors needing foreign capital
investments— in return for IRGC’s engagement in rural development projects79. Examples
of negotiations and tensions between the elite in power (primarily the executive branch)
and IRGC implies that unlike speculation, IRGC’s economic expansion has been limited
in the aftermath of Rouhani’s presidency. The IRGC is an established but not the sole
economic player.
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Scholars also have challenged the militarization thesis. Harris offers the most
intriguing analysis on outcomes of liberalization and privatization policies in Iran, and
particularly during Ahmadinejad. By analyzing the reforms in pension funds and Iran’s
Social Security Organization, the Justice Share Program, and the IRGC’s economic
activities, Harris disputes the militarization thesis. Although the privatization did not lead
to the growth of an independent private sector, it did transfer economic activity from a
relatively transparent public sector into the semi-public domain; Harris (2013) names this
semi-public domain a “parastatal subcontractor state” populated by interest groups such as
bonyads and the IRGC.
BBC80 reported in 2013 that Gen. Ramazan Sharif, Director of Public Relations and
spokesman for the IRGC, considers companies affiliated with the ‘Nationalist-Religious81’
political front as its economic competitors. According to Ramazan Sharif, IRGC assumed
economic projects with the Supreme Leader’s permission and that “70 to 80 percent of its
competitors are large companies affiliated with Nationalist-Religious groups. While no one
criticize the National-Religious groups, everyone condemns IRGC”. While IRGC’s claim
might be false (there is no clear evidence supporting or falsifying this claim), the mere fact
that IRGC either complains or justifies its economic projects is a testament to the existence
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of disagreements among the elite, as well as IRGC’s inability to pull enough leverage for
its economic projects.
While the economic activities of bonyads is not transparent, based on public
pronouncements of IRGC commanders and other elite in Iran, one can conclude there exists
competition among various elite-networks over assumption of economic projects in Iran.
For example, in 2015, Deputy Representative of Supreme Jurisprudence (Khamenei’s
representative), Abdollah Haji Sadeghi, stated that “if IRGC enters the domain of the
economy, it is not for personal or economic benefits but to protect the revolution”, and that
“the governmental elite should know that IRGC is not competing against ministries even
if it enters a specific domain because its goal is to consolidate the Islamic Republic’s
position82”. Such statements signal the IRGC’s need to justify its economic activities, and
attain the support of dominant civilians.
While Khamenei has defended IRGC’s economic activities, Rouahni implicitly
criticized its corruption. Corrupt economic activities, however, are not IRGC’s monopoly.
A massive portion83 of Iran’s economic activities have been monopolized by other
religious and state-affiliated groups, such as Bonyad Astan Qods-e Razavi. Furthermore,
these bonyads and the IRGC cooperate in carrying out economic tasks, such as jointprojects performed by Barekat Bonyad and the IRGC84. These joint projects show the
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IRGC’s economic inability to carry out economic tasks alone due to economic or political
considerations.
Further evidence of competing crony-networks was Ahamdinejad’s constant threats
to expose economically corrupt elite in Iran, as well as his harsh attacks against the previous
president, Rafsanjani and his economic-network. In 2011, Ahmadinejad threatened to
expose the corruption of his opponents as a tactic to silence them. He threatened to expose
only 25% of them and promised to keep the rest to himself out of his consideration for the
regime. According to Duetsche Welle’s analysis, Ahmadinejad’s strategy was to signal to
Khamenei that he would not expose the Supreme Leader’s economic corruption, but
meanwhile referred to three different groups as possible targets: 1-United Principalists’
Front
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2- Resistance Front86, and 3-groups within IRGC and other security forces

conspiring to remove Ahmadinejad from power87. Elite infighting, criticisms over the
management of economic assets, and threats to expose one another implies the existence
of competition among these crony network, as well as their shifting alliances. What were
the implications of this competitive system on the IRGC’s political control?
The IRGC’s economic and political expansion under Ahmadinejad concerned
analysts of Iranian politics who discussed Iran’s transformation into a military dictatorship
with the IRGC as the main political and economic player. Given the changing nature of
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civil-military relations, this outcome seemed plausible. However, the IRGC was unable to
assume an all-encompassing role in Iran’s domestic politics. The next section will explain
why, despite its aspirations, the IRGC failed to dominate Iran’s politics.
The Political Control of the IRGC
The growth of IRGC businesses was also coupled with its ambitious pursuit of
political power. In fact, those that warned about militarization of the Iranian economy were
also concerned about the militarization of Iranian politics. Unlike speculations, and despite
IRGC’s attempts to amass political power, IRGC failed to dominate Iran’s politics. Why?
Utilizing a political-economy framework, this section tests hypothesis set forth in this
dissertation: (H1) if Iran’s rapid economic liberalization failed to establish a competitive
economy, there is a higher likelihood for the IRGC to establish itself as economic actors,
and subsequently, transform its economic power into a political one. In testing the case of
Iran, this section will illustrate that the (H1) applies to the case of the IRGC but with a
caveat: the uncompetitive nature of Iran’s economy has facilitated the IRGC’s
establishment as a political player. However, the IRGC relies on factions of the elite with
linkages to the government who could provide the IRGC with new economic projects.
Consequently, the IRGC is relatively dependent on the civilians and is constrained by the
elites and elite-coalitions in different times.
This section will develop two interrelated arguments: First, the IRGC’s political
power increased following its expansion into the economic domain. Prior to privatization,
the IRGC obeyed Iran’s Supreme Leader’s demands. Post-privatization (since 2005),
however, it has become an established political player; its agenda is sometimes at odds
104

with the Supreme Leader’s interests. Furthermore, due to the uncompetitive nature of Iran’s
economy, the IRGC garnered enough economic leverage to pressure the government for
economic and political gain. Secondly, despite its attempts to dominate Iran’s politics, the
IRGC has been unable to become the most dominant political actor; the economic-political
elite networks in Iran constrain the IRGC’s political ambitions as well. In other words, the
limitations of the IRGC’s economic power has had significant implications for its ability
to leverage its economic power into a political one—the IRGC’s is dependent on at least a
faction of the civilians to expand its economic power.
Did the IRGC’s political autonomy change as a consequence of liberalization and
privatization? Yes. The degree of IRGC’s political autonomy increased. It became, and at
times acted, more independent of the Supreme Leader. Due to the politicized nature of the
IRGC in Iran, the line between civilian and military controls has always been blurry.
However, there is an observable change in the nature of the IRGC’s interference in politics.
The IRGC has changed from a military that engaged in acts of arbitration to a military
operating as an independent player at times. In other words, prior to privatization, the IRGC
arbitrated among the civilian elite by siding with the Supreme Leader and advancing his
political agenda. Post-privatization, it became a player that at times challenged the
Supreme Leader; the political coalitions or infightings either helped or constrained the
IRGC’s political maneuverability.
Historically, the IRGC was instrumental in consolidation of the theocratic right88 in
Iran. During the initial years after the 1979 Revolution, the revolutionary elite used the
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IRGC to suppress their opponents89. Article 150 of the Constitution cemented IRGC’s role
as the “protector of revolution90”. Article 109 appointed the Supreme Leader as the supreme
commander of the Armed Forces91. By codifying the role of Velayat-e Faqih (the
Guardianship of Jurisprudence92), the constitution demands IRGC’s allegiance to Velayate Faqih (Ottolenghi 2011, Kindle Locations 192-195). Hence, the constitution provides an
institutional mechanism for civilian control of the IRGC, although that control is limited
to the office of the Supreme Leader.
Existence of an institutional mechanism to supervise the IRGC, however, did not
mean that the IRGC remained apolitical. On the contrary, the unintended consequence of
the IRGC’s subjugation to the office of the Supreme Leader was its politicization by
Khamenei; he utilized the IRGC to advance his own political agenda (Alfoneh 2008). For
example, the IRGC became a stark critique of Rafsanjani’s economic liberalization and
Khatami’s political liberalization policies. Opposing Rafsanjani’s liberal agenda, then
IRGC commander, Mohen Rezaei, publically warned about dangers of economic
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liberalization in 1996 (Alfoneh 2008, par. 22). During Khatami, the IRGC became more
politically vocal and sided with the conservative elite, including the Supreme Leader, who
loathed Khatami’s political liberalization agenda. The IRGC became notorious for
meddling with Khatami’s reformist agenda, such as suppressing student protests in 199993,
issuing a public ultimatum94 to Khatami, and criticizing his reformist agenda95. However,
these interferences in politics were sanctioned by Khamenei, the Supreme Leader.
Takeyh analyzes the role of IRGC in Iranian politics and concludes that the IRGC
“functioned very much as a political entity” (2009, 22-23). But he also draws attention on
the IRGC’s adherence to conservative elite’s ideology. This attitude was evident in IRGC’s
commander Safavi’s remarks regarding 1999 Student Riots. While emphasized the
apolitical nature of IRGC, he also discussed IRGC’s adherence to a ‘political line’,
referring to the hardliner ideology of Khomeini’s revolutionary values (Takeyh 2009, 24).
Safavi’s remarks exemplified IRGC’s ‘responsiveness’ to the Supreme Leader as the main
figure protecting the values of the 1979 Revolution. This loyalty was best exemplified by
Commander Safavi’s labeling of reformists as ‘hypocrites’ who, he thought, threatened the
Islamic Republic. Following the arrest of Kharbaschi, a reformist and pro-Rafsanjani
Mayor of Tehran, Safavi stated:
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“[w]e do not interfere in politics but if we see that the foundations of our system
of government and our revolution is threatened…we get involved. When I see that
a [political] current has hatched a cultural plot, I consider it my right to defend the
revolution against this current. My commander is exalted leader and he has not
banned me [from doing this]” (Ehteshami and Zweiri 2007, 22).
The nature of IRGC’s political involvement however, took a different turn under
Ahmadinejad’s presidency. Since Ahmadinejad’s presidency, the IRGC began to serve its
own institutional interests, including its economic interests. First, the quality of the IRGC’s
interference in politics changed from arbitration to intervention in the electoral process, as
well as assumption of governmental institutions. The most striking change in the civilmilitary relations, however, was the IRGC’s contentious relationship with the Supreme
Leader, and the emergence of neo-principalist faction in the Iranian politics that opposed
the conservative clerical establishment, including Khamenei.
First, in collaboration with the conservative elite, and presumably Khamenei’s
son96, the IRGC intervened in Iran’s presidential election in 2009. Ahmadinejad was
brought into power for the second term in what became known as an ‘election coup-d’état’.
The IRGC and IRGC-affiliates also began controlling significant governmental institutions
such as ministries of Commerce, Defense, Economics, Intelligence, Interior, Islamic
Guidance, and Oil. Furthermore, an IRGC commander also ruled the Iran Armed Forces
General Command (the regular military) (Ottolenghi 2011, 689).
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Additionally, the most important sign of changing IRGC’s political power was the
rise of “neo-principalists” or “neo-fundamentalists”. While prinicpalists97 were traditional
conservative right wing elite, the neo-principalists98 were a new group consisting of
Ahmadinejad and middle-rank IRGC members (Ahdiyyih 2008, par. 17). Safshekan (2010)
considers neo-principalists as “political manifestations of IRGC”, and challenges the
conventional wisdom assuming IRGC loyalty to the clergy. He argues how IRGC has been
challenging the clergy not only by questioning the legitimacy of clerical governments prior
to Ahmadinejad, but also by attacking prominent clerical establishments like Rafsanjani
and Nateq-Nouri99. In a process qualified as “de-legitimizing the clergy”, Safshekan argues
how Ahmadinejad talked about his relationship with Mahdi100 ; it was a strategy to break
the clerical monopolization of having a relationship with Mahdi (Safshekan 2010, 552553).
IRGC’s lack of responsiveness to the conservative camp, and the Supreme Leader,
was also evident in the increasing polarization between the IRGC and conservative clergy.
The press reported on examples of elite reshufflings as signs of disagreements between
them. For example, Ahmadienjad’s dismissal of Gholam Hossein Mohseni Ejehei, then
Minister of Intelligence and Khamenei’s trustee, signaled tensions between the two camps.
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Ejehei was believed to possess information with regard to the 2009 elections that could
undermine Khamenei’s power (Smith 2011, 5). According to a report by the Tehran
Bureau, both cases of Mashaei and Ejehei “were meant to be IRGC’s high command’s
signals to Ayatollah Khamenei that they were in control and that he should toe the line—
their line”101. It seemed that not only did Ejehei not keep Ahmadinejad in the loop by
directly reporting to Khameneni instead, but his ministry’s reviews contradicted IRGC
claims regarding Green Movement’s qualification as a ‘velvet revolution102’. The Ministry
of Intelligence’s report also considered Mashaei, and commander of Basij, cleric Taeb as
“security risks”, and subsequently undercut IRGC commander’s accusations103. The above
confrontation, and similar incidents, signaled a change in the relationship between both the
Supreme Leader and his affiliated conservative clergy and the IRGC.
Why did the IRGC’s responsiveness to civilians, precisely the Supreme Leader and
conservative elite, decline? The rapid privatization led to the expansion of the IRGC’s
economic power, and subsequently, an increase in its political weight. The IRGC’s capacity
to both assume economic projects and preserve its businesses was a function of state’s
inability to foster economic competition. Not only did the privatization facilitate the
IRGC’s economic rise, the lack of economic competition made the IRGC more
independent of the civilians. Therefore, although there is an evidence of creeping growth
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of IRGC’s role in the Iranian politics, a radical transformation of the civil-military relations
occurred during Ahmadinejad’s presidency, following the acceleration of privatization. In
other words, one should distinguish between the intentions and the capacity to act. Even if
one argues that the IRGC manifested aspirations to enhance its political influence, it
became capable to actualize those political goals during Ahmadinejad’s presidency, and
more specifically in the aftermath of privatization policies.
The IRGC’s political expansion was not decoupled from its economic aspirations.
Some argue that the IRGC grew into political and economic power due to the support it
received from Ahmadinejad as well as the Supreme Leader. Although that’s an accurate
observation, what the analyses miss is the reason behind the IRGC’s economic expansion.
If a political power, in this case the presidency and the Supreme Leadership, had the goal
to elevate the IRGC politically, why grant it with economic projects too? Moreover, why
implement privatization policies and reinterpret the constitution in order to give the IRGC
economic projects? It seemed that if co-opting the IRGC was the ultimate goal, it would
have been logical to transfer SOEs from one sector of the government to another (to the
IRGC) by maintaining the article 44 of the Constitution rather than declaring an economic
reform project and facing ample criticism from both the elite and the public. The IRGC’s
economic role-expansion was a consequence of the type of privatization implemented in
Iran; it was an unintended consequence of privatization. Consequently, a transformation in
the IRGC’s corporal interests also was an unintended outcome of this policy. That’s why
both the conservative elite and the Supreme Leader have been cautious with the IRGC.
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There is evidence of tension, and hence negotiations, among the IRGC and various factions
of the civilian elite who ultimately limited the IRGC’s political ambitions.
The militarization of Iran’s political thesis proved wrong once Hassan Rouhani was
elected president in 2013. During the early stages of the presidential election in 2013, there
were speculations regarding both the Supreme Leader’s and IRGC’s preferred candidates
for presidency, which implied existence of disagreements both within the IRGC and
between the IRGC and the Supreme Leader. IRGC commander Jafari, as well as several
high rank commanders along with Khameni’s son and office of the Supreme Leader formed
one faction who supported candidacy of Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator and secretary
general of the Supreme National Security Council, Saeed Jalili. Another group consisted
of IRGC officers, who were reputable for being uncorrupt and professional. They
supported a former IRGC commander of the air force, and then mayor of Tehran, Ghalibaf.
The last group were those IRGC members who amassed wealth following the privatization
projects sanctioned by Khamenei. They rallied behind the previous IRGC Commander,
Mohsen Rezaei104.
The election of Rouhani signified an important outcome in terms of IRGC’s power
in Iran, that it was not the dominant actor. Even since his election, Rouhani has been trying
to limit the IRGC’s economic and political power. For example, as Business Insider
reports, Rouahni embarked on an anti-corruption campaign that focused on Ahmadinejadera economic scandals. Under the slogan of “equality under the law”, Rouhani succeeded
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in passing a bill in the parliament that removed tax-exemptions for several bonyads105 as
well as for Khatam Al-Anbia. Rouhani’s criticism of IRGC’s power triggered its reaction
when the IRGC condemned the president for “insulting the nation”. In response,
government officials praised IRGC and stated that it posed no threat to private sector
growth. Business Insider considers Rouhani’s setback in this case as an example of the
Supreme Leader’s ability to balance the power between IRGC and the executive branch.
This incident offers two conclusions. First, IRGC does not have an independent leverage,
despite its attempts to take-over the Iranian economy. It still needs support of the elite in
power to have access to state resources. Secondly, ample examples of public
pronouncements by IRGC and other government officials indicates the existence of
tensions, along with a process of bargaining and negotiations among the political players
in Iran.
In discounting Iran’s militarization thesis, scholars of Iranian politics underline
political variables as the most determinate factors driving IRGC’s behavior (Thaler et al.
2010, Sohrabi 2011, Ottolenghi 2011, and Mohseni 2016). Mohseni (2016) underscores
both inter-elite relations and republican features of institutional engineering106 as
determinant factors and concluded that Ahmadienjad’s election was a function of “internal
transformations within the confines of the same system of multiple contentious power
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centers that had been established with the revolution”. Contrary to the thesis of powermobilization, alterations in institutions and power dynamics should not be confused with a
regime change (Mohseni 2016, Kinle Locations 918-919). Similarly, others have discussed
the networked characteristics of Iranian politics and the existence of multiple power centers
fostering competitiveness rather than monopolization of power (Thaler et al. 2010, Sohrabi
2011). Ottolenghi (2011) identifies a symbiotic relationship whereby “IRGC takes
advantage of its influence and capabilities in one realm in order to increase its involvement
in another. Its growing economic clout is both an end in and of itself and a tool to advance
other agendas.” (Ottolenghi 2011, Kindle Locations 952-953). Above explanations stress
the role of multiple centers of power in constraining the IRGC’s behavior.
The IRGC’s adheres to the values of revolution and has constitutional mandate to
protect revolution, and thus, is an ideological military. In its history, IRGC has branded
itself as an ideological guardian of Islamic Revolution and has created an institutional
identity around this ideology. It has intervened in politics on ideological grounds,
especially during Khatami’s reform movement. The IRGC has maintained this loyalty,
even during Ahmadinejad’s presidency, but it has also grown increasingly calculating and
requires compensation in return for its loyalty. This transformation is evident primarily
after the privatization policies of Ahmadinejad and IRGC’s growth as an economic player.
Since Ahmadinejad’s period, the IRGC has been leveraging its accumulated economic and
political leverage to further its corporal interest, disregarding the long-term consequences
of those activities on Iran’s economy. For example, both the former Speaker of Majlis,
Larijani, and Ahmadinejad praised Khatam Al-Anbia and supported the IRGC’s takeover
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of oil projects to signal that they would compensate IRGC for the losses caused by
sanctions on the nuclear program (Alfoneh 2010, 1-2).
However, Recent public pronouncements between president Rouhani and
commander in chief, Abdollah Abdollahy107, illustrate existence of a contentious
relationship between the two. While Rouhani108 criticized the transfer of economic assets
to what he called a “government with guns”109, the commander underscored the IRGC’s
superior capacity to carry out economic tasks compared to foreign investors or the private
sector110. Constant debates about the economic role of the IRGC indicates civilians’
inability to completely contain the IRGC but also the IRGC’s inability to completely
override the civilians’ demands.
While primary explanations of Iranian politics highlight the role of political
variables, such as Iran’s republican features of institutional engineering or its networkbased politics, I underscore the importance of economic policy-making in understanding
the IRGC’s behavior. I do not disagree with political explanations. In fact, my argument
draws on the literature about Iran’s network-based economic and political character and
underscores the constraints the IRGC faces in pursuing its economic and political agendas.
My argument deviates, however, by highlighting the political implications of a change in
the IRGC’s capacities as a consequence of the privatization under Ahmadinejad. In the
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absence of competition and due to pseudo-privatization, the IRGC amassed a degree of
economic power that allowed it to carve out its own unique space in the Iranian politics.
Subsequently, it established itself as an economic and also a political player that regularly
negotiates with the civilians and sets forth new economic demands.
Despite establishing itself as an economic and political player, the IRGC needs to
partner with the civilian elite to further access the state resources. After all, its capture of
state resources has become a stark topic of criticism by Rouhani’s government. In order
for the IRGC to be able to continue its economic expansion, the IRGC needs the support
of elite-linkages to obtain new projects. If the executive branch chooses to dismiss its
demands, the IRGC enters into a process of bargaining, and succeeds if it is able to gain
support of the Supreme Leader or a different elite-network.
The Functional Control of the IRGC
Hypothesis number two suggests that if the state is successful in opening to the
global economy, and subsequently generating money, there should be a higher likelihood
for state increase of military spending; the outcome would be a probable increase in the
military’s functional control. In contrast, incomplete liberalization and the state’s lack of
sufficient income incentivizes the military to retain its income-generating businesses. A
military that focuses on both tasks of defense and economic activity would have a lower
prospect of increasing its functional efficacy. In other words, H2 suggests that the state’s
incomplete liberalization and its economic incompetence negatively impact the military’s
functional capacities. The reasoning lies behind (i) the state’s inability to fund the military
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and (ii) the military’s occupation with two simultaneous tasks of defense and income
generation.
Testing the second hypothesis, this section’s empirical evidence illustrates Iran’s
incompetence in functional capabilities. Extrapolating from Iran’s doctrinal changes, as
well as available data on indicators of functional control, it argues that incomplete
economic liberalization resulted in the IRGC’s inability to advance its military capabilities
noticeably. Drawing on Brook and Stanley’s (2007) operationalization of military
effectiveness, this section assesses the indicators of integration, responsiveness, skill, and
quality. Integration refers to consistency between tactics, logistics, and strategic plans with
political goals, whereas responsiveness signifies to the modification of forces to address
adversaries’ weaknesses and new threats. Skill and quality refer to personnel’s training and
nature of weaponry.
First, the data suggest that Iran has not been generating sources of income and
subsequently has not increased the defense expenditure. SIPRI111 data on Iran’s military
expenditure as a percentage of GDP demonstrates a decline in military spending from 6.3%
in 1988 to 2.6% in 1997, which coincides with Rafsanjani’s presidency. During Khatami,
there was a slight increase in military spending from 2.6% to 3.3% in 2005, whereas during
the term of Ahmadinejad, military spending fluctuated unevenly between 3.0% to 3.6%,
with the final years reaching as low as 2.3%. A lack of transparency makes it difficult to
assess whether the money was spent on the regular military or the IRGC. SIPRI speculates
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that, with the exception of year 2012, the figures based on the Central Bank indicate
inclusion of the IRGC’s budget in the data. Nevertheless, the data suggests that Iran has
not been increasing its military budget dramatically, at least officially.
The rest of this section will illustrate how the IRGC’s functional capabilities have
not increased throughout decades despite its attempts to expand its military capabilities. As
explained in the previous section, Iran’s incomplete economic liberalization, the state’s
inability to generate funds, and low military spending have incentivized the IRGC’s
maintenance in the economy. The inevitable consequence of this dual role has been lagging
functional capabilities. Therefore, despite liberalization attempts, IRGC’s functional
capabilities’ development has not been remarkable.
The crux of Iran’s doctrine has been an instrumental assessment of Iran’s military
capabilities vis-à-vis US and Israeli capacities and subsequent adoption of a “deterrencebased doctrine that stresses raising an adversary’s risks and costs rather than reducing its
own” (Ward 2005, 576). This doctrine looked for strategies to circumvent conventional
war and instead focused on irregular warfare, development of WMDs, and sponsoring
terrorism. Paired with threats to internationalize conflicts via disruption of oil trade routes,
these strategies’ goal was to pressure for diplomatic solutions to conflicts (Ward 2005,
567). For example, following the US deployments in Afghanistan in 2001, and Iraq in
2003, Iran was forced to reconsider its strategic doctrine; the goals did not change but the
methods did. The evidence suggests Iran’s ability to assess its economic resources and its
threat environment and plan accordingly.

118

In 2004, Vice-Defense Minister Mohammad Shafayi Rudsari announced that Iran’s
defense strategy was “diverse,” would allow Iran to combat great powers, and would
compensate for Iran’s weakness in ‘classic’ forms of military capability. In 2005, the IRGC
announced its “mosaic doctrine” and reorganized its structure by creating 31 command
centers in Iran’s provinces. The decentralization was expected to increase unit cohesion
and local level commanders’ authority; it was expected to make infiltration of the US forces
into Iran difficult1. Although Iran has been able to integrate its doctrinal developments and
its political goals, other aspects of its functional capabilities lag behind.
The IRGC’s tasks, especially in non-conventional warfare, have met the strategies
of the military doctrine. For example, the IRGC’s Al Quds force involvement with Hamas,
Hizbollah, and Iraqi groups in Afghanistan to engage in irregular warfare and defend Iran’s
interest against US and Israel has been well-documented. It is estimated that 5000 men in
the IRGC are assigned to unconventional warfare tasks. The IRGC has one special force
division, plus smaller units, that have been prioritized for training to conduct operations
abroad. In another example, the doctrine states that Iran should take advantage of Persian
Gulf’s geography and the limitations that it offers for the enemies’ maneuverability. Iran
should use islands to launch attacks, disrupt oil trade routes, and target enemy oil
installations; due to the Gulf’s limited depth and width, Iran could use anti-ship cruise
missiles and mines, conduct hit-and-run missions using fast boats, deploy submarines to
the Gulf of Oman for initial defensive purposes, and employ electronic warfare. According
to Ward, a report published in 2004 explained the maneuver of Ettehad-83 where the navy
practices electronic warfare, camouflage, concealment, and deception activities aiming at
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an enemy; these practices seem to be compatible with the overall doctrine (Ward, 2005:
568).
Regarding organizational training and skills, the IRGC transformed itself from a
disorganized revolutionary militia to a professional military institution by adopting
military-like ranks and uniforms and valuing knowledge and skills for promotion rather
than sole ideological loyalty; education level, experience, and managerial and
administrative skills became important factors (Cordesman 1999, 37). However, as Ward
argues, despite the attempts to create a coherent military doctrine, there seems to be either
an inability or unwillingness to train and support the armed forces effectively (2005, 573).
The effectiveness of the IRGC since 1988 has declined, with bureaucratization, corruption,
careerism, and financial abuses as likely causes. “It is the elite elements of IRGC that give
it real meaning” (Cordesman 2007, 4-6).
In terms of training and skills, as well as weaponry capabilities, the data is
contradictory. For example, some IRGC units operate as conventional army divisions,
whereas other divisions are capable of conducting asymmetric warfare and convert
operations, but the majority of the IRGC’s land force is trained to maintain internal security
rather than external defense. Cordesman (2007) underscores the existence of
inconsistencies in reports about the IRGC manpower capabilities and organizational
structure. It appears that the IRGC’s claims about its capabilities do not match experts’
opinions. The evidence of Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities and nuclear program do not
match the IRGC’s claims either. Although Iran’s air-force strategy includes the
development of ballistic missile program and air defense due to its limited nature of
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technology, it might threaten civilian targets rather than military ones. The limitations of
Iranian armed forces, such as its immobility, an infantry that utilizes towed artillery, and
the IRGC’s poorly trained reserve force, make it difficult to plan for conventional warfare
(Ward, 2005: 571-573).
Similarly, although Iran has acquired the capacity to build missiles with the IRGC
in leadership position, the ballistic missile program has not produced impressive outcomes.
By 2008, Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities consisted of short- and mid-range missiles,
capable of protecting Iran against its enemies in the Middle East (Alexander & Hoenig
2008, 176-177). In 1998, however, the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat
to the United States (Rumsfeld Report) determined Iran’s domestic missile program to be
underdeveloped and dependent on foreign assistance. Different reports estimated that Iran
possessed 300 domestically-produced Shahab1 short-range ballistic missiles in the 80s.
Since then, Iran has tested updated versions of Shahab, but the results have not been
impressive. Although there is disagreement among analysts regarding Iran’s missile
capabilities (Alexander & Hoenig 2008, 182), there are reports of failed launches, such as
the Iranian media’s reporting on photo-shopped fake images of missile tests portraying
failed attempts as successful in 20081. It is safe to assume that Iran also lags in developing
its defensive technological capabilities.
This section marshalled evidence suggesting IRGC’s incompetence in conventional
warfare, its reliance on unconventional strategies, poor equipment and training. Overall
lack of development and weak industrial base impedes IRGC’s military production as well.
Therefore, despite economic liberalization, Iran has failed to improve its economic
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performance and generate funds for the state. The result has been state’s inability to
increase defense spending and to invest in procurement of better weaponry, or investment
in conventional capabilities.
The Social Control of the IRGC
The third hypothesis suggests that if economic liberalization conditions the
maintenance of military’s economic activities, there is a higher likelihood for militaries to
operate as interest groups. Subsequently, the social control would decrease. In other words,
the commercialization of militaries (their expansion into new domains after liberalization
and privatization) accentuates their corporal interests as economic actors, and hence,
negatively impacts their social integration. Militaries, in their pursuit of self-interest, might
dismiss previously accepted social values at times, or may adopt new social values
corresponding to newly emerging values in the society.
In terms of the IRGC’s social values, the liberalization and privatization
complicated the social aspect of the military control. One the one hand, the IRGC has
remained loyal to conservative values of revolution, despite a political liberalization during
Khatami that challenged some of those fundamentalist or traditional political assumptions.
On the other hand, in the process of protecting its economic interests, the IRGC has been
undermining some of the economic and developmental values of the 1979 revolution,
specifically alleviation of poverty and “defending the oppressed”112.
Since Khatami’s presidency, there has been a shift among the elite and their social
constellation in support of democratization, liberalization, and human rights. Although the
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reformist elite in Iran remained loyal to Islamic values, they offered reinterpretations of
Islamic teachings and sharia law, and championed the necessity to provide political and
social rights in accordance with the universal human rights values. Prompting Iran’s
conservative elites’ reaction, Khatami’s presidency became a battleground between prodemocracy and traditional-Islamist forces and their respective social constellations. During
these tensions, and up until today, the IRGC has consistently presented itself as the
guardian of traditional revolutionary values. Therefore, in a sense, it has not changed its
initial social values; its social values are still in accordance with values of a portion of
population that favors islamist and traditional ideals of the 1979 Revolution. However,
given the pervasiveness of Khatami’s reform movement, as well as the Green movement
that rallied behind the reformist candidates in the 2010 presidential election, one can
conclude that the IRGC has not incorporated values of the pro-democracy portion of the
population.
Additionally, the rapid privatization led to the transformation of the IRGC into an
economic actor. The consequences of this change have been twofold: first, although the
IRGC maintains the Islamic revolutionary values, in pursuit of its economic interest, it
deviated from its initial responsibility of assisting the state in development. In other words,
although the IRGC has been portraying itself as an institution that upheld revolutionary
value of “defending the oppressed”, its behavior has not been reflecting a devotion to the
revolutionary values of eradicating poverty. For an institution that portrays itself as the
servant of the state, it has been undermining state’s attempts to facilitate economic
development.
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For example, the IRGC’s self-interested behavior was evident in the activities of its
Mehr Finance and Credit Institution. Mehr provided housing and loans to the Basij
members, had more than seven hundred branches, and were known as “the largest ‘Private’
Bank in the Islamic Republic”. However, this institution has been criticized for refusing to
give out loans to disadvantaged groups and instead has been caught in large trades in the
Tehran Stock Exchange through its subsidiary, Mehr-e Eghtesad-e Iranian Investment
Company (Afloneh 2010, 3-4). Such evidence highlights a disconnect between the
ideological convictions of IRGC and its actual behavior. The IRGC’s economic projects in
strategic sectors, and the subsequent impacts it has on foreign capital attraction, is another
example of IRGC’s negative influence on Iran’s economic development.
There have also been rumors regarding the IRGC’s involvement in illegal activities.
Sadri explains how the IRGC is believed to have monopolized the “smuggling of alcohol,
cigarettes and satellite dishes, among other things in great demand” (Sadri 2009, 102). In
fact, during a political rift between Ahmadinejad and Khamenei, Ahmadinejad, in
retaliation, revealed information about the IRGC’s illegal smuggling of cigarettes. If the
rumors were true, the IRGC engages in the import of alcohol and satellite dishes and
simultaneously preaches Islamic values, condemns consumption of alcohol, arrests people
for possession of alcohol, destroys satellite dishes, and criticizes the dissemination of
Western values. The contradictory behavior illustrates how the IRGC operates based on
the interests of its own corporation rather than a simple adherence to the values of the
revolution.
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Hence, the IRGC began behaving like a corporate entity seeking profitmaximization. The IRGC is still ideologically Islamic and in line with traditional social
values, but is also a self-interested organization with a network of beneficiaries and social
constellations that exert pressure on the organization. Moreover, the IRGC’s self-interested
behavior in the economic domain has undermined the state’s economic growth and
prosperity. Therefore, the IRGC might claim that it is protecting the regime and serving
the values of the 1979 Revolution, but its economic role expansion and subsequent
behavior has hurt the state and the future of its economic development.
Conclusion
This chapter Seth forth three hypotheses: The haphazard or incomplete economic
liberalization in Iran, has conditioned emergence of the IRGC as an established economic
and political player. The outcome has been decrease in civilian control of the IRGC relative
to the decade prior to the liberalization. Functional capabilities of the IRGC has not
changed dramatically, whereas decades of engagement in economic activities has turned
the IRGC into an economic interest group, and hence has reduced the social control.
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Chapter 5: Economic Liberalization and Egyptian Armed Forces’ Government
Take-Over

Introduction
Decades of economic liberalization and privatization policies in Egypt culminated
in the establishment of crony capitalism. Different from the state-led reforms in East Asia
or China, the economic liberalization and privatization in the Middle East and North Africa,
including in Egypt, led to “nomenklatura privatization” (Cammett et. al 2015, 280) or
“capitalism from above113” and the emergence of crony capitalism in Egypt. These reforms
have incorporated trade liberalization and rapid privatization in a context of incongruent
regulations; they also focused on the task of reform as an objective rather than a strategy
to achieve developmental goals, and hence, failed to direct the liberalization and
privatization to boost Egypt’s private sector and support productivity.
The Egyptian Armed Forces (EAF) operated under the conditions of a rapidly
liberalizing and privatizing economy. Like the cases of Iran’s IRGC and China’s PLA, the
EAF also had a history of engaging in economic developmental projects under Nasser’s
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leadership. Since 1980s, and primarily under Mubarak’s privatization plan in the 90s, the
EAF captured opportunities offered by rapid privatization and acquired new economic
projects. The EAF expanded into new economic sectors, such as international trade and
energy. The economic power struggle between the EAF and Mubarak-affiliated elite, more
precisely Hosni Mubarak’s son, Gamal Mubarak, ended when the EAF defected from the
civilian elite during the 2011 Egyptian revolution.
In this chapter, I illustrate how the economic liberalization and privatization during
Sadat, and specifically Mubarak, led to the EAF’s rise into economic power; later the EAF
transformed its economic empire into a political power. I argue that the types of economic
liberalization and privatization resulted in the EAF’s economic role-expansion and made
it less dependent on the civilians. This changing balance of power between governing
civilians and the institution of military became problematic once the civilians attempted to
limit the EAF’s economic power. In the absence of both economic competition and an
independent private sector, economic tensions rose between the civilians and the EAF over
Egypt’s future economic trajectory. The EAF resisted economic change. In the context of
these rising tensions, the 2011 Revolution became a catalyst for the EAF to assert its
independence from the civilians. The economic calculation played an integral part in EAF’s
decision to defect from Mubarak’s regime.
The next section will outline the economic liberalization and privatization under
Sadat and Mubarak to illustrate the process through which Egypt facilitated the emergence
of crony-networks, including the establishment of the EAF as an economic player.
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Egyptian Economic Trajectory and the Rise of the EAF’s Businesses
Economic liberalization since 1974 aimed to address inefficiencies of Nasserist
command economy. An uneven process of trade liberalization, capital attraction, and
privatization of State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) failed to establish market mechanisms.
Instead of fostering private sector growth and economic productivity, Egypt struggled with
macro-economic instability, capital attraction in unproductive sectors, and capture of state
resources by crony-networks consisting of several state-linked business networks,
primarily Mubarak’s affiliates, and the EAF. The economic liberalization and privatization
did not stimulate economic competitiveness, private sector growth, and economic
diversification. In fact, Egypt’s low economic performance coupled with the dominance of
crony-networks, including the EAF, exemplified its lack of competitiveness.
The EAF, similar to the IRGC and the PLA, entered the economic domain during
the period of central planning. Nasser (1956-1970) assigned high rank officers the
supervisory role over nationalization and import substitution industrialization policies and
thus sanctioned the EAF’s entrance into the non-defense sectors of the economy114. PanArab nationalism and the prominence of statist developmental models colored Egyptian
economic policymaking; the EAF became a major player, accepted both by domestic and
international actors such as the USAID, to accomplish domestic industrialization and
developmental projects. The EAF became involved in projects on land reclamation,
infrastructure building, basic commodity provision, manufacturing of appliances and
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electronics, and other industrial projects such as steel and fertilizers. Officers became
managers and administrators in factories and SOEs (Marshall 2015). Seeing itself at the
forefront of national development, the military obtained power over both use of public
lands and public enterprises (Roll 2017, 2). Hence, similar to Iran and China, the EAF
engaged in developmental projects during the period of central planning; it also become
active in industrial production.
The EAF’s economic expansion into new domains has been a gradual process.
However, the acceleration of the privatization process during Mubarak was the turning
point in terms of the EAF’s capability to amass substantial economic leverage. This
economic expansion occurred in an economy where selective protectionism had
established state-linked businesses since the late 1970s and 1980s. In the absence of
economic competitiveness, the crony-networks pressured the government to obtain
economic resources. Once privatization accelerated, the EAF was offered ample
opportunities to establish itself as an economic player too. Therefore, an interplay of weak
private sector, an undiversified economy, and privatization that prioritized the sale of SOEs
to strategic actors over to private ones, enabled the EAF’s economic rise. In the late 2000s,
the EAF refused to privatize its businesses and finally outcompeted other crony-networks
once the revolution destabilized Mubarak’s regime in 2011.
El-Ghonemy summarizes four economic development periods in Egypt: marketbased economic policies that existed pre-1952 revolution, Nasser’s central-planning from
1956 to 1970. Financial liberalization and structural adjustments from 1970 to 1990 that
did not resolve Egypt’s economic problems, such as its bloated public sector, and
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ultimately a stark shift to a new strategy of economic liberalization from 1991-2000 that
focused on the goal of achieving technological advancement and competitiveness in the
global economy (El-Ghonemy 2010, 74). The types of EAF’s economic role-expansion
also corresponded to the above strategies. While during Nasser, the military was engaged
in development and industrialization projects, since liberalization in 1973, the EAF’s
economic projects increased gradually. However, it was under Mubarak that the EAF’s
focus shifted away from economic developmental roles; in line with Mubarak’s policy of
opening to the global economy, the EAF also diversified and entered global markets.
Specifically, a privatization policy focusing on joint-venture formation enabled the EAF’s
entrance into the global economy. The EAF began diversifying its businesses and
commercializing by partnering with domestic and foreign private investors to access both
finances and technology. The EAF’s international joint ventures operated in industries such
as car manufacturing, hardware, and solar panels. In addition, the EAF became a
shareholder in critical domestic projects such as privately owned cargo container facilities
(Marshall 2015, 4-6).
The modes of economic liberalization, and specifically privatization policies,
explain the reasons behind the growth of crony-networks, as well as the EAF businesses
and its ability to outcompete other economic players since 2001. Drawing on King and
Szelenyi’s (2005) and Harris’ (2013) arguments on capitalist developmental models, I
illustrate that the Egyptian rapid liberalization and privatization, in the absence of
regulatory and bureaucratic reforms, established a state characterized by “capitalism from
above”. In this system, as Harris (2013) would explain, preserving patrimonial
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relationships took precedent over entrepreneurship; political exchange, rather than market
exchange, determined the nature of economic relationships. The economic system suffered
from a lack of industrial dynamism; its market mechanisms were weak, and capture of
SOEs by the patrimonial networks was common (Harris 2013, 65-66). Under these
uncompetitive economic conditions, the state-linked business elite, including the EAF,
maintained the economic system that benefited them.
Some of Sadat’s and Mubarak’s main economic liberalization policies
encompassed trade liberalization, capital attraction, and industrialization. Embarking on
trade liberalization, Sadat’s rapid trade approach created a balance of payment deficit.
Sadat inherited an economy overburdened by ambitious development projects (1960-65),
aid-dependency and a low rate of private savings (Amin 1981, 430). His strategy of rapid
trade liberalization and utilization of short-term credits to finance projects exacerbated
inherited budgetary problems; the outcome was import of ‘capital and intermediate’ goods
for consumption rather than production. While the trade boosted the housing market, other
industries such as cement, paper, cigarettes, tiers, and buses declined (Amin 1995).
Ultimately, the Egyptian economy suffered a balance of payment deficit. Since the late
1980s and 1990s, Mubarak also adopted his own version of trade liberalization, which also
negatively impacted production since it did not account for the impact of product dumping
on domestic manufactures. Similarly, Mubarak’s trade liberalization increased imports and
weakened domestic production (El-Ghonemy 2010, 78-83).
The experience of trade liberalization illustrates the inadvertent character of
economic policy-making. Egypt’s liberalization and privatization attempts did not
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encompass specific plans to meet state’s developmental goals. As Gillespie and Sotever
(1998), Egypt liberalized “for its own sake, without viewing…[liberalization] as a means
to and end”. This kind of undirected reform was evident in Egypt’s policies of capital
attraction and industrial development plans as well. For example, this lack of planning was
evident in fluctuating net inflows of capital: in 1990, capital inflow to Egypt was $ 734
million; in 2003, it was around $237 million. It hiked to $11.578 billion in 2007 and
dropped to about $-482 million in 2010.
Regarding capital attraction during Sadat’s rule, investments went to unproductive
sectors. As evident in sharp fluctuations115, capital attraction efforts were vulnerable to
inept planning and execution, and were exacerbated by political instabilities. This
incompetence was primarily a result of decoupling economic liberalization from the reform
of regulatory and institutional frameworks, a process whereby foreign investment was not
directed to achieve developmental goals. For example, the state created free zones but did
not adopt export-oriented policies that would boost competitiveness. The state enforced
joint-venture formations with foreign companies, but because the domestic private
companies were not large enough, the foreign investors were forced to work with the SOEs,
which subsequently discouraged the foreign companies from investing in the domestic
economy (Gillespie and Stoever 1988).

115

“Foreign Direct Investment, net inflows”, World Bank Data, n/d. The data suggests that Foreign
investment fluctuated radically at different periods. According to the World Bank data, there were
substantial fluctuations of FDI (net inflows, BoP), with $ 1.216B in 1979 and $1.25B in 1989 as the highest
points and then dropping to $295.571B in 1982.
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.KLT.DINV.CD.WD?locations=EG

132

Therefore, Egypt’s trade and capital attraction strategies did not promote exports,
nor did they promote competitiveness in production. Its policies instead contributed to the
establishment of an economically uncompetitive system. Due to the economy’s
uncompetitive nature, the EAF businesses were able to survive and thrive. For example,
the process of investment in unproductive sectors continued leading to investment in
domains dominated by the EAF. The military’s position in profitable sectors were greater
than other economic actors, and subsequently attracted more foreign investment.
Additionally, military businesses have been able to establish partnerships with gulf
conglomerates and western multinational corporations using the International financial
institutions’ loans (Casabon 2015).
Although both Sadat and Mubarak adopted industrialization strategies, neither
succeeded in fostering private sector development. Sadat’s industrial policy retained
Egypt’s rentier economy instead of boosting industrial production. Mubarak attempted to
resolve inefficiencies of a rentier economy and Egypt’s bloated public sector. State’s heavy
debt, however, hampered Mubarak’s industrialization plans. Under Sadat, Egypt’s GDP
share of industrial production exceeded agricultural production by 1979 (30.5% for
industry and 21% agriculture), but the main portion belonged to largely oil production.
Along with an increase in the oil production (57.4% of GDP in 1983), the share of
manufacturing in the industrial sector dropped from 79% in 1975 to 40% in 1983 (Algan
2003, 160-161). Instead of an export-oriented strategy, Mubarak (1981-2011) also
attempted to reestablish import substitution industrialization to boost industrial production.
His plan offered protective tariffs to domestic industries and lowered their interest rates
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and taxes. Mubarak, however, could not resolve the problem of domestic debt, partially
due to the high political costs of cutting spending. Again, as has been discussed thus far,
Egypt’s economic reform failed to foster productivity, competitiveness, and diversification
of the Egyptian economy.
Although Egypt registered GDP growth, it failed to improve its global
competitiveness relative to China’s ranking. For example, the World Economic Forum’s
data suggests that in the category of ability to encourage technological advancement, the
rank of spending on research and design was 70 out of 104 in 2004/2005, whereas China
ranked 26. Hence, the privatization in the late 90s and early 2000s, and the liberalization
that focused on technological advancement, did not yield expected results. This is despite
the fact that Egypt had a higher rank for FDI and technology transfers compared to China:
Egypt’s rank was 44 while China ranked 52. Therefore, although Egypt opened its
economy, it could not foster economic competitiveness. Egypt’s global competitiveness
index fluctuated dramatically and did not indicate a consistent growth over decades either.
Table 9:World Economic Forum116, Egypt’s Growth Competitiveness Ranking (19852017)

Egypt
Adjusted
rank (out
of 134
states)

116

1995 (out
of 48
states)

2000(out
of 58
states)

2005/2006
(out of 117
states)

2015 (out of 134
states)

42

2004/200
5(out of
104
states)
62

27

53

115

75

97

80

61

115

World Competitiveness Reports (1995, 2000, 2004/05, 2005/06, and 2015).
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The above rankings highlight the outcomes of Mubarak’s implementation of
Structural Adjustment Policies (SAP) following constant renegotiations with the IMF and
the WB. After the Gulf War in 1991, along with a promise for debt cancelation, Egypt
agreed to a new package of the SAP policies (Amin 1990, 21). While these policies117
boosted growth, they also received ample criticism (Ansari 1987, Belev 2001, Sika 2013)
since they addressed short-term fiscal problems instead of establishing market mechanisms
and competition.

Instead of resolving structural inefficiencies, the regimes’

implementation of the SAP exacerbated political and economic instabilities. In Egypt,
particularly, crony-networks emerged and consolidated their power in the 90s, with the
EAF rising into power in 2000s (Casabon 2015).
Therefore, the state, unable to implement the SAP effectively, constantly struggled
with introduction of new workable policies. Privatization being one of those strategies,
Egypt also experimented with various privatization policies, but these policies did not
strengthen the private sector either. On the contrary, during privatization, as Wurzel (2004)
discusses, Egypt experienced the growth of interest groups. Wurzel (2004) underscores the
institutional context, i.e., the specifics of the rentier state, to explain the economic
networks’ behavior in the context of privatization. To alleviate the state’s fiscal burden of
indebtedness and inefficient state-subsidized SOEs, privatization was destined to alter the
“power equilibrium” by favoring new actors vis-à-vis public actors. Instead, unlike
expectations, privileged networks manipulated pre-reform conditions in their favor
(Wurzel 2004: 104-105).
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As Nagarajan explains, not only did the SAP produce a “triangle of poverty,”118 it
also facilitated the emergence of “conglomerates owned by politically well-connected
families” instead of establishing a competitive market. “Osman, Bahgat, Seoudi, Mohamed
Mahmoud and Orascom groups” were families that formed conglomerates and formed joint
ventures with foreign partners (cited in Nagarajan 2013, 32). Sika, similarly argues, that
the Washington Consensus has not produced the expected results. In the case of Egypt,
liberalization and privatization contributed to “strengthening ties among the government,
the ruling party, and the businessmen.” For example, the Investment Law 8 in 2005 did not
lead to the establishment of a free market; on the contrary, deregulation and taxmarketization conditioned the emergence of monopolies, whereby alliances between the
government and the business elite led to the misuse of public resources (Sika 2013, 45-47).
Shahid (2002) also assesses the reasons behind the success of some networks in
capturing resources. The author underscores the impact of privatization in creating
networks—a process through which state officials and former bureaucrats formed
networks, captured the spoils of privatization, and sidelined the established business actors
(Shahid 2002, 78). A new network consisting of state-business connections emerged in the
90s whereby the businesses played a two-level game: preserving crony capitalism and
competing over rents created by shifting policies (Shahid 2002, 78). These business elite
consisted of mainly 32 businessmen involved in import substitution; they benefited from
protectionism and could not compete in the international markets. They were further
strengthened in the 90s because the privatization allowed them to both sustain and enlarge

118

Unemployment, low wages, and income inequality.

136

their interests against exporters who suffered from a collective action problem. These
networks sustained the uncompetitive character of the system—access to information,
connections with the bureaucrats, and economic opportunities—because it benefited them
and weeded out competitors (Shahid 2002, 98). EAF also operated as an economic actor,
and subsequently benefited from the same privatization policies.
In terms of the EAF’s economic power, scholars (Abul-Magd 2011, Casabon 2015,)
have highlighted the linkages between privatization policies under Mubarak and the EAF’s
economic growth. For example, Abul-Magd explains that Sadat’s privatization and import
of consumer goods led to a partial downgrading of military power due to the privatization
of a portion of military-controlled SOEs and facilitated the rise of new Sadat-affiliated
crony capitalists as competitors with the military economic power. However, this period
was short-lived and was reversed after the 1979 Peace Accord; the following years’ policies
strongly contributed to the further expansion of the military’s economic clout accompanied
by subsidies and tax exceptions for the EAF. Later, Mubarak’s privatization and
liberalization project in 1992 did not include the privatization of military businesses. On
the contrary, the military retained its businesses, and the corruption in the process of
privatization benefited high-ranking officers who received positions in privatized SOEs119.
Although since 1998 Egypt attempted to make the privatization reliant on market forces,
the process did not result in the sale of SOEs to private actors. Instead, it mainly took place
via the sale of SOEs to strategic investors (Shahid 2002).
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Casabon120 (2015) also argues that although Sadat’s Infitah introduced market
mechanisms and boosted US-Egyptian private sector growth, it was the privatization in the
90s that entrenched the military’s role as an economic actor. Offering an estimate of the
military’s share of the GDP as 40 percent, military businesses were part of a broader public
sector whose enterprises benefited from “private oligopoly” system that originated postprivatization. While SOEs privatized and the welfare state shrank, the oligarchy emerged
with the aid of “state subsidies and almost exclusive access to bank credit”; furthermore,
the state offered tax cuts to boost investment. In the context of capital inflight, the EAF
businesses attracted international investments due to their dominance in the profitable
sectors. Meanwhile, the tax system did not support smaller businesses. Smaller businesses
were unable to grow and incapable of guaranteeing basic rights and benefits to laborers
due to the lack of opportunities to borrow (Casabon 2015). Therefore, selective
protectionism, instead of competitiveness, prioritized state-linked economic actors,
specifically the EAF, over the private sector.
There are radically different estimates on the EAF’s share of the Egyptian economy.
Marshall and Stacher (2012) report that estimates vary between 5 to 40 percent or more
(2012, 12). Other reports suggest fluctuations between 40 percent (Naguib Sawiris) to 4060 percent (Transparency International). Springborg, an expert on the EAF, offers an
estimate of 10 to 40 percent121. If the EAF controlled about the 40% of the Egyptian
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economy, and since 2012 has been acquiring more projects, it is safe to assume that the
EAF has become a central economic player in the Egyptian economy. In an interview with
Al Jazeera, Springborg, an expert on Egyptian military, stated that "The question isn't what
sectors do they [the EAF] invest in, but rather: is there a sector that they don't invest
in?" For example, Ministry of Military Production runs 14 companies that produce military
equipment such as tank shells and ammunition, as well as civilian goods such as
“fertilizers, sports equipment, cement, pasta and cars122”.
Therefore, since Sadat, and following liberalization policies in 1970s, the EAF’s
assumed new economic projects in building infrastructures (waterways, transportation,
telecommunication, construction); it also became involved in real estate and housing, food
self-sufficiency, and import of commodities (Roy 1992, 703). Furthermore, the 1979
Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty led to cuts in defense expenditure, and the EAF was ordered
to generate its own defense revenue123 (Harding 2016, par.3). Hence, transforming its
military production into a civilian one, the Ministry of Defense-affiliated National Service
Project Organization (NSPO) controlled the military’s economic production in the civilian
domain, including the production of washing machines, heaters, clothing, pharmaceuticals,
tourism etc.124
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The EAF is also affiliated with the Arab Organization for Industrialization the
National Services Projects Organization (NSPO), and the Ministry of Military Production,
as well as infrastructure-building semi-public or private companies. It also operates in
strategically significant civilian sectors, such as airports. According to Transparency
International, the businesses profit both the military institution and individuals. The EAF
has been controlling most the public land (desert, agriculture, and urban: 94 percent of
Egyptian land) and receives compensations from the government by auctioning the land
and transforming military zones into civilian ones. Control over the coastline, categorized
as a border, is another source of revenues following developments in tourism industry. The
following table summarizes both the sectors of activity and known companies related to
the EAF:
Table 10: The EAF's Economic Role Expansion (Sectors & Companies)
Sector
Food
Production

Energy

Mixture of
civilian and
military goods

Company name
The National Service Projects
Organization (founded in 1979)

Since 2016, Ministry of Military
Production and Ministries of Petroleum
and Electricity established a joint
company to maintain state’s powerstations
Tharwa Petroleum Company
Arab Organization of Industrialization
formed joint ventures with a firm from
UAE to invest in renewable energy
Ministry of Military Production
Arab Organization of Industrialization
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Notes
Army runs chain of
supermarkets
representing 28% of
population
living
below poverty line
Provision
of
electricity
Veto power over oil
and gas production
since 2016

Construction
and
Infrastructure

Armed Forces Engineering Authority

Developmental
projects
+Building parks and
ports in the Suez Canal

Therefore, overall privatization strategies were irregular, the pace of privatization
fluctuated, and the ultimate outcome was consolidation of crony-networks rather than the
development of a private sector. Similarly, even in 2000s, when Mubarak authorized
Gamal Mubarak to embark on a rigorous economic reform project to strengthen the private
sector, the reform produced mixed outcomes. A privatization program, overseen by Ahmad
Nazif’s cabinet (2004-2011), aimed at creating a corporate sector capable of competing
internationally. The program included banking privatization, reforms of trade and the tax
system (tax cuts and restructuring administration), and liberalization of the financial sector
in 2005. These policies led to an increase in growth, as well as an increase in FDI (8.1% of
the GDP) in the energy, real estate, and tourism sectors, as well as a construction boom.
However, from the mid-2000s, a combination of insider firms and ventures linked to Gamal
Mubarak directed this process of reform. These ventures had the support of the state, were
financed by international and Arab interests, and profited from the privatization process.
These emerging businesses had positions in the governing bodies and were connected to
one another, which gave them leverage over economic policies (296). Privatization did not
resolve inequalities and did not alleviate poverty or unemployment. The “[c]rony nature of
private-sector development” hampered private sector development and has empowered “a
new class of capitalists connected to the state” (295-296).
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In 2008 Mubarak, adopted a new proposal to privatize 86 out of 153 public
companies via “voucher privatization” and “mass privatization.125” Despite a history of
privatization in Egypt, according to Saif, the problem was over a “highly publicized shift”
in privatization after the adoption of new regulations in 2008. Citing Mubarak’s interview
in Al-Ahram Weekly, where he defends “greater involvement of the people in managing
public assets,” Saif expressed concerns regarding Mubarak’s attitude towards ownership,
and public-private relations. Saif explained that the literature suggests that a mere transfer
of ownership has not been the most important factor in successful privatization but rather
coupling of the ownership-transfer with suitable regulation and increased competition. The
author argued that allowing the public to partake in ownership would not facilitate wealth
distribution. He anticipated, then, that what was required was the establishment of
institutions that would thwart monopolies and their formation. Unlike Mubarak’s
expectation, the author predicted the rise of “opportunistic businessmen” in the absence of
a clear institutional mechanism to manage privatization, along with unclear goals such as
the involvement of the Egyptian population to manage the SOEs.
Liberalization and privatization strategies of Sadat and Mubarak (in 90s and in
2000s) did not foster competitiveness. On the contrary, the state experienced emergence of
business-elite that benefited from selective protectionism and hampered competition. What
were the implications of this uncompetitive economy? In an uncompetitive unfair system,
the military businesses benefited. First, the military utilized the cheap (forced) labor by
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conscripts who were employed in military businesses. It also benefited from a system of
licenses and permits that favored the EAF in biddings for public contracts and facilitated
creation of partnerships with private investors. While these public-private partnerships held
the state reliable for losses, the EAF reaped the profits. Moreover, the EAF had an
advantage over competitors due to its access to off-book subsidies. For example, the
Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) decided to increase the prices of fuel for
industries that competed against EAF businesses while the EAF purchased subsidized fuel.
Additionally, not only were military businesses not productive, they prevented the growth
of small-sized private sector enterprises due to unfair competition.
An example is EAF’s profiteering via imports without a necessity to create jobs or
be productive. Roy (1992) identifies the EAF as a major contributor to the ‘secret economy.
It manages lands, produces food for domestic consumption, engages in real estate
development, speculations, and investments, provides for-profit health services to the
civilians by utilizing its military hospitals; it makes textbooks, smuggles goods via free
economic zones, uses military resources for private constructions, and reclaims lands (Roy
1992, 704). This hidden economy utilized inadequacies of the public sector, and its
operation had repercussions for wealth distribution. It created wealthy groups who did not
necessarily invest in domestic projects but rather sent their capital overseas, benefited from
corruption, and created a business environment un-conducive to production, innovation,
and profitability. This economic system also created coalitions between the military and
big businesses (Roy 1992, 709-710). These networks have created a self-perpetuating cycle
of inefficiency whereby economic survival is a function of selective protectionism and
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access to the state resources rather than of firms’ profitability and competitiveness in a free
market economy. In turn, these economic actors, including the EAF, impede the
development of a functioning market and an independent private sector.
Abul-Magd (2011), in an article titled “The Army and the Economy in Egypt,”126
raises the issue of transparency of the EAF’s economic activities. Not only have the EAF’s
economic activities not been subject to public debate, the EAF also lacks sufficient
expertise for economic tasks. Abul-Magd explains that the military has announced its
engagement in profitable enterprises such as “selling and buying of real estate on behalf of
the government, domestic cleaning services, running cafeterias, managing gas stations,
farming livestock, producing food products, and manufacturing plastic table covers,” but
there has been a taboo on public discussion around these activities, especially their
contribution to the military budget. Although the defense-related activities’ budget was
available to the public due to the demands of foreign donors (US aid) for transparency, it
is the non-defense portion of the military budget that is kept secret. Abul-Magd argues that
the military were an obstacle to liberalization policies (neoliberal model) not due to its
convictions to a socialist model but due to its economic interests. Corrupt practices, such
as forcing the purchase of army-produced food by the soldiers in remote areas, offering
deals to civilian distributors to assist the military in selling its products, and a law
permitting the military to take over public lands for defense or commercial purposes also
became sources of profit.
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As discussed thus far, new elite-business alliances emerged post-privatization, in
the early 2000s. Although the EAF’s expansion into new domains occurred from the 1980s,
the Egyptian economy, in the late 1990s, also faced the emergence of Gamal Mubarak’s
network of businessmen whose ambition to monopolize and privatize threatened the EAF’s
economic empire. Known for their neoliberal ideology, this new group challenged the
ruling elite by seeking to expand their control within the National Democratic Party (NDP).
This group challenged the EAF’s monopolies in some sectors; they emphasized
privatization in sectors controlled by the state and the military, i.e., national banks and land
reclamation projects (Salem 2013, par. 10-11) 127. The threat of the new business elite was
later instrumental in the EAF’s decision-making process but also illustrated how the
establishment of the EAF as an economic actor provided it with enough economic leverage
to weed out its competitors when the opportunity presented itself.
The EAF succeeded in securing economic assets over the course of rapid
privatization and transformed itself into an economic actor. Once the state decided to target
military-owned businesses, the military reacted by defecting and later executing a
government take-over in order to expand its businesses. Hence, taking over the Egyptian
political and economic system, under Gen. Sisi’s leadership, the Egyptian military was in
a unique position to further expand its economic empire. Egypt’s economic liberalization
and privatization led to the emergence of what Harris (2013) characterized as capitalism
from above. The EAF’s economic expansion was also an integral part of this economic
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developmental model. The next section will focus on the impact of these economic policies
on the question of civilian control.
The Political Control of the EAF
This section tests the number one hypothesis regarding the impact of Egypt’s
uncompetitive economy on increased political leverage of the EAF. (H1) suggests that the
incomplete economic liberalization and inability to establish competitive mechanisms
provided opportunities for the EAF’s consolidation of its businesses, and ultimately led to
the EAF’s assumption of political power. Although the EAF, similar to the militaries of
Iran and China, has been involved in the political sphere, the degree of civilian control over
the military declined following the EAF’s further expansion into the economy. The
economic interest played an integral part in the EAF’s decision to defect from Mubarak’s
regime during the 2011 uprising, and later in its takeover of the government in 2013.
Similar to other autocratic regimes, Egypt’s civilian control is also void of
democratic institutional mechanisms of control. Since the 1952 Revolution, the Egyptian
military has been an indispensable part of the autocratic rulers’ power calculation and has
played an integral role in suppressing dissent. However, given the account of civilian
control as a continuum in the present study, the degree of civilian control of the EAF
changed in the aftermath of Mubarak’s liberalization policies. Although the line between
civilian and military control has historically been ambiguous, the EAF’s responsiveness to
the government changed in the aftermath of the privatization policies, specifically in the
late 2000s.
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It is imperative to note that in Egypt, similar to Iran and China, the military initially
obeyed the civilians’ orders. Although the EAF exerted influence, the scholars of Egyptian
civil-military relations discuss its limited role in Egyptian politics. Droz-Vincent explains
that the armies of Arab autocracies, despite their vital role, did not constitute the core of
the autocratic regimes. Even in states where militaries were integral in forming new states,
“there has been a creeping ‘civilianization’ or a ‘demilitarization’ of political systems”
(2011, 2-3). The imperative has been state control via “a few networks of family members,
high bureaucrats, political elites, economic cronies, and high officers linked to the president
or king.” In these autocratic regimes, including Egypt, the army supported the rulers,
especially during crisis. There was a degree of separation between military and political
affairs in Egypt. Even though some officers exerted political power, the military as an
institution maintained distance from everyday politics. The military portrayed itself as the
protector of the state and engaged in tasks of external defense. Examples of the army’s
involvement in crushing protests, such as the 1986 riots over salaries or the 1997 attacks
of armed Islamists, according to the author, were exceptional moments rather than the norm
(Droz-Vincent 2011, 3-4).
For example, Frisch (2013) also describes Egyptian politics as a system consisting
of an authoritarian leader, who in operation with a small group of family members,
businessmen, and experts “severely limited the military influence” (2013, 182). This status
continued under both Nasser and Sadat, and later Mubarak (during the 90s). Although the
EAF had significant influence over the defense ministry, Mubarak, for example, attempted
to weaken the EAF by enhancing the budget and power of the police and allocating the
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task of internal security to intelligence agencies, the Egyptian Intelligence Services.
Mubarak also kept top military officers away from the position of Prime Minister (Frisch
2013, 183). Other scholars (Noll 2017, Droz-Vincent 2011) also underscore the limited
political role of the EAF. Noll (2017) also points to the EAF’s low political profile until
the 2011 uprising (2017, 2), which later led to the removal of Mohammad Morsi in 2013.
Therefore, in assessing civil-military relations in Egypt, scholars underscore the
contained nature of the EAF’s role in the political governance of the state. Simultaneously,
the discussions highlight the EAF’s economic privileges. While the EAF was a politically
subservient military, its role as a political player changed in the final years of Mubarak’s
regime. Understanding the EAF’s defection from Mubarak’s regime without an
examination of its economic motives would be incomplete.
For example, Noll (2017) states how Arab regimes have utilized various strategies
to keep militaries loyal, such as permission for the Egyptian military to engage in tourismrelated activities in Sinai and coastal lands (Noll 2017, 3). Frisch (2013) also relates that
the Egyptian state enabled the EAF’s substantial economic expansion, especially in the
1990s. Frisch states that “the new more economic-oriented concept of national security was
manipulated to enhance the Army’s privileged role in the state and its economy” (Frisch
2013, 184). The increasing economic power became a major culprit for the civilians. The
privatization in the 90s offered opportunities for networks with linkages to the state to
expand their power; the state did not take measures to stop this process. On the contrary,
the state facilitated this process by offering provisions to those groups, including the EAF.
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It was when Mubarak’s regime decided to limit the EAF’s economic power that the
EAF reacted. Although it succeeded in reducing the role of military in governing positions
(reducing from 12 to 7 by 1989), attempts to curb the EAF’s economic power failed. For
example, in 1991, Mubarak assigned Yusuf Sabri Abu Taleb to the position of Defense
Minister. Taleb aimed to divest military businesses but was removed and replaced by
Mohamed Hussein Tantawi, who protected and retained the military’s economic empire128.
Furthermore, the EAF’s rise into power in Egypt is an economic story. Analysis of
civil-military relations in Egypt highlight the EAF’s economic interest as a crucial factor
in its decision-making. Albretch and Bishara (2011) discuss a change in the EAF’s
behavior since Mubarak’s new wave of economic liberalization policies in 2003. The
authors argue that although the EAF historically influenced Egypt’s politics and
economics, it did not have a direct governing role; the EAF remained in the background
and retained its privileges. After 2003, however, the EAF became distressed with the
increasing power of Gamal Mubarak, Husni Mubarak’s son and his possible heir, as well
as Gamal’s economic policies. Suspicious of Gamal Mubarak’s liberalization and
privatization, the military supported state interventionism (Albretch and Bishara 2011, 18).
Not only did rapid privatization and liberalization upset the public, the EAF capitalized on
the situation to impede the process of reform.
The EAF’s persistence in maintaining its economic interests post-2013 also
supports the economic story. Under Mubarak, the EAF had a low political profile.
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However, since the 2011 uprising and removal of Mohammad Morsi in 2013, EAF has
shown a consistent commitment in protecting its economic interests via political means.
Ever since, the Ministry of Military Production has been growing in importance, signaling
Sisi’s priorities, which have been evident in his emphasis on the military’s role in Egypt’s
national development as well (Noll 2017, 2). In September of 2016, Sisi spoke against the
critics who considered the military’s economic activities as an impediment to fulfilling its
defense role competently; he claimed that the military is assisting the government to
“rebuild” the state129.
For example, Aljazeera130 reports that on April 6th of 2012, grassroots groups
initiated a campaign to boycott military products. As an activist state, “[j]ust like we’re
trying to bring them down politically, now we’re also trying to do it economically and
redistribute the wealth to the people.” There was anxiety among generals regarding a
possible increase in oversight over the budget. The military tried but failed to ensure its
autonomy from budgetary oversight by trying to pass constitutional declarations131. Other
newspapers also offer similar insights. The Middle East Monitor132 published a report based
on a local newspaper’s analysis of the EAF’s motives. The report argues that the military
junta “worked with all of its strength to protect its lucrative economic interests that made
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the military establishment a business empire and one of the most important factors
influencing the country’s economy.”
Moreover, measures have been taken to further reduce civilian control over the
military budget. The 2014 Constitution assigns the National Defense Council, consisting
of mainly military individuals, to control of the defense budget, eroding a civilian
mechanism of control via parliament. In addition, important parliament committees and
positions, such as the head of Defense and National Security Committee, were assigned
from military intelligence services, eroding another mechanism of civilian control. There
has also been evidence of increasing militarization of governmental positions ever since
(Noll 2017, 6). It was in the context of threatened economic interests that the military began
establishing itself as a political player. If one cannot distinguish the story of Egyptian
revolution of 2011 from its broader economic context, it is safe to assume that the military
as an economic actor operated to protect its interests.
The discussion so far highlights one key theme in all analyses—the EAF’s
economic interest as a motivating factor. Hence, any explanation underscoring political
variables such as elite rivalries or the role of uprising must consider the EAF’s economic
interests in decision-making. In fact, understanding the Egyptian revolution of 2011
without studying the economic dimension would be incomplete. Scholars discuss the
relationship of neoliberal economic policies to the 2011 uprising. Salem133 explains how
Gamal Mubarak’s neoliberal agenda aggravated the anxieties of the public, leading to a

133

Salem, Sara. “The Egyptian Military and 2011 Egyptian Revolution,” Jadaliyya, September 6, 2013.
http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/14023/the-egyptian-military-and-the-2011-revolution

151

revolution that, if it succeeded in overthrowing the regime, would also negatively impact
the military’s privileges. These economic policies also altered the balance of power among
the ruling elite, incentivizing the EAF to intervene in 2011, resulting in a military-led
transitional government and ultimately a constitution that under Morsi protected the
military’s businesses (Salem 2013, par. 17).
Similarly, Hanieh (2011) also analyzes the political crisis of Arab Spring by
underscoring the significance of economic policies—neoliberalism. Beginning with
Sadat’s Infitah, the neoliberal policies empowered state-sponsored capitalist classes of
military officers and a commercial bourgeoisie involved in foreign trade. Mubarak
accelerated this process. With a specific aim to boost private sector, the liberalization of
agriculture and state sector retrenchment resulted in the transformation of social relations
in rural areas and the deterioration of working conditions for privatizing SOE workers (1113). Growing disparities, whereby the state-affiliated elite benefited from privatization and
the rest suffered gravely, led to waves of protests in Egypt in 1977 and later during
Mubarak’s reign in 2006-2008.
For example, Nagarajan argues that the IMF’s and WB’s evaluation of Egypt’s
success relied on measuring “short-term fiscal parameters.” The policies were not
conducive to long term growth but instead focused on supply-side economics, did not
promote export-led strategies, and boosted the growth of the construction sector. In
addition, SAP contributed to income disparity, growing inequality due to rising food prices,
and stagnating wages (Nagarajan 2013, 31-32). Ghonemy (2010) also discusses the
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consequences of short-term stabilization and long-term adjustment programs134 that aimed
at alleviating the fiscal/monetary system and resource distribution, respectively. Although
data suggests a dramatic growth in the private sector’s market share (from 9% in 1980s to
67%), its growth resulted primarily from a shrinking public sector; meanwhile, the exportpromotion lagged. Unaddressed institutional barriers and lack of efficient infrastructure
were among the factors impeding exports.
Challenging the neoliberal thesis, Hanieh (2011) argues that the IMF and the WB
misjudged the success and resilience of the Egyptian economy when they praised
Mubarak’s attempts to implement the liberalization and privatization policies (Hanieh
2011, 15). Furthermore, unable to mitigate the shocks of the 2008 global economic crisis,
Egypt suffered due to a decreased demand in exports to Europe, massive layoffs in Middle
Eastern countries, and a loss of revenue from remittances, as well as increasing costs of
food and energy (17-18). In this context, the protests that overthrew Mubarak were not
merely political demands but a result of decades of accumulated grievances in the
economic domain (Hanieh 2011, 22). In this scenario as well, the EAF became an arbiter
during an economic struggle between the disenfranchised population and a political elite;
it did so not out of concern for the population but to protect its own economic interests in
a crippled regime.
Arguments criticizing the impact of neoliberal reforms on the social makeup offer
two significant insights regarding the hypothesis of this section: first, decades of failed
policies created a major cleavage between the poor and the elite, which resulted in uprisings
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in 2011. Second, once the population began protesting in 2011, the EAF became pivotal in
supporting the regime vis-à-vis protestors. However, given the history of tensions between
the business elite and EAF over Egypt’s economic policy, and vulnerability of the regime
to ongoing protests, the EAF defected from Mubarak’s regime, protecting its own
institutional interests, primarily its economic interests, over the ruling elite. It did not defect
in order to side with the population but to maintain its narrow economic interests.
Despite a plurality of stakeholders—the political elite, public sector technocrats,
public sector managers, private sector, interest-based organizations, and various identityand interest-based actors—the political elite have historically benefited from the rentier
economy. Comprised of a network of families, these elite exploited the national economy
and internal finances and maintained their political power and also co-opted various actors
by offering economic privileges. Hence, throughout privatization, maintaining this prereform system of economic distribution helped preserve these alliances and networks and
was in the interest of the state. Similarly, having established itself as an accepted economic
player, the EAF reacted to a new wave of privatization policies targeting its businesses
from 2003. The explanations for its defection from Mubarak’s regime in 2011 would not
be complete without considering the role of its economic interests, along its struggle with
Gamal Mubarak’s camp over economic policies.
The Functional Control of the EAF
This study assesses the impact of economic liberalization on the functional power
of the EAF. Hypothesis number 2 suggests that if economic liberalization is incomplete,
there is a higher likelihood for the military to turn into an economic interest group, which
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would decrease the functional efficacy. Note that this study assesses changes in the
functional control prior to and after economic liberalization. However, assessing H2 with
regard to economic policies impact on the EAF’s functional power is challenging given the
role of the US military aid and training. Separating the impact of economic liberalization
on functional capabilities from the impact of military aid would be a problematic task.
Testing four dimensions of functional control—integration, responsiveness, skills,
and quality—this section will illustrate that despite the US military support, the EAF has
not registered a remarkable improvement in its functional capabilities. Given the lack of
evidence and reports on Egyptian military’s functional power, as well as on the role of
military aid, this section will argue that an absence of strong evidence suggesting a notable
change in functional capabilities of EAF throughout decades could help extrapolate two
relevant conclusions: (i) as the hypothesis would predict, the incomplete economic
liberalization and subsequent transformation of EAF into a commercialized military has
turned it into an interest group and consequently negatively impacted its functional
capabilities, and (ii) even if lagging functional capabilities are the results of non-economic
variables, one could conclude that economic liberalization did not have a positive impact
on functional capabilities or had no impact, to say the least.
First, Huntington’s (1964) argument of objective control and professional
military’s obedience to the civilians does not apply to the case of Egypt given EAF’s role
as governors of the state today. Hence, because the EAF has assumed political roles, the
presumed relationship between professionalization and subsequent objective control does
not exist. Given the EAF’s political role in governing the state, one could conclude that the
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EAF has not undergone professionalization to an extent that would turn it into an
exclusively professional military. Consequently, its functional capabilities have lagged
throughout the decades.
Since 1987 to 2012, the US provided $1.3 billion yearly in aid to Egypt’s military.
Egypt has been the number two receiver of US bilateral foreign assistance after Israel.
Despite US aid and military training, analysts highlight discrepancies between readiness,
training, and weaponry. After 1973, the EAF underwent professionalization in terms of
weapons’ acquisition and trainings. However, the outcome was deemed slow and
incompetent. As Kechichian and Nazimek (1994-95) explain, the professionalization of the
military institution followed the 1979 peace treaty (Kechichian and Nazimek, par. 1). This
transformation has not been easy. First, despite $1.3 billion in yearly US aid since 1979,
the transformation from Soviet to Western equipment was challenging, with 50% of the
equipment belonging to the Soviet era by the mid-1990s. A change in weaponry was
coupled with new training, especially via programs such as International Education and
Training (IMET) provided in the aid package. The officers trained in the US acquired new
skills; since the 1990s, new tactical concepts were introduced to the military. However, as
Kechichian and Nazemik assess, “a cadre of Egyptian military leaders remained primarily
Soviet-trained,” which resulted in their attempts to marginalize US-trained officers via
mechanisms such as loyalty tests or limitations on promotions (par. 6-7).
Reports of such inconsistencies between the quality of procured weapons and
personnel’s ability to utilize them, or implement their skills, are not limited to the 90s.
McGregor, in a report published in 2006, explains that although the EAF has been a
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recipient of US aid and training since the 1979 Camp David Accord, the military’s
personnel are mainly underpaid conscripts who do not pursue a career in the military.
Relying on inexpensive manpower, the military has become bloated; there have been riots
and defections as well. Importing modern technology does not translate into effective
utilization of such equipment due to low education levels of conscripts from the regions
(McGregor 2006, 283). According to CNN’s135 analysis of the WikiLeaks cables, there
have been reports of mid-level officers’ discontent with their leadership; an account in
2008 suggested that promotions were based on loyalty, and those officers who were
considered too skilled were perceived as threats to the government.
With regard to its strategy, Egypt since 1979 has adopted a defensive strategy.
Stratfor136 (2015) reports that even after the revolution of 2011, the military has been
primarily focusing on conventional capabilities despite its leaders’ awareness of threats of
asymmetric warfare (insurgency and terrorism). The wars with Israel, albeit highly
unlikely, are still part of the consideration (Khaled 2015, par. 9). A focus on conventional
capabilities is in line with Egypt’s military tradition of preparing for large-scale wars,
partially due to the military’s goal of exhibiting a positive image of itself (Khaled 2015,
par. 11-12). There is a consistency, at least until 2011, in Egypt’s defensive approach. For
example, in an interview in 1987, the then Minister of Defense and War Production
announced, “military balance in relation to surrounding countries and deterrence” (cited in
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Khaled 2015) as primary goals of Egypt’s military strategy, which was aimed at protecting
its territorial integrity and economic interests.
Assessing military effectiveness, Springborg (2013) offers three indicators:
military objectives, professionalization and civilian control, and finally ‘security sector
reform,’ referring to compatibility with the rule of law and human rights (100). For the
purpose of this study, the third indicator belongs to the section of social control and will be
discussed in the next section. With regard to setting a doctrine and professionalization,
Springborg (2013) explains in terms of the “roles Egypt assigns to its military, they remain
ambiguous, as there is no official national security policy, nor any documents or official
proceedings that specify them” (2013, 100). Based on statements from the military,
however, defense of the territory and external threats have been the main objectives of the
military—defense against the regional states of Israel, Libya, and Sudan, as well as Iranconnected Islamic extremism. Springborg (2013), similar to previous authors, also
underlines Egyptian military’s “less impressive” capabilities regarding the “sophistication
of its procedures, readiness, and its capacity to meet sudden or diverse threats.” The
problems lie in the military’s focus on quantity rather than quality, as well as training
(Springborg 2013, 101). Therefore, in terms of evaluating its political goals, its threat
environment, and adopting a relevant strategy, Egypt has been consistent. The evidence on
its capacity to meet those goals suggests a lack of efficacy.
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For example, Dahsham137 (2012) contends that the Egyptian military has been
“mysterious” about its businesses and military capabilities. Regardless, occasional reports
in the Egyptian media alluded to the military’s deteriorating capabilities. Media accounts
of sinking vehicles in the Suez Canal, failing tank engines during exercises, and hijacking
of army vehicles by an unknown SUV are numerous. There is a low-level readiness among
the army personnel in the Sinai. Another piece of evidence indicating low readiness was
the killing of 16 personnel due to a militants’ attack of a bordering post; militants also stole
a tank from the post. Dahsham (2012) also draws attention to the economic activities of the
military as its main priority as opposed to focusing on the task of defense. He criticizes the
army for its inability to protect its vehicles from years of “neglect and complacency,” which
has created “a situation, in short, in which the army upper echelon is more concerned about
what’s happening in the army-owned pasta factory than in basic training”138.
There are other reports on the repercussions of economic activity on military
professionalism. For example, CNBC reported on a cable by US ambassador, Margaret
Scobey, that warns about the military’s opposition to Mubarak’s privatization plans139.
There are reports of military officers assuming executive positions and spending their time
in military-owned properties to foster allegiances within the military140.
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Therefore, the evidence suggests that despite weapons’ procurement, due to the
incompatibility of training with new technology, marginalization of trained officers from
decisive positions, and bloated military personnel based on poor conscripts, the EAF’s
functional capabilities are not impressive. Specifically, the EAF lags in the dimensions of
skills and responsiveness. Moreover, the military’s focus on maintaining its businesses has
turned it into an interest group concerned with maintaining its economic interests, albeit
via political means, rather than focusing on the task of defense.
The inability of the EAF to improve its functional capabilities throughout the
decades offers the following conclusion with regard to H2. The present study examines the
change in functional capabilities prior to and after economic liberalization. However,
because the military’s functional capabilities, especially in terms of its skills, have not
undergone striking improvement, it is safe to assume that neither military aid nor economic
liberalization positively impacted the functional capabilities. In other words, if the direct
military aid did not substantially improve the military’s professionalization in terms of its
readiness, one can extrapolate that economic liberalization did not positively impact the
military’s functional capabilities either. On the contrary, given reports in the Egyptian
media, the EAF’s involvement with simultaneous tasks of defense and economic
production has had a negative impact on its functional capability.
The Social Control of the EAF
Hypothesis number 3 suggests that if economic liberalization is incomplete,
economically active militaries become economic interest groups and the outcome is
decreased social control. With regard to the case of Egypt, the social control of the EAF
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also changed as a consequence of the liberalization and privatization policies. While the
EAF’s anti Muslim Brotherhood attitude illustrates its support of the former ruling elite,
and hence social values of a portion of the population, its state takeover and grave human
rights violations demonstrate its commitment to its narrow organizational interests,
primarily economic interests.
First, the Egyptian government, concerned with the rise of Islamism among the
EAF’s conscripts, kept the EAF’s involvement with domestic insurgency and Islamic
extremism in 1990s to a minimum. in 1992, Chief of Staff Salah Halaby expressed
concerns about the rise of extremism and terrorism and urged that the issue be resolved
without the EAF’s intervention. To ensure the EAF’s separation from internal security
concerns, Egypt relied primarily on domestic intelligence agencies with limited help from
the EAF (Hashim 2011, 110-111). In line with civilian anti-Islamist attitude, the EAF has
adopted the secular social values, rather than Islamist values in its decisions. The most
striking example of the anti-Muslim Brotherhood, and anti Islamist values, was the EAF’s
role in ousting Muhammed Morsi in 2013. Claiming to protect the secular portion of the
Egyptian society from Islamism, after four days of anti-Morsi protests in July of 2013141,
the EAF led by Al-Sisi ousted Morsi from power. Dismissing the results of the election,
and hence the social attitudes of those supporting Muslim Brotherhood, the EAF portrayed
itself as protectors and champions of secularism and democracy. In doing so, it sided with
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Morsi’s opposition leader, Mohammed Al Bradei, the sheikh of Al-Azhar mosque, the
Coptic pope, and leaders of Islamic Nour Party142.
After the EAF’s takeover of the government, however, the evidence suggests the
EAF’s focus on its narrow institutional interests as opposed to its commitment to values of
the society. Not only does it not represent Islamist values, the EAF has been undermining
both human rights and democracy. The Pew research data143 suggests that by 2010, 59% of
Muslim Egyptians supported democracy, 22% preferred a non-democratic government
only under certain circumstances, and 18% did not have a preferred form of government.
Although the EAF toppled Morsi’s government in support of protestors in Tahrir square,
its actions ever since either have not reflected values of the society or at best reflected a
portion of the population. Ever since its dominance, the EAF has dismissed the general
attitude of the society pertaining to human rights and democracy. By 2014144, 72% of
Egyptians were unhappy with the country’s political direction. Pew also reports that by
2014, 54% of Egyptians supported Sisi over Morsi although the data might be skewed due
to misreporting. 54% value democracy and human rights indicating a decrease from 66%
in 2013.
There is ample evidence that the EAF violated human rights to maintain both its
economic and political power, reflecting the EAF’s refusal to incorporate values of human
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rights into its practices. According to Human Rights Watch145, under General Sisi’s
leadership, there have been numerous cases of torture and disappearance. Furthermore, in
North Sinai, the military has been involved in extrajudicial killings during its pursuit of
Islamic State. “Prosecutions, travel bans and asset freezing against human rights defenders,
in addition to repressive new legislation” are other cases that violate civil and political
rights; further violations include anti-union and anti-strike measures.
Conclusion
This chapter illustrated that a haphazard liberalization, rapid privatization, and
failure to adopt laws to mitigate shocks of economic reform offered the EAF opportunities
for capture of state resources. When the civilian elite decided to limit the EAF’s economic
power by new privatization policies, the EAF had amassed enough economic leverage to
challenge the civilians’ decision. Since the state had failed to establish a competitive
economy and an independent private sector, the EAF was able to maintain its businesses,
and leverage its economic power to gain economic power. Moreover, the EAF turned into
an interest group, the outcome of which has been declining functional and social controls.
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Conclusion: Policy Implications and Future Research

Three Cases: Findings
This dissertation illustrated that a state’s ability to direct the process of economic
liberalization and privatization determines its capacity to manage the influence of its
economic interest groups, including its economically-active militaries. Implementation of
a state’s reform agenda depends, to an extent, on its ability to remain independent of social
and economic pressure groups. If the state directs its economic liberalization and
privatization process, progressively liberalizes and reforms its regulations and
bureaucracy, it has a greater capacity to direct the power of economic interest-groups that
would either benefit or lose from the process of reform. Conversely, if state engages in
uneven and haphazard economic liberalization, zigzags between various policies without a
cohesive strategy, its prospects for mitigating both the shocks to the liberalization and the
pressures of socio-economic interest-groups declines substantially. This dissertation adds
to this research area by examining the impact of reform processes on those militaries that
operate as economic actors.
By comparing the three cases of China, Iran, and Egypt, the central hypothesis tests
the empirical evidence for the impact of rapid versus gradual liberalization on militaries’
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political, functional, and social powers. Out of the three cases, China was the only case
where there was a state-led liberalization strategy coupled with regulatory reform to meet
arising changes. China was also the only state that was successful in managing an
economically-active military’s aspirations, both via regulations and later via a divestiture
campaign. The World Bank data on economic performances of three cases shows China’s
unparalleled success compared to Iran and Egypt, both of which adopted unsystematic and
chaotic economic liberalization policies. Compared to Iran and Egypt, Chinese GDP
growth increased dramatically from the 1980s to 2010, indicating China’s success in
fostering economic growth.
Table 11: World Band, GDP Growth (Current US$) in China, Iran, and Egypt (19802010)
1980

1990

2000

2010

Iran

165.117 billion

205.514 billion

281.928 billion

China

349.351 billion

829.562 billion

2.237 trillion

Egypt

52.6 billion

89.583 billion

136.381 billion

467.79
billion
6.101
trillion
218.888
billion

In terms of the other economic indicators, China also performs outstandingly better.
For example, China’s merchandise exports in 2010 amounted $1.573 trillion, whereas Iran
exported $101.318 billion and Egypt $26.438 billion worth of goods in the same year.
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Table 12:World Bank, Trade (Merchandise Export) in China, Iran, and Egypt (19802010)
Iran
China
Egypt

1980
80.910.000

1990
-361.950.000

2000
193.575.000

2010
3.649 billion

No-Data
(430.000.000 in
1982)
548.285.710.069

3.487 billion

42.095 billion

243.703 billion

734.000.000

1.235 billion

6.386 billion

Table 13: World Bank, FDI Net Flows (BOP, Current US$) in China, Iran, and Egypt
(1980-2010)
Iran

1980
12.338 billion

1990
19.305 billion

2000
28.739 billion

China

18.099 billion

62.019 billion

249.203 billion

Egypt

3.046 billion

3.477 billion

5.278 billion

2010
101.318
billion
1.578
trillion
26.438
billion

In terms of capital inflows and private sector investments also, China is ahead of
Iran and Egypt. Net flows of foreign direct investment (FDI) in China increased from
$430,000,000 in 1982 to $243.703 billion in 2010. In comparison, Iran’s FDI was negative
in the 1990s and grew to $3.649 billion in 2010. Egypt, on the other hand, performed better.
Its FDI grew from roughly $548.290 million to $6.386 billion. While, growth of Egyptian
FDI could be attributed to both its political position and Mubarak’s renewed commitment
to implementation of WB and IMF policy recommendations, Iran performed better both on
its share of manufacturing and its private-sector development. The data provided by Iran’s
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Central Bank146 suggests that Iran was number two in the region, raking above Pakistan,
Egypt, Turkey, and Israel147 for its GDP share of manufacturing for 2004, and from 2005
to 2007.
Table 14: World Bank, Private Sector (Domestic Credit to Private Sector, % of GDP) in
China, Iran, and Egypt (1980-2010)
Iran

1980
29.691

1990
22.979

2000
26.25

2010
54.615

China

52.627

86.2

51.953*

126.3

Egypt

13.181

25.436

111.123

33.072

Data on domestic sector development also points to China’s superior performance
in the area of finance, with that state recording the highest percentage of GDP share of
domestic credit to the private sector. Economic indicators in the cases of China, Iran, and
Egypt suggest that China was the only case that has been able to register relative progress
in its economic performance. Iran and Egypt have both lagged. Therefore, in China, gradual
economic liberalization, alongside systemic legal–bureaucratic reforms, culminated in the
establishment of relatively competitive economy. Export of goods, capital inflows, and
private sector growth are indicators of such success.
Out of all three cases, China differed markedly with an economically-active
military that divested majority of its businesses by early 2000 and returned to barracks. The
road to containing the military’s economic empire was uneven, with the state passing
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regulations and insisting that the PLA’s businesses operate based on market laws. In
addition, decades of steady economic reform had conditioned the gradual establishment of
market mechanisms and a private sector in which profitability was the measure of success.
Under conditions of competitiveness, PLA firms could not compete effectively. They
engaged in illegal smuggling instead. PLA’s agreement to divest was a result of its inability
to both sustain its businesses and simultaneously engage in the task of defense effectively.
The same was not true for Iran and Egypt. In both cases, haphazard economic
liberalization provided opportunities for militaries to capture state resources. The state’s
inability to implement effective regulations, along with the rapid sale of SOEs, facilitated
the emergence of crony networks. In this context, economically active militaries leveraged
their positions to further their economic interests. Once the states decided to limit the
militaries’ economic power, the military had already amassed substantial economic clout
relative to other economic actors, including the private sector. In the absence of laws
encouraging market-based competition or discouraging selective protectionism, alongside
the absence of an independent private sector, militaries had no incentives to pull out of the
economy.
While in both Egypt and Iran, economically active militaries remained both
economically and politically active, the degree of civilian control varies. This divergence
is explicable by underscoring the role of bonyads and crony networks in Iran’s semi-public
domain. Formation of bonyads in the aftermath of the 1979 revolution created a semipublic domain characterized by a plurality of competing economic actors. Competition
among these bonyads in the semi-public domain to capture Iran’s state resources in limited
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the IRGC’s attempts to take over the state. On the contrary, the EAF’s main rival was
Mubarak’s son, Gamal Mubarak; Gamal’s attempts to monopolize economic power
antagonized the EAF, pushing it to capture of the state once an opportunity presented itself.
Assessing Alternative Explanations
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and acceleration of globalization, scholars
have been arguing about the pressure globalization asserts on states to liberalize their
economies and politics. For example, race-to-the-bottom arguments, and transnational
norm diffusion discussion by Bunce and Wolchik (2010) suggest that given market
pressures and the diffusion of norms, liberalization of economics and politics is inevitable.
Civil–military relations are not exempt from this process. More specifically, arguments on
the spread of democracy would suggest that a push for democratization should also
democratize civil–military relations.
Hence, an alternative hypothesis would link changes in civil–military relations to
the degree of political liberalization states experience. It anticipates that in states with
greater degree of liberalization and economic integration, militaries are politically less
autonomous, culturally more democratic, and functionally more capable. The empirical
evidence from China, Iran, and Egypt disconfirms this hypothesis. Unlike China, Iran and
Egypt had episodes of political liberalization. In fact, Presidency of Mohammad Khatami
was distinguished for political and social liberalization, rather than economic reforms.
However, among the three cases under study, China was the one that succeeded in
increasing civilian control over the military.
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Therefore, the evidence of increasing political power of the military in Iran and
Egypt, especially given both regimes’ attempts at political liberalization suggests that the
spread of democratic norms or pressure to liberalize might not lead to democratization of
civil-military relations. In fact, in autocratic regimes, political liberalization takes the form
of broadening the space for political participation of formerly excluded opponents, and the
reform of civil and political liberties, rather than a comprehensive institutional reform of
civil–military relations. The regime might implement security sector reforms that would
introduce institutional mechanisms of monitoring (such as creating internal security bodies
to monitor the military’s loyalty). The democratization of civil–military relations, however,
is contingent upon regime change, not liberalization.
Another alternative hypothesis relevant to the cases of China, Iran, and Egypt is a
professionalization argument. Based on Huntington’s (1964) view of objective civilian
control, professionalization of the military would be the determining variable explaining a
change in civil–military relations. In fact, as discussed in the chapter on China, scholars
underscore the professionalization of the PLA as an explanatory variable for changes in
civil–military relations in China—an increasing degree of civilian control, or a change from
a personalistic to an institutional form of control. On the contrary, lack of
professionalization in Iran would explain the IRGC’s political behavior—its interference
in politics. The same would apply to the EAF case in Egypt.
In China, military and civilian leaders were alarmed by illegal smuggling and
corruption in PLA businesses. The accounts regarding divestiture suggested both military’s
top brass officers and civilians’ willingness to resolve corruption in PLA. The PLA’s
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officers’ emphasis on PLA’s need to focus on defense was interpreted as its professional
attitude towards PLA’s responsibilities. However, timing of the divestiture, civilians’ fear
of backlash by PLA, and civilians’ compensation package in return for PLA’s acceptance
of divestiture illustrated that the situation was more complex. PLA had been undergoing
modernization and professionalization, but its divestiture was not simply motivated by its
values of professionalism. First, divestiture came after years of rectification campaigns
aiming to regulate and restructure PLA businesses, not divest them. Secondly, there are
contradicting accounts suggesting both PLA officers’ inclination to divest versus their
resistance to divest. These inconsistent reports indicate existence of tensions within the
PLA with regard to divestiture. Ultimately, the civilian leaders had to negotiate a deal with
the PLA and offer a compensation package for its economic losses in addition to increasing
the defense budget. Therefore, although professionalization is an important factor, it was
not the most determinant cause explaining PLA’s divestiture.
In China, military and civilian leadership were alarmed by illegal smuggling and
corruption in PLA businesses. The accounts regarding divestiture suggest both the top brass
and civilians’ willingness to resolve corruption in the PLA. The PLA’s officers’ emphasis
on primary task of defense was taken as a sign of their professional attitude towards the
PLA’s responsibilities. However, the timing of the divestiture, civilians’ fear of backlash
from the PLA, and civilians’ compensation of the PLA in return for its acceptance of
divestiture indicated that the situation was more complex. The PLA had been undergoing
modernization and professionalization, but its divestiture was not simply motivated by its
concern for professionalism. First, divestiture came after years of rectification campaigns
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aiming to regulate and restructure PLA businesses, not divest them. Secondly, different
accounts can be used as evidence, some pointing to a willingness to divest and others
showing resistance to divestiture.” These inconsistent reports indicate the existence of
tensions within the PLA regarding the divestiture. Ultimately, civilian leaders had to
negotiate a deal with the PLA and offer a compensation package for its economic losses in
addition to increasing the defense budget. Therefore, although professionalization is an
important factor, it was not the most determinant cause explaining PLA’s divestiture.
Policy Implications
This dissertation offers significant conclusions for policy-makers of international
or regional organization, as well as United States’ foreign policy circles. It situates the
study of economically active militaries in broader debates on states’ responses to the
pressures of globalization. It draws attention to the impact of liberalization and
privatization on an often-overlooked economic actor—economically active militaries.
The literature of political economy has already assessed the consequences of
economic liberalization policies on domestic economies. The convergence or divergence
of economic systems as a consequence of globalization constitutes a central debate in
economic liberalization literature. Liberal race-to-the-bottom arguments, as well as
Marxist explanations, argue for the convergence of economies into deregulated liberal
economic systems. Subsequently, failures of development are associated with either a
state’s ineptitude in implementing neoliberal policies, or its inability to tackle the
devastating effects of globalization. The opposing camp, as in Varieties of Capitalism (Hall
and Soskice 2001), and the literature about divergent outcomes of economic liberalization
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or globalization (Kohli 2009, Schneider 2010) emphasize the impact of domestic
institutional peculiarities and political forces in mitigating the forces of globalization.
In line with neoclassical race-to-the-bottom arguments, in the 1990s international
financial institutions offered structural adjustment policies known as the Washington
Consensus (WC). These policies aimed at promoting macroeconomic stability, exchangerate and price liberalization. They also promoted a market-based allocation of finances and
labor, private-sector driven growth, trade liberalization and increased exports. They
expected these to lead to state retrenchment and price reforms, which would encourage
capital inflows, private sector development, and would improve productivity and
competitiveness at the international level. The outcomes, however, occasionally did not
match the expectations.
For example, in criticizing WC policies, Cammett et al. cited scholars such as
Polanyi (2001), Rodrik (2004), Stiglitz (2003, 2004), and Easterly (2011) who underscored
the vital role of states in directing reform, as well as the need to adapt the reform strategies
(modes of reform) to local conditions. For example, according to both Stiglitz (2003, 2004)
and Easterly (2011), the WC’s failure to offer “local adjustments” impeded expected
growth—“a governance failure to develop checks and balances needed to make markets
work, and economic failures particularly associated with the growth-reducing effects of
private monopolies and destabilizing effects of capital mobility” (Cammett et. al 2015,
279). Unlike successful state-led reforms in East Asia or China, the authors refer to the
WC-led “uncompetitive form of privatization” in the Middle East and North Africa, labeled
as “nomenklatura privatization” that led the reallocation of public wealth to insider elites
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(Cammett et. al 2015, 280).

As discussed in this dissertation, economically active

militaries’ capture of state resources and their gradual increase in economic and political
leverage was also an outcome of such rapid liberalization policies.
Following crisis and failures, the “Post-Washington Consensus” emerged in the
aftermath of the 2008 economic crisis. It addressed the necessity of institutional reforms
and a focus on political reform and governance, over mere economic liberalization; instead
of perceiving the “state as the problem”, the post-WC advocated the need for strong states
with regulatory capacity and the ability to provide public goods (Commett et al. 2015, 281).
Extending this view to the reform of civil–military relations, this dissertation’s findings
advise a more careful examination of the implications of liberalization not only on states’
development, but also on the balance of civil–military relations in countries with
economically active militaries. Encouraging the states to reform their institutions should
also incorporate recommendations for regulating military businesses.
By examining changing power (political, functional, or social) of economically
active militaries, this dissertation’s findings offer two areas of considerations for policymakers: (i) economic reform packages should incorporate the possible impact of policy
recommendations on militaries with a history of engagement in the economic domain. (ii)
The international organization or Western policy-makers should consider the security
implications of militaries’ economic power. Policy-makers who offer recommendations for
security sector reform and economic reform in developing states should collaborate.
For example, donor states and organization after the Cold War required states to
reduce military spending to receive money. The IMF and the WB spearheaded this change
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for two reasons: their mandate prevented them from interfering in domestic politics. By
reframing military spending as a fiscal issue, they could influence beneficiaries’ decisions.
The IMF and the WB also adhered to the neoclassical economic model that prioritized
capital investments in productive sectors to boost growth and considered military spending
as “pure waste.” Since the late 1990s, the specific issue of military spending has become a
part of a broader framework of security sector governance (Brozska 2003, 6-9). This
dissertation’s findings suggest that the interrelation of military spending and civilian
control is not straightforward. The case of China illustrated how the state’s ability to
increase its defense spending and compensate the PLA served as a catalyst for both the
PLA’s return to barracks and increased civilian control. Therefore, policy-makers should
pay closer attention to the domestic dynamics of state–military relations to be able to offer
nuanced, or at times even counterintuitive, policy recommendations that would assist the
states in their both economic and security sector reforms.
Future Research
This research puts forth a framework to assess the nexus of economic policies and
civil–military relations in those autocratic regimes where militaries have had a history of
economic activity. The evidence tells a causal story that links the impact of the specifics of
liberalization and privatization policies to militaries’ economic expansion and contraction.
The future research could take six directions likely to improve our understanding of the
interrelation of economic policy and civil–military relations:
First, research should focus on collecting more detailed evidence on the specifics
of micro-economic policies and their impact on militaries’ economic behavior in a smaller
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time-frame. This dissertation examines specific policies to illustrate the overall economic
success and failure of states to establish market economy, and its subsequent impact on
militaries’ power. A more careful and comprehensive elaboration of micro-economic
policies was outside of this dissertation’s scope. In order to postulate a more complete
causal picture, future research should divide the study into both shorter time periods and
look at more specific policy choices.
For example, there is a consensus among scholars that the pace of privatization in
Iran and Egypt was relatively fast compare to that of China. The rapid privatization also
led to asset-stripping of state resources. This dissertation draws on the above-mentioned
arguments on the pace of privatization to explain militaries’ opportunistic behavior as
economic actors, specifically in Iran and Egypt. However, it would be valuable to conduct
a microstudy of types of privatization arrangements, such as asset divestiture, outsourcing,
or infrastructure partnership148, along the span of shorter time-frames, such as during a
specific administration; it would help to identify micro-causal relationships between a
detailed policy and a military’s behavior in a short span of time.
A second area requiring further research is variation militaries’ business activities in
different sectors. For example, military business productivity in the oil and gas sector as
opposed to manufacturing. Was there a variation across time in a certain sector? Or were
there variations across various military-owned companies in the same sector? The goal
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would be to gather new evidence that would assist with testing the hypotheses set forth by
this dissertation.
In this same area, investigators need to improve the quality of data on the economic
activities these militaries operating in a non-transparent autocratic regime is sparse or likely
to be inaccurate. Available data is anecdotal or speculative. Accurate evidence on
profitability or losses of military businesses is lacking. While there are general reports
about their overall performance, the data is scant. Access to data, especially on militaries’
budget and business profits are the biggest challenge of such study. Therefore, the second
direction should include collecting more specific data on militaries’ business activities. As
countries liberalize and begin opening their markets for investments, such data should
become more available. Conducting interviews with officials, dissenting politicians or
former military elites, would be another avenue to pursue.
The third avenue for future research would be analysis of the fate of military businesses
under current leaderships. For example, what happened to those PLA companies that had
engaged in international trade? Or what has been happening to IRGC companies following
the lifting of sanctions against Iran sanctions and Iran’s gradual opening to global markets?
Assessing the negotiation process between the IRGC and the civilian elite in both the
economic and the political spheres would be a logical continuation of examining the ability
of this dissertation’s hypotheses to predict future behaviors.
The fourth potential for research lies in assessing the relationship between
militaries’ economic activities and both the provision of social services and regime
durability. In other words, do militaries engage in contracting, job-creation, or provision of
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services, especially in underdeveloped or rural regions? If yes, understanding the
possibilities of those activities for establishing loyalty and subsequent regime stability,
would be an important issue to study. Do militaries foster social constellations that they
are able to leverage during a crisis?
While China was relatively successful in demanding that the PLA divest, Iran and
Egypt have not been able to push their militaries back to barracks. A fifth direction for
research should examine whether there is a variation in the future course of economic
liberalization in Iran and Egypt. If yes, how do the militaries of each country influence the
process? In other words, given the enormous economic leverage the IRGC and the EAF
have amassed, understanding the possible conflict of interests for the militaries, or their
possible role in encouraging or discouraging economic as well as political reforms is
crucial.
Ultimately, this research offered a comparative case study to offer contingent
generalizations about the political behavior of militaries, as well as their functional power
and social attitudes following economic reforms. The hypotheses should be tested against
evidence from other cases with economically active militaries to examine their validity.
For example, Turkey has had a similar trajectory regarding its economically active military
and economic liberalization. However, the attempted coup d’état in the summer of 2016
has ended up with consolidation of power amounting almost to monopolization by
President Erdogan. How would findings from this dissertation help us further our
understanding of the interrelation of economic policies and civil–military relation.
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